pax_global_header 0000666 0000000 0000000 00000000064 15055626765 0014533 g ustar 00root root 0000000 0000000 52 comment=c565d13ba9ce94c4acf81dced28ec2440db31170
syd-pandora-0.15.0/ 0000775 0000000 0000000 00000000000 15055626765 0014037 5 ustar 00root root 0000000 0000000 syd-pandora-0.15.0/.builds/ 0000775 0000000 0000000 00000000000 15055626765 0015377 5 ustar 00root root 0000000 0000000 syd-pandora-0.15.0/.builds/alpine-x86-64.yml 0000664 0000000 0000000 00000003567 15055626765 0020257 0 ustar 00root root 0000000 0000000 triggers:
- action: email
condition: always
to: syd-devel <~alip/syd-devel@lists.sr.ht>
image: alpine/latest
arch: x86_64
artifacts:
- syd-git-x86_64-alpine.tar.xz
- syd/syd-bench-git-alpine.md
- syd/target/release/syd
packages:
- autoconf
- automake
- cargo
- cargo-auditable
- cmake
- coreutils
- gawk
- gettext
- gettext-dev
- gperf
- hyperfine
- iproute2
- iptables
- jq
- libcap-dev
- libtool
- linux-headers
- luajit
- openssl
- openssl-dev
- perf
- podman
- procps
- python3-dev
- sed
- socat
- strace
- valgrind
- xz
- zlib-dev
sources:
- https://git.sr.ht/~alip/syd
tasks:
- init: |
uname -a
- scmp: |
cd syd
sudo dev/install_libseccomp.sh -i /usr -v main
- pwn: |
umask 077
python -mvenv venv
source ~/venv/bin/activate
pip install lief
pip install pwntools
- make: |
umask 077
cd syd
sudo bash -lc 'env RUSTFLAGS="-g -Ctarget-cpu=native -Ctarget-feature=+crt-static" make CARGOFEATS=uring release'
- test: |
umask 077
cd syd
LANDLOCK_CRATE_TEST_ABI=$(./target/release/syd-lock -A || true)
sudo chmod 700 target/release
sudo bash -lc "export LANDLOCK_CRATE_TEST_ABI=${LANDLOCK_CRATE_TEST_ABI}; source /home/build/venv/bin/activate; make CARGOFEATS=uring distcheck"
cd ..
sudo chown -R "${USER}:" syd
- libc: |
umask 077
cd syd
make lib
- pandora: |
cd syd/pandora
make
- runsc: |
cd syd
dev/install_gvisor.sh
- bench: |
cd syd
env SYD_BENCH_OUT=syd-bench-git-alpine SYD_BENCH_SHOW_OUTPUT=1 PATH=$PWD/target/release:$PATH dev/syd-bench.bash git
- tar: |
tag=$(cd syd; git describe)
mkdir syd-$tag
for bin in $(find syd/target/release -mindepth 1 -maxdepth 1 -type f -executable -name 'syd*'); do chmod 755 $bin; sudo mv $bin syd-$tag; done
mv syd/pandora/target/release/pandora syd-$tag
tar --owner=0 --group=0 -cJvpf syd-git-x86_64-alpine.tar.xz ./syd-$tag
syd-pandora-0.15.0/.builds/compat.yml 0000664 0000000 0000000 00000002604 15055626765 0017407 0 ustar 00root root 0000000 0000000 triggers:
- action: email
condition: always
to: syd-devel <~alip/syd-devel@lists.sr.ht>
image: fedora/latest
arch: x86_64
artifacts:
- syd/target/release/syd
packages:
- attr
- autoconf
- automake
- awk
- diffutils
- glibc-static
- gperf
- jq
- libcap-devel
- libgcc
- libstdc++-devel
- libtool
- openssl
- openssl-devel
- perl
- perl-IO-Socket-SSL
- python
- socat
- strace
- tar
- valgrind
- wget
- xz
sources:
- https://git.sr.ht/~alip/syd
tasks:
- hack: |
sudo dnf update -y libgcc libstdc++-devel gcc-c++ glibc-devel binutils
sudo dnf install -y libgcc.i686 libstdc++-devel.i686 gcc-c++.i686 glibc-devel.i686 binutils.i686
- init: |
uname -a
- scmp: |
cd syd
sudo dev/install_libseccomp.sh -i /usr -v main
- rust: |
umask 077
curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf https://sh.rustup.rs > rustup.sh
chmod +x rustup.sh
./rustup.sh --profile minimal -y
source ~/.cargo/env
rustup target add i686-unknown-linux-gnu
rustc --version
rustc --print cfg
- make: |
umask 077
source ~/.cargo/env
cd syd
sed -i -e '/^lto/s/=.*$/= "off"/' Cargo.toml
make release
- test64: |
umask 077
env SYD_TEST_DMESG=1 PATH="$HOME/syd/target/release:$PATH" ./syd/dev/gnulib-test.sh 50
- test32: |
umask 077
env SYD_TEST_DMESG=1 PATH="$HOME/syd/target/release:$PATH" CC="cc -m32" CXX="c++ -m32" LD="ld -m32" ./syd/dev/gnulib-test.sh 50
syd-pandora-0.15.0/.builds/debian-x86-64.yml 0000664 0000000 0000000 00000020605 15055626765 0020221 0 ustar 00root root 0000000 0000000 triggers:
- action: email
condition: always
to: syd-devel <~alip/syd-devel@lists.sr.ht>
image: debian/stable
arch: amd64
artifacts:
- syd-git-x86_64-debian.tar.xz
- syd/syd-bench-git-debian.md
- syd/target/release/syd
- syd/target/release/syd32
packages:
- attr
- autoconf
- automake
- binutils-i686-linux-gnu
- build-essential
- cpanminus
- file
- g++-multilib
- gawk
- gcc-multilib
- gettext
- golang
- gperf
- hyperfine
- iptables
- jq
- libcap-dev
- libio-socket-ssl-perl
- libssl-dev
- libtool
- linux-perf
- openssl
- pkg-config
- luajit
- python-is-python3
- python3-venv
- ruby
- ruby-ffi
- socat
- strace
- valgrind
- wget
- zlib1g-dev
sources:
- https://git.sr.ht/~alip/syd
tasks:
- hack: |
sudo apt install gcc-multilib -y
sudo apt install g++-multilib -y
sudo apt install gcc-i686-linux-gnu -y
sudo apt install g++-multilib-i686-linux-gnu -y
- init: |
uname -a
- scmp: |
cd syd
sudo dev/install_libseccomp.sh -i /usr -v main
- scmp32: |
cd syd
sudo env LDFLAGS="-L/usr/i686-linux-gnu/lib" CFLAGS="-m32" LD=i686-linux-gnu-ld CC=i686-linux-gnu-gcc dev/install_libseccomp.sh -v main -i /usr/i686-linux-gnu
- perl: |
sudo cpanm --force -n FFI::Platypus JSON
- pwn: |
umask 077
python3 -mvenv venv
source ~/venv/bin/activate
pip install lief
pip install pwntools
- rust: |
umask 077
curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf https://sh.rustup.rs > rustup.sh
chmod +x rustup.sh
./rustup.sh --profile minimal -y
source ~/.cargo/env
rustup target add i686-unknown-linux-gnu
rustc --version
rustc --print cfg
cargo install --locked cargo-auditable
cargo install --locked cargo-deny
- deny: |
source ~/.cargo/env
cd syd
make deny
- make: |
umask 077
source ~/.cargo/env
cd syd
sed -i -e '/^lto/s/=.*$/= "off"/' Cargo.toml
make CARGOFEATS=log,oci,uring release
- make32: |
umask 077
source ~/.cargo/env
cd syd
env LDFLAGS="-L/usr/i686-linux-gnu/lib" CFLAGS="-m32" LD=i686-linux-gnu-ld CC=i686-linux-gnu-gcc LIBSECCOMP_LINK_TYPE=static LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/usr/i686-linux-gnu/lib LIBSECCOMP_LIB_PATH=/usr/i686-linux-gnu/lib RUSTFLAGS="-Ctarget-feature=+crt-static" cargo build --target=i686-unknown-linux-gnu --release -j$(nproc) -vv --features log,uring
mv target/i686-unknown-linux-gnu/release/syd target/release/syd32
mv target/i686-unknown-linux-gnu/release/syd-aes target/release/syd-aes32
mv target/i686-unknown-linux-gnu/release/syd-asm target/release/syd-asm32
mv target/i686-unknown-linux-gnu/release/syd-aux target/release/syd-aux32
mv target/i686-unknown-linux-gnu/release/syd-bit target/release/syd-bit32
mv target/i686-unknown-linux-gnu/release/syd-cap target/release/syd-cap32
mv target/i686-unknown-linux-gnu/release/syd-cat target/release/syd-cat32
mv target/i686-unknown-linux-gnu/release/syd-cpu target/release/syd-cpu32
mv target/i686-unknown-linux-gnu/release/syd-dns target/release/syd-dns32
mv target/i686-unknown-linux-gnu/release/syd-elf target/release/syd-elf32
mv target/i686-unknown-linux-gnu/release/syd-emacs target/release/syd-emacs32
mv target/i686-unknown-linux-gnu/release/syd-env target/release/syd-env32
mv target/i686-unknown-linux-gnu/release/syd-err target/release/syd-err32
mv target/i686-unknown-linux-gnu/release/syd-exec target/release/syd-exec32
mv target/i686-unknown-linux-gnu/release/syd-fd target/release/syd-fd32
mv target/i686-unknown-linux-gnu/release/syd-fork target/release/syd-fork32
mv target/i686-unknown-linux-gnu/release/syd-hex target/release/syd-hex32
mv target/i686-unknown-linux-gnu/release/syd-info target/release/syd-info32
mv target/i686-unknown-linux-gnu/release/syd-key target/release/syd-key32
mv target/i686-unknown-linux-gnu/release/syd-ldd target/release/syd-ldd32
mv target/i686-unknown-linux-gnu/release/syd-load target/release/syd-load32
mv target/i686-unknown-linux-gnu/release/syd-lock target/release/syd-lock32
mv target/i686-unknown-linux-gnu/release/syd-ls target/release/syd-ls32
mv target/i686-unknown-linux-gnu/release/syd-mdwe target/release/syd-mdwe32
mv target/i686-unknown-linux-gnu/release/syd-mem target/release/syd-mem32
mv target/i686-unknown-linux-gnu/release/syd-net target/release/syd-net32
mv target/i686-unknown-linux-gnu/release/syd-open target/release/syd-open32
mv target/i686-unknown-linux-gnu/release/syd-path target/release/syd-path32
mv target/i686-unknown-linux-gnu/release/syd-poc target/release/syd-poc32
mv target/i686-unknown-linux-gnu/release/syd-pds target/release/syd-pds32
mv target/i686-unknown-linux-gnu/release/syd-pty target/release/syd-pty32
mv target/i686-unknown-linux-gnu/release/syd-read target/release/syd-read32
mv target/i686-unknown-linux-gnu/release/syd-rnd target/release/syd-rnd32
mv target/i686-unknown-linux-gnu/release/syd-run target/release/syd-run32
mv target/i686-unknown-linux-gnu/release/syd-sh target/release/syd-sh32
mv target/i686-unknown-linux-gnu/release/syd-sha target/release/syd-sha32
mv target/i686-unknown-linux-gnu/release/syd-size target/release/syd-size32
mv target/i686-unknown-linux-gnu/release/syd-stat target/release/syd-stat32
mv target/i686-unknown-linux-gnu/release/syd-sys target/release/syd-sys32
mv target/i686-unknown-linux-gnu/release/syd-test target/release/syd-test32
mv target/i686-unknown-linux-gnu/release/syd-test-do target/release/syd-test-do32
mv target/i686-unknown-linux-gnu/release/syd-tck target/release/syd-tck32
mv target/i686-unknown-linux-gnu/release/syd-tor target/release/syd-tor32
mv target/i686-unknown-linux-gnu/release/syd-tty target/release/syd-tty32
mv target/i686-unknown-linux-gnu/release/syd-x target/release/syd-x32
- test: |
umask 077
source ~/.cargo/env
source ~/venv/bin/activate
cd syd
chmod 700 target/release
env LANDLOCK_CRATE_TEST_ABI=$(./target/release/syd-lock -A) make CARGOFEATS=log,oci,uring distcheck
- test32:
umask 077
source ~/.cargo/env
source ~/venv/bin/activate
cd syd
chmod 700 target/release
env LANDLOCK_CRATE_TEST_ABI=$(./target/release/syd-lock -A) LDFLAGS="-L/usr/i686-linux-gnu/lib" CFLAGS="-m32" LD=i686-linux-gnu-ld CC=i686-linux-gnu-gcc LIBSECCOMP_LINK_TYPE=static LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/usr/i686-linux-gnu/lib LIBSECCOMP_LIB_PATH=/usr/i686-linux-gnu/lib RUSTFLAGS="-Ctarget-feature=+crt-static" ./dev/cargo-test.sh --target=i686-unknown-linux-gnu --release -j$(nproc) -vv --features uring
- test64_32: |
umask 077
source ~/.cargo/env
source ~/venv/bin/activate
cd syd
chmod 700 target/release
env LANDLOCK_CRATE_TEST_ABI=$(./target/release/syd-lock -A) CARGO_BIN_EXE_syd=$PWD/target/release/syd CARGO_BIN_EXE_syd-aux=$PWD/target/release/syd-aux32 CARGO_BIN_EXE_syd-bit=$PWD/target/release/syd-bit32 CARGO_BIN_EXE_syd-cap=$PWD/target/release/syd-cap32 CARGO_BIN_EXE_syd-dns=$PWD/target/release/syd-dns32 CARGO_BIN_EXE_syd-aes=$PWD/target/release/syd-aes32 CARGO_BIN_EXE_syd-key=$PWD/target/release/syd-key32 CARGO_BIN_EXE_syd-exec=$PWD/target/release/syd-exec32 CARGO_BIN_EXE_syd-elf=$PWD/target/release/syd-elf32 CARGO_BIN_EXE_syd-env=$PWD/target/release/syd-env32 CARGO_BIN_EXE_syd-test-do=$PWD/target/release/syd-test-do32 CARGO_BIN_EXE_syd-cpu=$PWD/target/release/syd-cpu32 CARGO_BIN_EXE_syd-hex=$PWD/target/release/syd-hex32 CARGO_BIN_EXE_syd-info=$PWD/target/release/syd-info32 CARGO_BIN_EXE_syd-lock=$PWD/target/release/syd-lock32 CARGO_BIN_EXE_syd-mdwe=$PWD/target/release/syd-mdwe32 CARGO_BIN_EXE_syd-pds=$PWD/target/release/syd-pds32 CARGO_BIN_EXE_syd-size=$PWD/target/release/syd-size32 CARGO_BIN_EXE_syd-tor=$PWD/target/release/syd-tor32 ./target/release/syd-test32
- libc: |
umask 077
source ~/.cargo/env
cd syd
make lib
env PATH="${PWD}/target/release:${PATH}" CGO_LDFLAGS="-L${PWD}/target/release/deps" make checklib
- pandora: |
source ~/.cargo/env
cd syd/pandora
make
- runsc: |
cd syd
dev/install_gvisor.sh
- bench: |
source ~/.cargo/env
cd syd
env SYD_BENCH_OUT=syd-bench-git-debian SYD_BENCH_SHOW_OUTPUT=1 PATH=$PWD/target/release:$PATH dev/syd-bench.bash git
- tar: |
tag=$(cd syd; git describe)
mkdir syd-$tag
for bin in $(find syd/target/release -mindepth 1 -maxdepth 1 -type f -executable -name 'syd*'); do chmod 755 $bin; mv $bin syd-$tag; done
mv syd/pandora/target/release/pandora syd-$tag
tar --owner=0 --group=0 -cJvpf syd-git-x86_64-debian.tar.xz ./syd-$tag
syd-pandora-0.15.0/.builds/fedora-x86-64.yml 0000664 0000000 0000000 00000004030 15055626765 0020231 0 ustar 00root root 0000000 0000000 triggers:
- action: email
condition: always
to: syd-devel <~alip/syd-devel@lists.sr.ht>
image: fedora/latest
arch: x86_64
artifacts:
- syd-git-x86_64-fedora.tar.xz
- syd/syd-bench-git-fedora.md
- syd/target/release/syd
packages:
- attr
- autoconf
- automake
- awk
- cargo
- clang
- cpanminus
- diffutils
- glibc-devel.i686
- glibc-static
- golang
- gperf
- hyperfine
- jq
- libcap-devel
- libtool
- openssl
- openssl-devel
- perf
- perl
- perl-IO-Socket-SSL
- podman
- luajit
- python
- ruby
- rubygem-ffi
- rubygem-minitest
- rust
- socat
- strace
- tar
- valgrind
- wget
- xz
sources:
- https://git.sr.ht/~alip/syd
tasks:
- init: |
uname -a
- scmp: |
cd syd
sudo dev/install_libseccomp.sh -i /usr -v main
- perl: |
sudo cpanm --force -n FFI::Platypus JSON
- pwn: |
umask 077
python -mvenv venv
source ~/venv/bin/activate
pip install lief
pip install pwntools
- make: |
umask 077
cd syd
sed -i -e '/^lto/s/=.*$/= "off"/' Cargo.toml
env PKG_CONFIG_PATH="/usr/local/lib/pkgconfig:$PKG_CONFIG_PATH" make CARGOFEATS=log,oci,uring release
- test: |
umask 077
source ~/venv/bin/activate
cd syd
chmod 700 target/release
env LANDLOCK_CRATE_TEST_ABI=$(./target/release/syd-lock -A) PKG_CONFIG_PATH="/usr/local/lib/pkgconfig:$PKG_CONFIG_PATH" make CARGOFEATS=log,oci,uring distcheck
- libc: |
umask 077
cd syd
make lib
env PATH="${PWD}/target/release:${PATH}" CGO_LDFLAGS="-L${PWD}/target/release/deps" make checklib
- pandora: |
cd syd/pandora
make
- runsc: |
cd syd
dev/install_gvisor.sh
- bench: |
cd syd
env SYD_BENCH_OUT=syd-bench-git-fedora SYD_BENCH_SHOW_OUTPUT=1 PATH=$PWD/target/release:$PATH dev/syd-bench.bash git
- tar: |
tag=$(cd syd; git describe)
mkdir syd-$tag
for bin in $(find syd/target/release -mindepth 1 -maxdepth 1 -type f -executable -name 'syd*'); do chmod 755 $bin; mv $bin syd-$tag; done
mv syd/pandora/target/release/pandora syd-$tag
tar --owner=0 --group=0 -cJvpf syd-git-x86_64-fedora.tar.xz ./syd-$tag
syd-pandora-0.15.0/.builds/linux-arm64.yml.disabled 0000664 0000000 0000000 00000002464 15055626765 0021764 0 ustar 00root root 0000000 0000000 triggers:
- action: email
condition: always
to: syd-devel <~alip/syd-devel@lists.sr.ht>
image: debian/sid
arch: arm64
artifacts:
- syd-git-arm64-debian.tar.xz
packages:
- autoconf
- automake
- build-essential
- cpanminus
- file
- golang
- gperf
- libcap-dev
- libio-socket-ssl-perl
- libtool
- linux-perf
- musl
- openssl
- pkg-config
- ruby
- ruby-ffi
- socat
- strace
- valgrind
sources:
- https://git.sr.ht/~alip/syd
tasks:
- init: |
uname -a
- scmp: |
cd syd
sudo dev/install_libseccomp.sh -i /usr -v main
- perl: |
sudo cpanm -n FFI::Platypus JSON
- rust: |
curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf https://sh.rustup.rs > rustup.sh
chmod +x rustup.sh
./rustup.sh --profile minimal -y
source ~/.cargo/env
rustc --version
rustc --print cfg
- make: |
source ~/.cargo/env
cd syd
sed -i -e '/^codegen-units/d' Cargo.toml
sed -i -e '/^lto/s/=.*$/= "off"/' Cargo.toml
make release
- libc: |
source ~/.cargo/env
cd syd
make lib
- tar: |
tag=$(cd syd; git describe)
mkdir syd-$tag
for bin in $(find syd/target/release -mindepth 1 -maxdepth 1 -type f -executable -name 'syd*'); do chmod 755 $bin; mv $bin syd-$tag; done
mv syd/pandora/target/release/pandora syd-$tag
tar --owner=0 --group=0 -cJvpf syd-git-arm64-debian.tar.xz ./syd-$tag
syd-pandora-0.15.0/.gitattributes 0000664 0000000 0000000 00000000062 15055626765 0016730 0 ustar 00root root 0000000 0000000 *.el whitespace=-trailing-space
*.scd -whitespace
syd-pandora-0.15.0/.gitignore 0000664 0000000 0000000 00000001654 15055626765 0016035 0 ustar 00root root 0000000 0000000 # syd's .gitignore
#
# Normal rules
#
.*
*.o
*.o.*
*.a
*.s
*.ko
*.so
*.so.dbg
*.la
*.lo
*.gz
*.bz2
*.lzma
*.lzo
*.xz
*.patch
*.gch
*.gcno
core*
*.tmp
#
# git files that we don't want to ignore even if they are dot-files
#
!.gitlab
!.gitattributes
!.gitignore
!.gitreview
!.mailmap
# YAML config files that we don't want to ignore even if they are dot-files
!.*.yml
# sr.ht builds
!/.builds
# stgit generated dirs
patches-*
# quilt's files
patches
series
# cscope files
cscope.*
ncscope.*
# gnu global files
GPATH
GRTAGS
GSYMS
GTAGS
# backup files
*.bak
*.orig
*~
\#*#
*.messy
# emacs & python byte objects
*.elc
*.py[co]
# log files
*.log
# trinity
trinity[.-]*
# perf files
perf.data*
# rusty tags
rusty-tags.vi
# scdoc
man/*.1
man/*.2
man/*.5
man/*.7
# syd temporary files
*.syd-tmp
# Specific ignores
out.syd-3
/bpf/*.bpf
/oprofile_data
/dev/aes-ctr
/dev/aes-xts
/dist
/root
/target
/fuzz/out
!/fuzz/out/.keep
/libcosmo
syd-pandora-0.15.0/.gitlab-ci.yml 0000664 0000000 0000000 00000024575 15055626765 0016510 0 ustar 00root root 0000000 0000000 stages:
- build
- build_lib
- test
- test_lib
- compat
- release
variables:
CARGO_HOME: $CI_PROJECT_DIR/.cargo
LANDLOCK_CRATE_TEST_ABI: 6
.cache:
cache:
key: ${CI_COMMIT_REF_SLUG}-${HOST}
paths:
- .cargo
- target
policy: pull-push
.build:
stage: build
extends: .cache
image: exherbo/syd-builder:${HOST}
interruptible: true
variables:
- MAKEARGS: ""
script:
- sed -i -e '/^lto/s/=.*$/= "off"/' Cargo.toml
- dev/install_libseccomp.sh -v main -i /usr/host || true
- chown -R paludisbuild:paludisbuild .
- su paludisbuild -c 'test -e ~/.cargo/env && . ~/.cargo/env; make ${MAKEARGS} release'
rules:
- if: $CI_COMMIT_TAG
when: never
- when: always
.build_lib:
stage: build_lib
extends: .cache
image: exherbo/syd-builder:${HOST}
interruptible: true
script:
- chown -R paludisbuild:paludisbuild .
- su paludisbuild -c 'test -e ~/.cargo/env && . ~/.cargo/env; cd lib; make'
rules:
- if: $CI_COMMIT_TAG
when: never
- when: on_success
.test:
stage: test
extends: .cache
image: exherbo/syd-builder:${HOST}
interruptible: true
script:
- cave sync || true
- cave resolve socat -zx || true
- sed -i -e '/^lto/s/=.*$/= "off"/' Cargo.toml
- dev/install_libseccomp.sh -v main -i /usr/host || true
- chown -R paludisbuild:paludisbuild .
- su paludisbuild -c 'test -e ~/.cargo/env && . ~/.cargo/env; env LANDLOCK_CRATE_TEST_ABI=${LANDLOCK_CRATE_TEST_ABI} make distcheck'
rules:
- if: $CI_COMMIT_TAG
when: never
- when: on_success
.test_lib:
stage: test_lib
extends: .cache
image: exherbo/syd-builder:${HOST}
interruptible: true
script:
- chown -R paludisbuild:paludisbuild .
- su paludisbuild -c 'test -e ~/.cargo/env && . ~/.cargo/env; export PATH=$PWD/target/release:$PATH; cd lib; make check'
rules:
- if: $CI_COMMIT_TAG
when: never
- when: on_success
.compat:
stage: compat
extends: .cache
image: exherbo/syd-builder:${HOST}
interruptible: true
script:
- sed -i -e '/^lto/s/=.*$/= "off"/' Cargo.toml
- dev/install_libseccomp.sh -v main -i /usr/host || true
- chown -R paludisbuild:paludisbuild .
- su paludisbuild -c 'test -e ~/.cargo/env && . ~/.cargo/env; env PATH="$PWD/target/release:$PATH" ./dev/gnulib-test.sh 30'
rules:
- if: $CI_COMMIT_TAG
when: never
- when: on_success
.release:
stage: release
image: exherbo/syd-builder:${HOST}
interruptible: true
rules:
- if: $CI_COMMIT_TAG =~ /^v.+/
script:
- dev/install_libseccomp.sh -v main -i /usr/host || true
- test -e ~/.cargo/env && . ~/.cargo/env
- test -e ~/.venv/bin/activate && . ~/.venv/bin/activate
- rm -rf target
- mkdir -p syd-${CI_COMMIT_TAG#v}-${HOST}/bin
- cp -ax src/esyd.sh ./README.md ./ChangeLog.md ./COPYING syd-${CI_COMMIT_TAG#v}-${HOST}/
- |
LIBSECCOMP_LINK_TYPE=static \
LIBSECCOMP_LIB_PATH=$(pkg-config --variable=libdir libseccomp || echo /usr/lib) \
RUSTFLAGS="-g -Ctarget-feature=+crt-static" \
cargo build --release --locked -j${RUNNER_BUILD_JOBS:-5}
- target/release/syd -V
- |
for bin in $(find target/release -mindepth 1 -maxdepth 1 -type f -executable -name 'syd*'); do
file -L "${bin}"
size "${bin}"
chmod 755 "${bin}"
mv "${bin}" "syd-${CI_COMMIT_TAG#v}-${HOST}/bin/"
done
- tar --owner=0 --group=0 -cJvpf ./syd-${CI_COMMIT_TAG#v}-${HOST}.tar.xz syd-${CI_COMMIT_TAG#v}-${HOST}
- sha512sum ./syd-${CI_COMMIT_TAG#v}-${HOST}.tar.xz > ./syd-${CI_COMMIT_TAG#v}-${HOST}.tar.xz.sha512sum
- echo "${GPG_PRIVATE_KEY}"|base64 -d > private.gpg
- gpg --import private.gpg
- gpg --default-key F60FF478 --sign --armor --output ./syd-${CI_COMMIT_TAG#v}-${HOST}.tar.xz.sha512sum.asc --detach-sig ./syd-${CI_COMMIT_TAG#v}-${HOST}.tar.xz.sha512sum
- s3cmd --host=${CELLAR_ADDON_HOST} --host-bucket=${CELLAR_ADDON_HOST} --access_key=${CELLAR_ADDON_KEY_ID} --secret_key=${CELLAR_ADDON_KEY_SECRET} -P -M put ./syd-${CI_COMMIT_TAG#v}-${HOST}.tar.xz ./syd-${CI_COMMIT_TAG#v}-${HOST}.tar.xz.sha512sum ./syd-${CI_COMMIT_TAG#v}-${HOST}.tar.xz.sha512sum.asc s3://${EXHERBO_CELLAR_HOSTNAME}/sydbox/
build:aarch64:
tags:
- aarch64
variables:
HOST: aarch64-unknown-linux-gnueabi
MAKEARGS: "CARGOFEATS=oci,uring"
extends: .build
build_lib:aarch64:
tags:
- aarch64
needs: ['build:aarch64']
variables:
HOST: aarch64-unknown-linux-gnueabi
extends: .build_lib
test:aarch64:
tags:
- aarch64
needs: ['build:aarch64']
variables:
HOST: aarch64-unknown-linux-gnueabi
extends: .test
test_lib:aarch64:
tags:
- aarch64
needs: ['build:aarch64', 'build_lib:aarch64']
variables:
HOST: aarch64-unknown-linux-gnueabi
extends: .test_lib
compat:aarch64:
tags:
- aarch64
needs: ['build:aarch64']
variables:
HOST: aarch64-unknown-linux-gnueabi
extends: .compat
release:aarch64:
tags:
- aarch64
extends: .release
variables:
HOST: aarch64-unknown-linux-gnueabi
build:armv7:
tags:
- armv7
variables:
HOST: armv7-unknown-linux-gnueabihf
extends: .build
build_lib:armv7:
tags:
- armv7
needs: ['build:armv7']
variables:
HOST: armv7-unknown-linux-gnueabihf
extends: .build_lib
test:armv7:
tags:
- armv7
needs: ['build:armv7']
variables:
HOST: armv7-unknown-linux-gnueabihf
extends: .test
test_lib:armv7:
tags:
- armv7
needs: ['build:armv7', 'build_lib:armv7']
variables:
HOST: armv7-unknown-linux-gnueabihf
extends: .test_lib
compat:armv7:
tags:
- armv7
needs: ['build:armv7']
variables:
HOST: armv7-unknown-linux-gnueabihf
extends: .compat
release:armv7:
tags:
- armv7
extends: .release
variables:
HOST: armv7-unknown-linux-gnueabihf
build:loongarch64:
tags:
- loongarch64
variables:
HOST: loongarch64-unknown-linux-gnu
extends: .build
build_lib:loongarch64:
tags:
- loongarch64
needs: ['build:loongarch64']
variables:
HOST: loongarch64-unknown-linux-gnu
extends: .build_lib
test:loongarch64:
tags:
- loongarch64
needs: ['build:loongarch64']
variables:
HOST: loongarch64-unknown-linux-gnu
extends: .test
test_lib:loongarch64:
tags:
- loongarch64
needs: ['build:loongarch64', 'build_lib:loongarch64']
variables:
HOST: loongarch64-unknown-linux-gnu
extends: .test_lib
compat:loongarch64:
tags:
- loongarch64
needs: ['build:loongarch64']
variables:
HOST: loongarch64-unknown-linux-gnu
extends: .compat
release:loongarch64:
tags:
- loongarch64
extends: .release
variables:
HOST: loongarch64-unknown-linux-gnu
build:ppc64le:
tags:
- ppc64le
variables:
HOST: ppc64le-unknown-linux-gnu
MAKEARGS: "CARGOFEATS=oci,uring"
extends: .build
build_lib:ppc64le:
tags:
- ppc64le
needs: ['build:ppc64le']
variables:
HOST: ppc64le-unknown-linux-gnu
extends: .build_lib
test:ppc64le:
tags:
- ppc64le
needs: ['build:ppc64le']
variables:
HOST: ppc64le-unknown-linux-gnu
extends: .test
test_lib:ppc64le:
tags:
- ppc64le
needs: ['build:ppc64le', 'build_lib:ppc64le']
variables:
HOST: ppc64le-unknown-linux-gnu
extends: .test_lib
compat:ppc64le:
tags:
- ppc64le
needs: ['build:ppc64le']
variables:
HOST: ppc64le-unknown-linux-gnu
extends: .compat
release:ppc64le:
tags:
- ppc64le
extends: .release
variables:
HOST: ppc64le-unknown-linux-gnu
build:riscv64:
tags:
- riscv64
variables:
HOST: riscv64-unknown-linux-gnu
MAKEARGS: "CARGOFEATS=oci,uring"
extends: .build
build_lib:riscv64:
tags:
- riscv64
needs: ['build:riscv64']
variables:
HOST: riscv64-unknown-linux-gnu
extends: .build_lib
test:riscv64:
tags:
- riscv64
needs: ['build:riscv64']
variables:
HOST: riscv64-unknown-linux-gnu
LANDLOCK_CRATE_TEST_ABI: 0
extends: .test
test_lib:riscv64:
tags:
- riscv64
needs: ['build:riscv64', 'build_lib:riscv64']
variables:
HOST: riscv64-unknown-linux-gnu
extends: .test_lib
compat:riscv64:
tags:
- riscv64
needs: ['build:riscv64']
variables:
HOST: riscv64-unknown-linux-gnu
extends: .compat
release:riscv64:
tags:
- riscv64
extends: .release
variables:
HOST: riscv64-unknown-linux-gnu
build:s390x:
tags:
- s390x
variables:
HOST: s390x-unknown-linux-gnu
MAKEARGS: "CARGOFEATS=oci,uring"
extends: .build
build_lib:s390x:
tags:
- s390x
needs: ['build:s390x']
variables:
HOST: s390x-unknown-linux-gnu
extends: .build_lib
test:s390x:
tags:
- s390x
needs: ['build:s390x']
variables:
HOST: s390x-unknown-linux-gnu
LANDLOCK_CRATE_TEST_ABI: 5
extends: .test
test_lib:s390x:
tags:
- s390x
needs: ['build:s390x', 'build_lib:s390x']
variables:
HOST: s390x-unknown-linux-gnu
extends: .test_lib
compat:s390x:
tags:
- s390x
needs: ['build:s390x']
variables:
HOST: s390x-unknown-linux-gnu
extends: .compat
release:s390x:
tags:
- s390x
extends: .release
variables:
HOST: s390x-unknown-linux-gnu
build:i586:
tags:
- i586
variables:
HOST: i586-pc-linux-gnu
extends: .build
build_lib:i586:
tags:
- i586
needs: ['build:i586']
variables:
HOST: i586-pc-linux-gnu
extends: .build_lib
test:i586:
tags:
- i586
needs: ['build:i586']
variables:
HOST: i586-pc-linux-gnu
extends: .test
test_lib:i586:
tags:
- i586
needs: ['build:i586', 'build_lib:i586']
variables:
HOST: i586-pc-linux-gnu
extends: .test_lib
compat:i586:
tags:
- i586
needs: ['build:i586']
variables:
HOST: i586-pc-linux-gnu
extends: .compat
release:i586:
tags:
- i586
extends: .release
variables:
HOST: i586-pc-linux-gnu
build:x86_64:
tags:
- x86_64
variables:
HOST: x86_64-pc-linux-gnu
MAKEARGS: "CARGOFEATS=oci,uring"
extends: .build
build_lib:x86_64:
tags:
- x86_64
needs: ['build:x86_64']
variables:
HOST: x86_64-pc-linux-gnu
extends: .build_lib
test:x86_64:
tags:
- x86_64
needs: ['build:x86_64']
variables:
HOST: x86_64-pc-linux-gnu
extends: .test
test_lib:x86_64:
tags:
- x86_64
needs: ['build:x86_64', 'build_lib:x86_64']
variables:
HOST: x86_64-pc-linux-gnu
extends: .test_lib
compat:x86_64:
tags:
- x86_64
needs: ['build:x86_64']
variables:
HOST: x86_64-pc-linux-gnu
extends: .compat
release:x86_64:
tags:
- x86_64
extends: .release
variables:
HOST: x86_64-pc-linux-gnu
syd-pandora-0.15.0/.gitlab/ 0000775 0000000 0000000 00000000000 15055626765 0015357 5 ustar 00root root 0000000 0000000 syd-pandora-0.15.0/.gitlab/issue_templates/ 0000775 0000000 0000000 00000000000 15055626765 0020565 5 ustar 00root root 0000000 0000000 syd-pandora-0.15.0/.gitlab/issue_templates/default.md 0000664 0000000 0000000 00000000737 15055626765 0022542 0 ustar 00root root 0000000 0000000 ### Describe the bug
### syd --version
### Logs or it did not happen!
### Poem
syd-pandora-0.15.0/COPYING 0000664 0000000 0000000 00000104515 15055626765 0015100 0 ustar 00root root 0000000 0000000 GNU GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE
Version 3, 29 June 2007
Copyright (C) 2007 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
Everyone is permitted to copy and distribute verbatim copies
of this license document, but changing it is not allowed.
Preamble
The GNU General Public License is a free, copyleft license for
software and other kinds of works.
The licenses for most software and other practical works are designed
to take away your freedom to share and change the works. By contrast,
the GNU General Public License is intended to guarantee your freedom to
share and change all versions of a program--to make sure it remains free
software for all its users. We, the Free Software Foundation, use the
GNU General Public License for most of our software; it applies also to
any other work released this way by its authors. You can apply it to
your programs, too.
When we speak of free software, we are referring to freedom, not
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have the freedom to distribute copies of free software (and charge for
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To protect your rights, we need to prevent others from denying you
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For example, if you distribute copies of such a program, whether
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Developers that use the GNU GPL protect your rights with two steps:
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The GNU General Public License does not permit incorporating your program
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.
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"windows_aarch64_gnullvm 0.53.0",
"windows_aarch64_msvc 0.53.0",
"windows_i686_gnu 0.53.0",
"windows_i686_gnullvm 0.53.0",
"windows_i686_msvc 0.53.0",
"windows_x86_64_gnu 0.53.0",
"windows_x86_64_gnullvm 0.53.0",
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checksum = "9ecf5b4cc5364572d7f4c329661bcc82724222973f2cab6f050a4e5c22f75181"
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"proc-macro2",
"quote",
"syn",
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source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
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syd-pandora-0.15.0/Cargo.toml 0000664 0000000 0000000 00000026053 15055626765 0015775 0 ustar 00root root 0000000 0000000 [package]
name = "syd"
version = "3.38.0"
edition = "2021"
authors = ["Ali Polatel "]
description = "rock-solid application kernel"
readme = "README.md"
license = "GPL-3.0-only"
categories = ["command-line-utilities", "os::linux-apis", "security"]
keywords = ["container", "linux", "security", "sandbox"]
homepage = "https://man.exherbo.org"
repository = "https://gitlab.exherbo.org/sydbox/sydbox.git"
rust-version = "1.73"
include = ["**/*.rs", "*.md", "src/*.el", "src/*.sh", "man/*.scd", "vim/*/*.vim", "Cargo.toml", "Cargo.lock"]
[features]
default = ["asm", "log", "utils"]
# Build syd-asm(1) the instruction decoder.
asm = ["iced-x86", "raki", "yaxpeax-arch", "yaxpeax-arm"]
# Enable the virtual syslog(2) interface.
# You need this to read access violations using dmesg(1) inside Syd.
log = ["ringbuf"]
# Build OCI runtime helper "syd-oci"
oci = ["clap", "libcgroups", "libcontainer", "liboci-cli", "oci-spec", "procfs", "tabwriter", "tracing", "tracing-subscriber"]
# Enables io-uring based integration tests.
# This is not used by the main Syd binary.
uring = ["io-uring"]
# Build helper utilities.
# No reason to disable this unless you want fast build cycles.
utils = ["linefeed"]
# Enable profiling.
# Requires gperftools installed.
prof = ["gperftools", "tcmalloc"]
# TODO: Remove overflow-checks when the code
# is free of arithmetic side effects, prove
# it with forbidding clippy lints.
[profile.release]
debug = true
overflow-checks = true
lto = "thin"
panic = "unwind"
###
# Main programs
###
[[bin]]
name = "syd"
path = "src/syd.rs"
[[bin]]
name = "syd-aux"
path = "src/utils/syd-aux.rs"
[[bin]]
name = "syd-bit"
path = "src/utils/syd-bit.rs"
[[bin]]
name = "syd-cap"
path = "src/utils/syd-cap.rs"
[[bin]]
name = "syd-cpu"
path = "src/utils/syd-cpu.rs"
[[bin]]
name = "syd-dns"
path = "src/utils/syd-dns.rs"
[[bin]]
name = "syd-env"
path = "src/utils/syd-env.rs"
[[bin]]
name = "syd-exec"
path = "src/utils/syd-exec.rs"
[[bin]]
name = "syd-hex"
path = "src/utils/syd-hex.rs"
[[bin]]
name = "syd-info"
path = "src/utils/syd-info.rs"
[[bin]]
name = "syd-key"
path = "src/utils/syd-key.rs"
[[bin]]
name = "syd-lock"
path = "src/utils/syd-lock.rs"
[[bin]]
name = "syd-mdwe"
path = "src/utils/syd-mdwe.rs"
[[bin]]
name = "syd-pds"
path = "src/utils/syd-pds.rs"
[[bin]]
name = "syd-size"
path = "src/utils/syd-size.rs"
[[bin]]
name = "syd-aes"
path = "src/utils/syd-aes.rs"
[[bin]]
name = "syd-elf"
path = "src/utils/syd-elf.rs"
[[bin]]
name = "syd-pty"
path = "src/utils/syd-pty.rs"
[[bin]]
name = "syd-tor"
path = "src/utils/syd-tor.rs"
[[bin]]
name = "syd-oci"
path = "src/utils/syd-oci.rs"
required-features = ["oci"]
[[bin]]
name = "syd-test"
path = "src/t/main.rs"
[[bin]]
name = "syd-test-do"
path = "src/t/do.rs"
[[bin]]
name = "syd-x"
path = "src/utils/syd-x.rs"
####
## Utilities
[[bin]]
name = "syd-asm"
path = "src/utils/syd-asm.rs"
required-features = ["asm"]
[[bin]]
name = "syd-emacs"
path = "src/utils/syd-emacs.rs"
required-features = ["utils"]
[[bin]]
name = "syd-fd"
path = "src/utils/syd-fd.rs"
required-features = ["utils"]
[[bin]]
name = "syd-ls"
path = "src/utils/syd-ls.rs"
required-features = ["utils"]
[[bin]]
name = "syd-cat"
path = "src/utils/syd-cat.rs"
required-features = ["utils"]
[[bin]]
name = "syd-err"
path = "src/utils/syd-err.rs"
required-features = ["utils"]
[[bin]]
name = "syd-mem"
path = "src/utils/syd-mem.rs"
required-features = ["utils"]
[[bin]]
name = "syd-net"
path = "src/utils/syd-net.rs"
required-features = ["utils"]
[[bin]]
name = "syd-open"
path = "src/utils/syd-open.rs"
required-features = ["utils"]
[[bin]]
name = "syd-poc"
path = "src/utils/syd-poc.rs"
required-features = ["utils"]
[[bin]]
name = "syd-read"
path = "src/utils/syd-read.rs"
required-features = ["utils"]
[[bin]]
name = "syd-stat"
path = "src/utils/syd-stat.rs"
required-features = ["utils"]
[[bin]]
name = "syd-sys"
path = "src/utils/syd-sys.rs"
required-features = ["utils"]
[[bin]]
name = "syd-ldd"
path = "src/utils/syd-ldd.rs"
required-features = ["utils"]
[[bin]]
name = "syd-load"
path = "src/utils/syd-load.rs"
required-features = ["utils"]
[[bin]]
name = "syd-rnd"
path = "src/utils/syd-rnd.rs"
required-features = ["utils"]
[[bin]]
name = "syd-run"
path = "src/utils/syd-run.rs"
required-features = ["utils"]
[[bin]]
name = "syd-tty"
path = "src/utils/syd-tty.rs"
required-features = ["utils"]
[[bin]]
name = "syd-fork"
path = "src/utils/syd-fork.rs"
required-features = ["utils"]
[[bin]]
name = "syd-sh"
path = "src/utils/syd-sh.rs"
required-features = ["utils"]
[[bin]]
name = "syd-sha"
path = "src/utils/syd-sha.rs"
required-features = ["utils"]
[[bin]]
name = "syd-path"
path = "src/utils/syd-path.rs"
required-features = ["utils"]
[[bin]]
name = "syd-tck"
path = "src/utils/syd-tck.rs"
required-features = ["utils"]
[[test]]
name = "tests"
#
# Benchmarks
#
[[bench]]
name = "sandbox_from_str"
path = "bench/sandbox/from_str.rs"
harness = false
[[bench]]
name = "sys-exec"
path = "bench/sys/exec.rs"
harness = false
[[bench]]
name = "sys-getdents"
path = "bench/sys/getdents.rs"
harness = false
[[bench]]
name = "sys-getpid"
path = "bench/sys/getpid.rs"
harness = false
[[bench]]
name = "sys-gettid"
path = "bench/sys/gettid.rs"
harness = false
[[bench]]
name = "sys-fork"
path = "bench/sys/fork.rs"
harness = false
[[bench]]
name = "sys-kill"
path = "bench/sys/kill.rs"
harness = false
[[bench]]
name = "sys-mmap"
path = "bench/sys/mmap.rs"
harness = false
[[bench]]
name = "sys-open"
path = "bench/sys/open.rs"
harness = false
[[bench]]
name = "sys-open-read-close"
path = "bench/sys/open_read_close.rs"
harness = false
[[bench]]
name = "sys-stat"
path = "bench/sys/stat.rs"
harness = false
[[bench]]
name = "sys-unlink"
path = "bench/sys/unlink.rs"
harness = false
[[bench]]
name = "canon"
path = "bench/canon.rs"
harness = false
# Old criterion bencmarks.
# TODO: Rewrite with brunch.
#[[bench]]
#name = "parse_elf"
#harness = false
#
#[[bench]]
#name = "path_unsafe"
#harness = false
#
#[[bench]]
#name = "proc_fd"
#harness = false
#
#[[bench]]
#name = "sandbox_forcemap"
#harness = false
#
#[[bench]]
#name = "sandbox_globset"
#harness = false
[dependencies]
ahash = { version = "0.8", features = [ "no-rng" ] }
bitflags = { version = "2.9", default-features = false }
btoi = { version = "0.5", default-features = false }
# Upgrading to 0.4 requires update to rust edition 2024
# which is not widely available yet.
constant_time_eq = { version = "0.3", default-features = false }
crc = { version = "3.3.0", default-features = false }
data-encoding = { version = "2.9", default-features = false, features = ["std"] }
expiringmap = { version = "0.1", default-features = false }
fixedbitset = { version = "0.5", default-features = false }
hkdf = { version = "0.12", default-features = false }
indexmap = { version = "2.10", default-features = false, features = ["std"] }
ipnet = { version = "2.11", default-features = false, features = ["std"] }
iprange = { version = "0.6", default-features = false }
itoa = { version = "1.0", default-features = false }
lexopt = { version = "0.3", default-features = false }
libc = { version = "0.2", default-features = false }
libloading = { version = "0.8", default-features = false }
libseccomp = { version = "0.4", default-features = false }
libseccomp-sys = "0.3"
md5 = { version = "0.8", default-features = false, features = ["std"] }
memchr = { version = "2.7", default-features = false, features = ["std"] }
netlink-sys = { version = "0.8", default-features = false }
nix = { version = "=0.30.1", default-features = false, features = ["dir", "env", "event", "fanotify", "fs", "hostname", "inotify", "mount", "mman", "net", "personality", "poll", "ptrace", "resource", "sched", "signal", "socket", "term", "time", "uio", "user", "zerocopy"] }
nom = { version = "8.0", default-features = false, features = ["alloc", "std"] }
num_cpus = { version = "1.17", default-features = false }
once_cell = { version = "1.21", default-features = false, features = ["std"] }
# parse-size=1.1.0 removes std feature and bumps MSRV to 1.81.0
# We'll keep this strict dependency until we bump MSRV to this or a newer version.
parse-size = { version = "=1.0", default-features = false }
# procfs is for syd-oci only.
# Core syd code uses procfs-core only.
procfs = { version = "0.17", default-features = false, optional = true }
procfs-core = { version = "0.17", default-features = false }
ringbuf = { version = "0.4", default-features = false, features = ["portable-atomic", "std"], optional = true }
shellexpand = { version = "3.1", default-features = false, features = ["base-0", "tilde"] }
serde = { version = "1.0", default-features = false, features = ["std"] }
serde_json = { version = "1.0", default-features = false, features = ["preserve_order", "std"] }
sha1 = { version = "0.10", default-features = false, features = ["std"] }
sha3 = { version = "0.10", default-features = false, features = ["std"] }
# =0.7 breaks 32-bit compilation: https://builds.sr.ht/~alip/job/1401070
io-uring = { version = "=0.6", default-features = false, optional = true }
sendfd = { version = "0.4", default-features = false }
lexis = { version = "0.2", default-features = false }
zeroize = { version = "1.8", default-features = false, features = ["simd", "std"] }
# instruction decoders (thx wikky!)
iced-x86 = { version = "1.21", default-features = false, features = ["decoder", "fast_fmt", "intel", "std"], optional = true }
raki = { version = "1.3", default-features = false, optional = true }
yaxpeax-arch = { version = "0.3", default-features = false, features = ["std"], optional = true }
yaxpeax-arm = { version = "0.3", default-features = false, features = ["std"], optional = true }
# syd-sh deps.
linefeed = { version = "0.6.0", default-features = false, optional = true }
# profiling deps.
gperftools = { version = "0.2", default-features = false, features = ["heap"], optional = true }
tcmalloc = { version = "0.3", default-features = false, optional = true }
# syd-oci deps.
clap = { version = "4.4", optional = true }
libcgroups = { version = "0.5", optional = true }
libcontainer = { version = "0.5", optional = true }
liboci-cli = { version = "0.5", optional = true }
oci-spec = { version = "0.8", default-features = false, features = ["runtime"], optional = true }
tabwriter = { version = "1.4", optional = true }
tracing = { version = "0.1", features = ["attributes"], optional = true }
tracing-subscriber = { version = "0.3", optional = true }
[target.'cfg(target_arch = "aarch64")'.dependencies]
tick_counter = { version = "0.4", default-features = false }
[target.'cfg(target_arch = "x86_64")'.dependencies]
tick_counter = { version = "0.4", default-features = false }
[build-dependencies]
pkg-config = "0.3.32"
[dev-dependencies]
# brunch[>=0.8] has MSRV 1.83 which is too new for CI.
brunch = { version = "=0.5", default-features = false }
goblin = { version = "0.9", default-features = false, features = ["std", "elf32", "elf64", "endian_fd"] }
lazy_static = "1"
strum = { version = "0.27", default-features = false }
strum_macros = { version = "0.27", default-features = false }
tempfile = { version = "3.20", default-features = false }
[lints.rust]
unexpected_cfgs = { level = "warn", check-cfg = ['cfg(libseccomp_v2_6)'] }
syd-pandora-0.15.0/ChangeLog.md 0000664 0000000 0000000 00001005655 15055626765 0016224 0 ustar 00root root 0000000 0000000 ChangeLog
=========
# 3.38.0
- The installation of the _syd-asm_(1) utility is now gated behind its
own `asm` feature rather than the `utils` feature. This feature
defaults to on.
- Add rule
[`sandbox/pty:off`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#sandbox/pty) to
the `firefox` profile.
- Bind logging of process name changes to the
[`log/verbose`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#log/verbose)
option. The special rule `filter/read+!proc/name` to silence process
name changes is no longer supported. Verbose mode is intended for
malware analysis and it defaults to off.
- The rule
[`trace/allow_unsafe_filename:1`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#trace/allow_unsafe_filename)
has been removed from the builtin _firefox_(1) profile. See the
[`PROFILES`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.5.html#PROFILES) section of
the _syd_(5) manual page for more information.
- Remove the characters `{` and `}` from the set of unsafe characters
which are not permitted in filenames because _firefox_(1) uses these
characters in filenames under the profile directory. See the section
[`Enhanced Path Integrity Measures`] of the _syd_(7) manual page for
more information.
- Remove the character `:` from the set of unsafe characters which are
not permitted in filenames because the usage of this character is
common across devfs and procfs. See the section [`Enhanced Path
Integrity Measures`] of the _syd_(7) manual page for more information.
- Add OpenBSD _pledge_(2) like category sets for sandboxing categories.
See the [`SETS`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#SETS) section of
the _syd_(2) manual page for more information.
- The keyword `all` can now be specified to
[`allow/net/link`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#allow/net/link)
to allow all known _netlink_(7) families.
- Prevent unhiding paths by passing-through them during path resolution.
- Fix handling of _proc_pid_ns_(5) magic symlinks in path canonicalizer.
- Exit with `EBADF` if `SYD_LOG_FD` environment variable is a positive
number but an invalid FD. Negative values are permitted as a shorthand
to disable logging.
- Add rule
[`trace/force_rand_fd:1`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#trace/force_rand_fd)
to the `user` profile to force randomized file descriptors. This
feature makes use of _kcmp_(2) system call and requires `CONFIG_KCMP`
option to be enabled for the host Linux kernel. See [`Force Randomized
File
Descriptors`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#Force_Randomized_File_Descriptors)
section of the _syd_(7) manual page for more information.
- Add rule
[`trace/allow_unsafe_proc_status:1`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#trace/allow_unsafe_proc_status)
to the `paludis` profile.
- Teach _syd-lock_(1) the `-E errata` flag to query/list _landlock_(7)
erratas which is new in _landlock_(7) ABI 7 supported by Linux>=6.15.
- Provide hardening for _proc_pid_status_(5) by masking
security-sensitive fields such as `TracerPid` and `Seccomp`. This
hardening may be disabled with the option
[`trace/allow_unsafe_proc_status:1`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#trace/allow_unsafe_proc_status).
See the [Hardened
proc\_pid\_status(5)](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#Hardened_proc_pid_status(5))
section of the _syd_(7) manual page for more information.
- Rename the option `trace/allow_unsafe_open_cdev` to
[`trace/allow_unsafe_kfd`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#trace/allow_unsafe_kfd)
and verify `/dev/kfd` metadata prior to continue. This is a specific
workaround for AMD GPUs, therefore reducing the scope of the unsafe
option to cover only this type of character devices provides some
hardening.
- Add `lock/mkbdev` category to confine block device creation using
_landlock_(7). Rename `lock/mkdev` category which confines character
device creation to `lock/mkcdev`. These categories are also available
using the _syd-lock_(1) utility.
- Add `mkbdev` category to confine block device creation. Rename
`mkdev` category which confines character device creation to `mkcdev`.
To use these categories for path-based access check on devices, the
user must opt-in using
[`trace/allow_unsafe_mkbdev:1`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#trace/allow_unsafe_mkbdev),
or
[`trace/allow_unsafe_mkcdev:1`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#trace/allow_unsafe_mkcdev)
at startup.
- Refine device restrictions. Install a seccomp-bpf filter at startup to
terminate processes which attempt to create a block or character
device with _mknod_(2). Include the Syd process into the filter to
ensure a compromised Syd process can't create devices either.
Restrictions for block devices may be lifted using
[`trace/allow_unsafe_mkbdev:1`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#trace/allow_unsafe_mkbdev)
at startup. Restrictions for character devices may be lifted using
[`trace/allow_unsafe_mkcdev:1`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#trace/allow_unsafe_mkcdev)
at startup.
- _syd-lock_(1) learned the `-S` argument to enable scoped signals, and
the `-U` argument to enable scoped UNIX abstract sockets. Previously
both scopes were enabled by default.
- _syd-lock_(1) utility learned the `-F flag` argument to specify flags
for _landlock_restrict_self_(2) which are new in _landlock_(7) ABI 7.
Use `-F list` to print a list of flags.
- Add boolean options
[`log/lock/same_exec_off`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#log/lock/same_exec_off),
[`log/lock/new_exec_on`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#log/lock/new_exec_on),
and
[`log/lock/subdomains_off`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#log/lock/subdomains_off)
to configure _landlock_(7) audit logging. These options are off by
default and setting them is a NO-OP on systems where _landlock_(7) ABI
7 is unsupported.
- Add support for _landlock_(7) ABI which is new in [Linux
6.15](https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/72885116069abdd05c245707c3989fc605632970).
- Add `MUSL_LOCPATH` to the list of unsafe environment variables. musl
libc ignores this environment variable in secure-execution mode. The
`LOCPATH` environment variable was already listed as unsafe. Run
`syd-ls env` to see a list of unsafe environment variables.
- Improve the [Enforcing AT\_SECURE and UID/GID
Verification](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#Enforcing_AT_SECURE_and_UID/GID_Verification)
section of the _syd_(7) manual page with a list of implications of
the secure-execution mode.
- When
[`trace/allow_unsafe_memfd:1`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#trace/allow_unsafe_memfd)
is set, do an additional access check for `exec` rights in addition to
`create` at _memfd_create_(2) boundary so the user can easily confine
executable memory file descriptors based on their names. Note, though,
filtering on name is unsafe and should be used with care unlike the
`!memfd:` and `!memfd-hugetlb:` prefixes which can not be altered by
the sandbox process so the only safe use of name matching is done with
a catch-all glob `**`, e.g. `allow/create,exec,truncate+!memfd:**`
which is a rule used in the `paludis` profile where we allow
executable memory file descriptors.
- Fix matching of hugetlb memory file descriptors with the
`!memfd-hugetlb:` prefix for system calls other than
_memfd_create_(2), e.g. _ftruncate_(2) which is used to allocate
space.
- Change memory file descriptor name prefix used in pattern matching for
access checks from `/memfd:` and `/memfd-hugetlb:` to `!memfd:` and
`!memfd-hugetlb:` to indicate their special nature and prevent the
user from allowing them using a catch-all rule like `allow/exec+/***`.
This allows easy filtering of memory file descriptors, e.g.
`allow/create+!memfd:**`, or `deny/truncate+!memfd-hugetlb:**`.
- Change default value of
[`log/verbose`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#log/verbose) to
false. Verbose logging is primarily intended for malware analysis and
should be turned on as necessary.
- Port to `x32` architecture.
- _syd-sys_(1) learned the `-i` argument to query _ioctl_(2) requests by
name or number per-architecture.
- Fix _sysinfo_(2) handler on 32-bit architectures.
- Ports are now stored as a fixed bit set for _landlock_(7) network
rules when using
[`allow/lock/bind`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#allow/lock/bind),
and
[`allow/lock/connect`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#allow/lock/connect)
enabling range additions and precise port removals with predictable
behavior.
- Prevent shared memory mappings for append-only writable file
descriptors when append-only feature is active. This feature is
activated by either setting
[`append`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#append) paths or
activating [Crypt
Sandboxing](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#Crypt_Sandboxing) This
prevents an attacker from utilizing the _mmap_(2) system call to
bypass append-only guarantees provided by the sandbox and has the same
implications as the previous change log entry. Integration tests were
added to ensure the problem does not resurface.
- Add a _seccomp_(2) filter to deny _pwritev2_(2) system call using the
`RWF_NOAPPEND` flag which is new in Linux-6.9 with the `EOPNOTSUPP`
_errno_(3) unless sandbox is locked at startup without any
[`append`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#append) clauses and
without [Crypt
Sandboxing](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#Crypt_Sandboxing)
setup. This prevents an attacker from utilizing this system call to
bypass append-only guarantees provided by the sandbox. Users of the
[`append`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#append) feature are
recommended to upgrade. Users of [Crypt
Sandboxing](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#Crypt_Sandboxing) are
**strongly** recommended to upgrade because this vector can be used to
corrupt encrypted files by first opening them as append-only and then
writing to an arbitrary file offset using the _pwritev2_(2) system
call thereby confusing the `syd_aes` thread to decide to mistakenly
perform last block re-encryption where a full re-encryption is
required. Integration tests were added to ensure the problem does not
resurface. The filter is portable and designed to work when sandboxing
`x32` binaries as well, where the flag is the 5th argument rather than
the 6th like other architectures.
- Harden _personality_(2) system call filter to kill process upon uses
of the unsafe flags `READ_IMPLIES_EXEC` and `ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE`.
Previously unsafe flags were denied with the `ENOSYS` _errno_(3).
This hardening helps with the early notification of potentially
malicious activity through the system audit log.
- _syd-mdwe_(1) has been promoted to a core utility and installed
without the `utils` feature. This utility is especially useful in
combination with the _syd-lock_(1) utility to build lightweight
sandboxes.
- Deny `READ_IMPLIES_EXEC` and `ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE` flags of the
_personality_(2) system call for the _seccomp_(2) W^X filters applied
by _syd-mdwe_(1) and _syd-load_(1) utilities. This hardens executable
memory guarantees and is consistent with what _syd_(1) applies by
default.
- Move _landlock_(7) access rights `lock/bind`, `lock/exec`,
`lock/mkfifo`, and `lock/symlink` for the public directories
`/dev/shm`, `/tmp`, and `/var/tmp` from the `landlock` profile to the
`paludis` profile to adhere with safe defaults.
- Teach _syd-lock_(7) the new _landlock_(7) category sets. See
[`SETS`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd-lock.1.html#SETS) section of the
_syd-lock_(1) manual page for more information.
- Support category sets in _landlock_(7) rules.
- Remove `rdset`, `wrset` sets and define new OpenBSD _pledge_(2) like sets
to streamline sandbox profile composition. See the
[`SETS`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#SETS) section of the _syd_(2)
manual page for more information.
- Grant access to the directory `/proc/sys/net` for the `paludis`
profile.
- Add support for _ioctl_(2) commands in for vim syntax file.
- Add support for _ioctl_(2) name to request conversion. The commands
[`ioctl/deny`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#ioctl/deny), and
[`ioctl/allow`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#ioctl/allow) now
accept a comma-delimited list of _ioctl_(2) request names as argument.
The old way of passing requests as number is still supported but it is
strongly discouraged because request numbers may vary across
architectures which is transparently handled when the request is
passed as a name.
- Grant read access to files `/proc/self/cgroup` and
`/proc/self/mountinfo` for the `paludis` profile.
- Harden the per-thread _seccomp_(2) filter of emulator threads by only
allowing the required _socket_(2) domains and explicitly denying the
raw and packet sockets unless
[`trace/allow_unsafe_socket:1`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#trace/allow_unsafe_socket)
is set at startup. This hardening only works on 64-bit architectures
where the _socketcall_(2) multiplexer is not available.
# 3.37.9
- Support `AT_EACCESS` flag for the _faccessat2_(2) system call.
- Support sandboxing 32-bit binaries on 64-bit powerpc.
- Fix executable stack detection on powerpc64 where ABI defaults to
non-executable stack in the absence of a `PT_GNU_STACK` header.
- Add initial support for the M68k architecture.
- Finish MIPS porting work. Most tests now pass on `mips64el`,
and other MIPSen should in theory just work too. We do not
plan to publish release binaries for this architecture but
it is easy enough to cross compile Syd for MIPS using a tool
such as [cross](https://crates.io/crates/cross).
- Replace `procfs` crate with the `procfs_core` crate.
- Allow the _ioctl_(2) requests `TCGETS2`, `TCSETS2`, `TCSETSF2`, and
`TCSETSW2` for the _syd-pty_(1) utility. This is in consistence with
the `TCGETS`, `TCSETS`, `TCSETSF`, and `TCSETSW` requests that are
already allowed and fixes panics on newer Linux.
- Turn on `overflow-checks` for release mode. We plan to turn this back
off when the code is provably free of arithmetic side effects which is
work in progress. In the meantime, these checks give us safe
behaviour, e.g. an overflow occuring in an emulator thread will panic
which will invoke the RAII guard on drop to deny the ongoing system
call with `EACCES`.
- Improve [safe
filename](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#Enhanced_Path_Integrity_Measures)
checks to include UTF-8 whitespace into leading and trailing space
checks, thanks to an idea by Jacob Bachmeyer, see [this
link](https://seclists.org/oss-sec/2025/q3/123) for more information.
- Improve symlink loop detection in path canonicalizer, fixes #231.
- Allow _timer_settime64_(2) syscall in addition to the
_timer_settime_(2) syscall for emulator threads. This
fixes tests on x86.
- Harden `user` profile to set
[`trace/force_umask`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#trace/force_umask)
to `7177` rather than the old `7077` to disable executable bits to
enhance W^X.
- Harden `user` profile to deny read-access to all dotfiles except shell
history files which are append-only. This includes critical paths such
as `~/.gnupg`, and `~/.ssh` and adheres to the principle of secure
defaults.
- Minimize `user` profile default access not to include DRI, sound, HID,
syslog and systemd journal. These accesses may be added as separate
profiles in the future to be stacked for finer confinement. This way
we ensure the builtin `user` profile adheres to secure defaults.
- Fix compatibility issues with older landlock ABIs.
- Increase default stack size of the monitor thread from `96k` to
`128k`.
# 3.37.8
- Replace `secure-string` crate dependency with the better
maintained `zeroize` crate.
- Upgrade _syd-oci_(1) dependencies from youki: `libcgroups`,
`libcontainer` and `liboci-cli` have been upgraded from version
`0.5.4` to `0.5.5`. Similarly the `oci-spec` crate has been upgraded
from version `0.8.1` to `0.8.2`.
- The `log` feature is now enabled by default and means only one thing
which is to add support for Syd's _syslog_(2) emulation so access
violations are readable from within sandbox using _dmesg_(2) provided
that the sandbox process has access to the sandbox lock.
- The utility `syd-log` has been removed.
- Host syslog support has been removed. This was broken with the
[`CLONE_FILES`
isolation](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#Thread-Level_Filesystem_and_File-Descriptor_Namespace_Isolation).
The libc implementation does not support per-thread syslog
connections and therefore is no longer usable for Syd.
- Fix `RENAME_EXCHANGE` flag handling in _renameat2_(2) handler.
- Add rule `allow/read,stat+/proc/uptime` to the `container` profile.
This file is time-namespace aware and therefore is not an information
leak when `unshare/time:1` is set as done by the `container` profile.
# 3.37.7
- Harden deleted path handling in path canonicalizer.
- Harden dotdot and symbolic link handling in path canonicalizer.
- Fix a TOCTOU issue in path canonicalizer when the target of a magic
symbolic link can change after _readlink_(2) but before _open_(2).
This can allow a fellow attacker thread who shares a file descriptor
or current working directory with the current thread to change where
the magic symbolic link points to in between these two calls and
potentially access resources outside the sandbox. The solution is to
first _open_(2) the magic symbolic link and run the _readlink_(2) call
on the resulting fd which is accessible by the current Syd emulator
thread only. This is a good example of why you should build a
multi-layered sandbox using [Lock
Sandboxing](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#Lock_Sandboxing) for
defense-in-depth.
# 3.37.6
- Enable synchronous seccomp with
[`trace/sync_seccomp`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#trace/sync_seccomp)
by default and remove the environment variable `SYD_SYNC_SCMP`. In
addition with the removal of CPU pinning for the emulator threads,
this mode now reliably helps with performance, substantially reducing
the kernel overhead.
- Change the emulator threads to simultaneously block on
`SECCOMP_NOTIFY_RECV` _ioctl_(2) rather than using multithreaded
_epoll_(7). This provides a more effective solution and fixes the
thundering herd problem which reappeared after the introduction of
[`CLONE_FILES`
isolation](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#Thread-Level_Filesystem_and_File-Descriptor_Namespace_Isolation)
for emulator threads. This solution requires POSIX timers to retire
idle helper emulator threads which is enabled by default on Linux
kernels, check for `CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS`.
- Deny `O_NOTIFICATION_PIPE` flag for the _pipe2_(2) system call, and
add the option
[`trace/allow_unsafe_pipe`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#trace/allow_unsafe_pipe)
to lift the restriction. See the [Denying `O_NOTIFICATION_PIPE` Flag
in
pipe2](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#Denying_O_NOTIFICATION_PIPE_Flag_in_pipe2)
section of the _syd_(7) manual page for more information.
- Deny `MSG_OOB` flag for _send_(2), _sendto_(2), _sendmsg_(2), and
_sendmmsg_(2) system calls and add the option
[`trace/allow_unsafe_oob`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#trace/allow_unsafe_oob)
to lift the restriction. See the [Denying MSG\_OOB Flag in send System
Calls](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#Denying_MSG_OOB_Flag_in_send_System_Calls)
section of the _syd_(7) manual page for more information.
- Add rule `trace/allow_unsafe_personality:1` to the `paludis` profile.
# 3.37.5
- Return `EACCES` rather than `EISDIR` when attempting to execute
directories. Unlike what the _exec_(3) manual page claims, the
original system call returns `EACCES` rather than `EISDIR` and this
errno is corrected further down the call path. Thanks to GNU make
tests for making us notice this!
# 3.37.4
- Add rule `trace/allow_unsafe_create:1` to the `paludis` profile.
- Add option
[`trace/allow_unsafe_create`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#trace/allow_unsafe_create)
to disable `O_CREAT` hardening.
- Implement `O_CREAT` hardening. Refer to the [Trusted File
Creation](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#Trusted_File_Creation)
section of the _syd_(7) manual page for more information.
- Add rule `trace/allow_unsafe_hardlinks:1` to the `paludis`
profile.
- Allow the _ioctl_(2) request `TCGETS2` for the `tty` profile.
Note, the _ioctl_(2) request `TCGETS` was already allowed so
this is consistent.
- Add option
[`trace/allow_unsafe_hardlinks`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#trace/allow_unsafe_hardlinks)
to disable hardlink target hardening.
- Implement _link_(2) and _linkat_(2) target hardening a la
`/proc/sys/fs/protected_hardlinks` and `CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LINK`.
Refer to the [Trusted
Hardlinks](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#Trusted_Hardlinks)
section of the _syd_(7) manual page for more information.
- Protect _linkat_(2) system call usage of Syd emulator threads with
syscall argument cookies for added hardening. See the [Syscall
Argument
Cookies](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#Syscall_Argument_Cookies)
section of the _syd_(7) manual page for more information.
- Fix a filesystem TOCTTOU in _link_(2) and _linkat_(2) system call
handlers. The base name of the old path which was passed to the host
Linux kernel is susceptible to change after access check providing the
attacker a way to hardlink arbitrary files outwith sandbox access
checks. Due to the fact that the `AT_SYMLINK_FOLLOW` flag was not
passed to the Linux kernel, the exploitability is somewhat limited.
The new implementation uses _procfs_(5) indirection and the base name
is never passed to the host Linux kernel. The alternative of using the
`AT_EMPTY_PATH` flag is rejected because it requires the
`CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH` capability which we cannot always assume to
have.
# 3.37.3
- Add rule
[`trace/allow_unsafe_symlinks:1`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#trace/allow_unsafe_symlinks)
to the `paludis` profile.
- Fix an issue with the new [Trusted
Symlinks](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#Trusted_Symbolic_Links)
feature and write tests to verify it works correctly.
# 3.37.2
- Mount _procfs_(5) with `hidepid=4` option rather than `hidepid=2` when
`unshare/pid:true` is set. This option is new in Linux>=5.8.
- Allow the _ioctl_(2) requests `TIOCGPGRP`, aka _tcgetpgrp_(3), and
`TIOCGSID`, aka _tcgetsid_(3), for the `tty` profile. Note, the
_ioctl_(2) request `TIOCSPGRP`, aka _tcsetpgrp_(3), was already
allowed so this is consistent.
- Add option
[`trace/allow_unsafe_symlinks`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#trace/allow_unsafe_symlinks)
to disable _symlink_(7) hardening.
- Implement _symlink_(7) hardening for path canonicalizer. See the
[Trusted Symbolic
Links](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#Trusted_Symbolic_Links)
section of the _syd_(7) manual page for more information.
- Add option
[`tpe/root_mount`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#tpe/root_mount)
to pin all executions to the root filesystem.
- Harden [TPE
sandboxing](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#TPE_sandboxing)
with file based checks in addition to parent directory checks.
- Improve [TPE
sandboxing](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#TPE_sandboxing) with
more descriptive error messages akin to GrSecurity.
- Fix network system call handlers to correctly return `EBADF`
_errno_(3) on `O_PATH` file descriptors rather than incorrectly
returning `ENOTSOCK`. Thanks to LTP tests for making us notice this!
- Fix a bug in _xattr_(7) name validation when `EOPNOTSUPP` _errno_(3)
was incorrectly returned instead of `EINVAL` when the name is not in
`namespace.attribute` form. Thanks to
[`sys-apps/attr`](https://summer.exherbo.org/packages/sys-apps/attr/index.html)'s
tests for making us notice this!
- _unshare_(2) `CLONE_FS|CLONE_FILES` for emulator, IPC and interrupt
threads for added hardening. Note, `CLONE_FS` was already unshared for
emulator threads and `CLONE_FILES` _unshare_(2) for emulator threads
is skipped if Crypt sandboxing is on. See the [Thread-Level Filesystem
and File-Descriptor Namespace
Isolation](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#Thread-Level_Filesystem_and_File-Descriptor_Namespace_Isolation)
section of the _syd_(7) manual page for more information.
- Improve symbolic loop detection in path canonicalizer.
- Ensure all utilities return _errno_(3) number as exit code on error.
- Teach _syd-read_(1) options to configure path resolution.
Particularly interesting are options `-B` for `RESOLVE_BENEATH`, `-F`
for `RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS`, `-P` for `RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS`, and `-X`
for `RESOLVE_NO_XDEV`. See the _syd-read_(1) manual page for more
information.
- Put PTY main file descriptor into exclusive mode using
_TIOCEXCL_(2const) _ioctl_(2) request to harden _syd-pty_(1) against
terminal sniffing.
- Flush output pipes on error for _syd-tor_(1) to guard against
packet-loss.
- Add rule `trace/allow_unsafe_shm:true` to the `paludis` profile.
Perl tests map executable shared memory and require this option.
- Protect syscall handlers' map using _mseal_(2). This is a critical
data-structure which has function pointers to Syd's syscall handler
functions and as such it can be a reliable target for control flow
hijacking attacks.
- Ensure _xattr_(7) handlers return same error numbers as the host Linux
kernel when an invalid name is passed to the syscalls. We have
reported [bug
220374](https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=220374) to address
the issue in the Linux kernel.
# 3.37.1
- Further harden _xattr_(7) handlers by applying strict argument
validation for name and length arguments.
- Fix a bug in _flistxattr_(2) handler which caused it to return
incorrect buffer size on success when `trace/allow_unsafe_xattr:1` is
in affect. Thanks to GNU tar's tests for making us notice this!
- Restrict the `linux` profile by removing access rights to
_proc_pid_maps_(5). The rules to allow per-process _proc_pid_maps_(5)
have been moved to the `paludis` profile. Access to the
_proc_pid_maps_(5) file allows an attacker to easily circumvent ASLR.
- Harden the `linux` profile to deny access to `/lib/modules` to prevent
leaking host kernel config/module information. Add the new rule
`deny/exec,read,stat,chdir,readdir+/lib*/modules/***` which acts as an
override to the `allow` rule with the same capabilities over the
`/lib` directory.
# 3.37.0
- Fix a bug with _kcmp_(2) filters in `syd_emu` threads
on ARMv7.
- Fix PID validation for _kill_(2) family system calls
when Syd is built as 32-bit on a 64-bit platform.
- Support the new `SYD_PDS` environment variable to set
the parent-death signal. The value may be a signal name
or a signal number.
- Implement kernel-validated peer authentication for
[`ipc`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#ipc). Add options
[`ipc/uid`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#ipc/uid), and
[`ipc/gid`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#ipc/gid) to configure
UID/GID overrides for IPC authentication which default to current
UID/GID.
- Remove the restriction of requiring absolute pathnames for the
[`ipc`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#ipc) option.
- Remove the restriction of requiring absolute pathnames for the
[`proxy/ext/unix`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#proxy/ext/unix)
option.
- Allow _sync_file_range2_(2) system call on ARM and PowerPC.
This is consistent with the _sync_file_range_(2) system call
which is already allowed.
- Optimize the parent _seccomp_(2) BPF filter by removing duplicate
filters shared with the child _seccomp_(2) filter.
- Mitigate Linux kernel MDWE bypass, aka [bug
219227](https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=219227) with a
proactive file writability check at _mmap_(2) boundary for
`PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC` mappings. See the third paragraph of the
[Memory-Deny-Write-Execute
Protections](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#Memory-Deny-Write-Execute_Protections)
section of the _syd_(7) manual page for more information.
- Remove option `trace/lock_personality`.
- Restrict _personality_(2) personas to a default allowlist, and provide
the option
[`trace/allow_unsafe_personality`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#trace/allow_unsafe_personality)
to lift this restriction at startup. See the [Personality Syscall
Restrictions](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#Personality_Syscall_Restrictions)
section of the _syd_(7) manual page for more information.
- Upgrade _syd-oci_(1) dependencies from youki: `libcgroups`,
`libcontainer` and `liboci-cli` have been upgraded from version
`0.5.3` to `0.5.4`. Similarly the `oci-spec` crate has been upgraded
from version `0.7` to `0.8`.
- Replace `hex-conservative` crate with the `data-encoding` crate. The
former decided to remove the hex-encoding in the latest major version
in an effort to stabilize the crate therefore we can no longer use it.
Moreover, the latter allows us to do permissive hex decoding when
parsing is done case-insensitively.
- Use pipes in packet mode for _syd-tor_(1), remove the `-b bufsiz`
option which now is always `PIPE_BUF` to ensure no packet loss
happens.
- Add new options
[`trace/allow_unsafe_shm`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#trace/allow_unsafe_shm),
and
[`trace/allow_unsafe_mqueue`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#trace/allow_unsafe_mqueue)
to relax shared memory permission restrictions.
- Deny `{SHM,SEM,MSG}_STAT_ANY` operation for _shmctl_(2), _semctl_(2),
and _msgget_(2) system calls.
- Deny `IPC_SET` operation for _shmctl_(2), _semctl_(2), and _msgctl_(2)
system calls.
- Deny unsafe permissions (ie, bits 0o177) for _shmget_(2), _semget_(2),
_msgget_(2), and _mq_open_(2) system calls. See the [Shared Memory
Permissions
Hardening](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#Shared_Memory_Permissions_Hardening)
section of the _syd_(7) manual page for more information.
- Move the system calls _fsconfig_(2), _fsmount_(2), _fsopen_(2),
_fspick_(2), _open_tree_(2), _open_tree_attr_(2) from `dead`
set to `mount` set.
- Fix elf parser to correctly take into account the last occurence of
the `PT_GNU_STACK` header to determine executable stack. Previously
the parser incorrectly only looked at the first occurence of the
header.
- Seal the memory area where the external network address resides using
_mseal_(2) on Linux>=6.10 for _syd-tor_(1) and add guard pages
to surrounding memory to prevent overflow or adjacent corruption.
- Use `MADV_GUARD_INSTALL` _madvise_(2) operation on Linux>=6.13 to
install lightweight-guard pages during sandbox policy lock.
- Deny Restartable Sequences with the _rseq_(2) system call by default
and add the option
[`trace/allow_unsafe_rseq`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#trace/allow_unsafe_rseq)
to allow _rseq_(2). See the [Denying Restartable
Seqeuences](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#Denying_Restartable_Sequences)
section of the _syd_(7) manual page for more information.
- Fixed a packet loss bug in _syd-tor_(1) by treating
`EPOLLRDHUP`/`EPOLLHUP` as a final read drain under `EPOLLET` so no data
is left stranded after an edge notification.
- Fix _connect_(2) handler in _syd-tor_(1) to check for the `EAGAIN`
_errno_(3) together with the `EINPROGRESS` _errno_(3). The former
may be returned by UNIX sockets.
- Add rules
`allow/stat,exec,read,write,create,chmod,truncate+/memfd:**`,
and
`allow/stat,exec,read,write,create,chmod,truncate+/memfd-hugetlb:**`
to the `paludis` profile.
- Make path canonicalizer aware of memory file descriptors. This allows
for writing more intuitive access control rules for mfds.
- Prepend _memfd_create_(2) name argument with `/memfd-hugetlb:`, rather
than `/memfd:` before access check when flags include `MFD_HUGETLB`.
- Add new builtin profile `rand` to enable [randomized file
descriptors](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#Force_Randomized_File_Descriptors).
You may refer to this profile shortly as just **r**.
- Add rule `trace/allow_unsafe_memfd:1` to the `paludis` profile.
- Make the `immutable` profile more portable by mounting a readonly
_tmpfs_(5) over `/boot` rather than bind mounting `/var/empty` over
it. `/var/empty` is not a standard directory and notably does not
exist on Debian and Ubuntu distributions.
- Ensure file offset is always correctly set to the start of the file
before ELF parsing.
- Validate flags argument early in _memfd_create_(2) hook.
- Fix _memfd_create_(2) hook to fallback to using _fchmod_(2) to remove
executable bits on kernels which does not support the
`MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL` flag. This flag is new in Linux>=6.3.
- Set [BIG TCP](https://lwn.net/Articles/884104/) for the internal
loopback device when
[`unshare/net`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#unshare/net) is set
to true at startup.
- Harden
[`trace/allow_unsafe_ebpf:1`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#trace/allow_unsafe_ebpf)
to always drop the `CAP_BPF` Linux capability and deny the _bpf_(2)
commands `BPF_MAP_CREATE` and `BPF_PROG_LOAD` with the _errno_(3)
`EPERM`. This is in consistence with the Linux kernel checks for the
`kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled` _sysctl_(8).
- Fix a race in [`Crypt
sandboxing`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#Crypt_Sandboxing)
which caused some blocks not to be written to the output file when
appending consecutively to the same file in rapid succession. Users
of Crypt sandboxing are highly recommended to update.
- Do not put syd into its own process group to defend the parent
against group signals on systems not supporting Landlock ABI 6
which is Linux>=6.12.
- Use cargo-auditable to build auditable binaries on builds.sr.ht.
- Switch `ubuntu/plucky` CI to `debian/stable` on builds.sr.ht.
- Fix per-thread _seccomp_(2) filter loading logic of the main thread
filter to honour `SYD_SKIP_SCMP` environment variable to skip
filtering rather than the (old default) `SYD_LOG=debug` in consistence
with other per-syd-thread _seccomp_(2) filters.
- Ensure Crypt sandboxing keys are sent to host Linux kernel and wiped
from Syd memory before execution of the sandbox process to prevent any
potential race with the sandbox process.
- Reduce memory allocations in _sendmsg_(2) and _sendmmsg_(2) handlers
for the `SCM_RIGHTS` request.
- Ensure memory sealing of sandbox happens before execution of the
sandbox process when sandbox lock is set at startup to prevent
any potential race with the sandbox process. This is the default.
- Cap `MMAP_MIN_ADDR` at `PAGE_SIZE` to respect OpenBSD's _mmap_(2)
floor. Linux allows processes with the `CAP_SYS_RAWIO` capability to
edit/override `vm.mmap_min_addr` and this provides hardening against
such edits.
- Increase [`mem/max`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#mem/max)
default from `128MB` to `256MB`.
- PTY sandboxing is now only activated when both standard input and
standard output is attached to a terminal. Previously only standard
input was checked.
- Teach _syd_(1) the _--api_ option to output _syd_(2) API specification
in JSON format. This specification is intended to ease generation of
language bindings and is also available via the magic path `/dev/syd`.
- Support the `SYD_OCI_NO_CONFIG` environment variable to skip
configuration parsing for _syd-oci_(1) and to parse the `oci` profile.
This is primarily intended for testing.
- Add _kcmp_(2) to the allowlisted system calls for _syd-oci_(1). This
system call is only used by Syd unless
[`trace/allow_unsafe_ptrace:1`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#trace/allow_unsafe_ptrace)
is set at startup in which case the sandbox processes are allowed to
call it as well.
- Teach _syd-x_(1) the _-l_ option to list executables of the given
processes using `PROCMAP_QUERY` _ioctl_(2) request on Linux-6.11
and newer and fall back to parsing _proc_pid_maps_(5) textually
on older Linux.
- Use the new `PROCMAP_QUERY` _ioctl_(2) request on Linux-6.11 and
newer to parse _proc_pid_maps_(5) efficiently at _ptrace_(2)
`PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC` boundary.
- Fix a path canonicalizer bug where bad directory file descriptors were
incorrectly not allowed with absolute paths. Thanks to gnulib tests
for identifying this regression!
- Print detected host Linux kernel features in version output.
- Support the `SYD_ASSUME_KERNEL` environment variable to override
host Linux version for feature detection.
- Deny installing new signal handlers using the _sigaction_(2) and
_rt_sigaction_(2) system calls in per-thread seccomp filters of the
main thread, emulator threads and aes threads for added hardening.
- Disable _ld.so_(8) exec indirection check if
[`trace/allow_unsafe_exec:1`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#trace/allow_unsafe_exec)
is set at startup.
- Check for file type before file executability check
in _exec_(3) handlers.
- Avoid using `codegen-units=1` for release builds.
- Use `thin` LTO rather than `fat` LTO for release builds.
- Add rule `trace/allow_unsafe_xattr:1` to the `paludis` profile.
- Add new option
[`trace/allow_unsafe_xattr`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#trace/allow_unsafe_xattr)
to lift extended attributes restrictions for `user.syd.*` and
`security.*`.
# 3.36.0
- Add rule `sandbox/pty:off` to the `paludis` profile. Paludis creates
TTYs on its own as necessary.
- Add
[`trace/allow_safe_bind`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#trace/allow_safe_bind)
the ability to allow implicit binds as part of _connect_(2) UDP calls
(thx mixi!).
- Add new commands
[`pty/row`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#pty/row) (or shortly
just `pty/x`) and
[`pty/col`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#pty/col) command to set
the default size of the pseudoterminal window created by _syd-pty_(1)
for PTY sandboxing.
- Add new sandboxing type [PTY
Sandboxing](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#PTY_Sandboxing) to
run the process inside a PTY managed by _syd-pty_(1).
- Add new utility _syd-pty_(1) to do PTY forwarding.
- Move the _ioctl_(2) requests `FIFREEZE`, `FITHAW`, `FS_IOC_FIEMAP`,
`FIGETBSZ`, `FS_IOC_GETFSUUID`, and `FS_IOC_GETFSSYSFSPATH` from the
_ioctl_(2) allowlist to the _ioctl_(2) denylist to prevent leaking
on-disk layout to the sandbox process.
- Add the rule `ioctl/allow+0x5401` to the `tty` profile which stands
for the _ioctl_(2) request `TCGETS` used by _isatty_(3) and
_tcgetattr_(3) etc.
_ioctl_(2) requests to magic links are now denied unless
[`trace/allow_unsafe_magiclinks`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#trace/allow_unsafe_magiclinks`)
option is set.
- _ioctl_(2) requests to block devices are now always denied.
- Apply a _seccomp_(2) filter early during sandbox process startup to
deny seccomp-notify _ioctl_(2) requests. Since seccomp-notify
sandboxes are not stackable, these requests have no point in the
sandbox. To identify misbehaviour easily, the default action is to
`KillProcess` rather than denying with an _errno_(3).
- The command
[`sandbox/pid`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#sandbox/pid) may
now be used dynamically to enable/disable PID sandboxing after startup
before the sandbox is locked. Previously, this command was _static_, ie
could only be passed to Syd at startup.
- Set
[`sandbox/ioctl`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#sandbox/ioctl)
default to `on` to adhere to the principle of safe defaults.
- The `log` feature is now required to log to the host _syslog_(3). Due
to the current _seccomp_(2) confinements regarding the _socket_(2)
system call, a reconnection to the host syslog during a Syd run is not
permitted and will result in immediate termination. Syd preempts this
termination by panicking at the first error to send a message to the
host syslog. The environment variable `SYD_NO_SYSLOG` has no effect if
the `log` feature was not enabled at build time.
- The `log` feature is now required for the utility _syd-log_(1) to be
installed. _syd-log_(1) utility is a simple wrapper around
_journalctl_(1) and currently has no function on non-systemd systems.
- Use the safe `nix` _syslog_(3) interface to send log messages to the
host _syslogd_(8) rather than the unsafe `libc` interface.
- The `log` feature is no longer on by default. The only default
enabled feature currently is `utils`.
- Raise the default cycle period of the `syd_int` interrupt thread
from 5 milliseconds to 10 milliseconds. This is a compile-time
default which may be changed by editing `src/config.rs`.
- Reduce the stack size of the `syd_int` interrupt thread from 256 bytes
to 128 bytes. Note, this thread is confined by _seccomp_(2) such that
it can only deallocate memory and attempts in memory allocation will
result in instant process termination enforced by the host Linux
kernel.
- Change interrupt handling to preopen path to _proc_pid_status_(5) in
emulator threads. Further confine `syd_int` thread to remove read
access to _procfs_(5) with Landlock and remove the _seccomp_(2) allow
clause for the _openat2_(2) system call filter. _openat2_(2) is now
denied in the interrupt thread with the `ENOSYS`, aka "Function not
implemented", error like the other _open_(2) and _stat_(2) family
system calls for compatibility. With this change, the interrupt
thread now runs with no access to the filesystem and network.
- Exclude per-thread blocked signals during interrupt delivery in
`syd_int` interrupt handler thread. Previously, blocked signals caused
incorrect interruption of the ongoing system call. Notably, this made
`go mod download` fail with `EEXIST`, aka "File exists" errors when a
go thread is preempted with a `SIGURG` signal during an ongoing,
exclusively creating _open_(2) system call.
- Print information on open file limits in version output.
- Make `syd_int` interrupt handler send the unblocking `SIGALRM` signal
to the `syd_emu` syscall handler thread even if the respective sandbox
process gets killed mid-way. This fixes a hang in miniupnpc tests (thx
kepstin!)
- Add rule `mask^` to the `paludis` profile so as not to inherit path
masking rules from the `linux` profile. These rules are intended for
secure defaults and _not_ package building.
- Extend the `linux` profile to
[`mask`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#mask) many critical
_procfs_(5) and _sysfs_(5) files and directories previously mounted
over using [`bind`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#bind) by the
`immutable` profile. The list is heavily inspired by that of
_podman_(1), and it extends it with wider-range of paths for secure
defaults. See `syd-cat -plinux | grep mask` for the complete list of
patterns. Note, these
[`bind`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#bind) commands were
removed from the `immutable` profile in version 3.35.0 because this
command has been hardened to fail on non-existing files therefore it
is hard to provide a portable list of bind-paths.
- Extend the [`mask`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#mask) command
with optional directory overrides. This feature provides a
non-privileged alternative to the
[`bind`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#bind) command because it
does not require the creation of a mount namespace. Moreover,
[`mask`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#mask) commands may be
specified dynamically after startup using the _syd_(2) API allowing
for fine-tuned and/or incremental confinement.
- Fix a startup conflict in _syd-oci_(1) utility when both
the _youki_(1) container runtime and the Syd sandbox invokes
the same _setpgid_(2) call to put the process into a new
process group in which case the latter attempt fails with
permission denied and aborts the startup process. This bug
was first introduced in version 3.35.2.
- Document path unhiding bug using pass-thru paths during
canonicalization in the
[BUGS](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.1.html#BUGS) section of the
_syd_(1) manual page.
- Fix an issue with determining the `RLIMIT_NOFILE` hard limit on armv7.
- Add rule `trace/allow_unsafe_nocookie:1` to the `paludis` profile.
- Add new option
[`trace/allow_unsafe_nocookie`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#trace/allow_unsafe_nocookie)
to disable [Syscall Argument
Cookies](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#Syscall_Argument_Cookies).
- esyd: Fix various POSIX compatibility issues reported by
_shellcheck_(1).
- esyd: Fix `info` subcommand for non-{ba,z}sh POSIX shells.
- Fix an off-by-one in argument passing for _truncate64_(2),
_ftruncate64_(2) and _fallocate_(2) system calls on armv64, ppc64, and
ppc64le architectures.
- Fix an issue with invoking the _kcmp_(2) system call on armv7.
- Harden _socket_(2), _truncate_(2), _truncate64_(2), _ftruncate_(2),
and _ftruncate64_(2) system calls in emulator Syd threads by enforcing
cookies in unused system call arguments. In addition, harden the
`SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND` and `SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ADDFD` _ioctl_(2)
requests for Syd emulator threads with cookies to prevent potential
misuse of the response flag `SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUE` which
cause a system call pass-through to the host Linux kernel or fd
stealing. See the [Syscall Argument
Cookies](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#Syscall_Argument_Cookies)
section of the _syd_(7) manual page for more information.
# 3.35.2
- Create an unconditional, best-effort Landlock scope-only sandbox
domain for the sandbox process. This adds a layer of isolation
between the sandbox process and Syd process.
- Harden _memfd_create_(2), _renameat2_(2) and _unlinkat_(2) system
calls in emulator Syd threads by enforcing cookies in unused system
call arguments.
- Harden _openat2_(2) system calls in main and emulator Syd threads by
enforcing cookies in unused system call arguments. See the [Syscall
Argument
Cookies](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#Syscall_Argument_Cookies)
section of the _syd_(7) manual page for more information.
- Move the system calls _sethostname_(2) and _setdomainname_(2) from
`safe` system call set to the new system call set `uts`. The `uts`
system call set is only allowed when UTS subnamespace is allowed with
`trace/allow_unsafe_namespace:uts`. This handling is similar to
the `mount` system call set and `trace/allow_unsafe_namespace:mount`.
- The system calls _pidfd_getfd_(2) and _process_madvise_(2) have been
moved from `safe` system call set to the `ptrace` system call set.
This is consistent with the host kernel check for
`PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREADS`.
- The `kill` action has been enhanced to utilize the
_process_mrelease_(2) system call to release sandbox process memory to
the system immediately after sending a `SIGKILL` through the same
PIDFd using _pidfd_send_signal_(2). This is especially useful with
[Memory Sandboxing](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#Memory_Sandboxing).
- The default action for [Memory
Sandboxing](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#Memory_Sandboxing) has
been changed from `deny` to `kill` to be consistent with [PID
Sandboxing](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#PID_sandboxing).
This default may be changed using the command
[`default/mem`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#default/mem).
- Add new builtin profile `firefox` to relax restrictions which are
needed to make Firefox family browsers work under the sandbox. Use
`syd-cat -pfirefox` to list the rules. You may refer to the profile
shortly as just `ff`.
- Add options `trace/allow_unsafe_memory:1`,
`trace/allow_unsafe_magiclinks:1`, and `trace/allow_unsafe_prctl:1` to
the `debug` profile to allow _gdb_(1) usage within the sandbox.
- Add option `trace/allow_unsafe_page_cache:1` to the `paludis` profile.
- Add new option
[`trace/allow_unsafe_page_cache`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#trace/allow_unsafe_page_cache)
to allow _cachestat_(2) and _mincore_(2) system calls in the sandbox.
This is done by default to mitigate page-cache attacks, however this
system call may be necessary to make direct rendering work with
Firefox family browsers. See the [`Mitigation against Page Cache
Attacks`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#Mitigation_against_Page_Cache_Attacks)
section of the _syd_(7) manual page for more information.
- Start denying _cachestat_(2) as it is a scalable version of
_mincore_(2) which we already deny to mitigate page cache attacks.
- Recursively create parent directories when
[`bind`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#bind) mounting
into empty mount namespaces with
[`root:tmpfs`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#root).
- Make Syd the leader of a new process group at startup to isolate it from
the sandbox process and release the controlling terminal for the Syd
process using the `TIOCNOTTY` _ioctl_(2) request. This ensures a
compromised Syd process cannot be abused to inject characters into the
buffer of the controlling terminal.
- Disable Speculative Store Bypass mitigations for _seccomp_(2)
filters when `trace/allow_unsafe_spec_exec:1` is set.
- Fix file flags and mode validation for _open_(2) family system calls.
- Add new command
[`trace/force_ro_open`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#trace/force_ro_open)
to reject creating and writing _open_(2) family system calls.
- Add new command
[`trace/force_rand_fd`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#trace/force_rand_fd)
to return randomized fds rather than lowest available slot at
_open_(2), _socket_(2), _accept_(2), and _memfd_create_(2) boundaries
to harden against fd reuse. Read the section [`Force Randomized File
Descriptors`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#Force_Randomized_File_Descriptors)
of the _syd_(7) manual page for more information. The new environment
variable `SYD_FORCE_RANDFD` may be used to set this by default which
is provided as convenience to ease testing.
- Add new command
[`trace/force_cloexec`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#trace/force_cloexec)
to force `O_CLOEXEC` at _open_(2), _socket_(2), _accept_(2), and
_memfd_create_(2) boundaries. Read the section [`Force Close-on-Exec File
Descriptors`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#Force_Close-on-Exec_File_Descriptors)
of the _syd_(7) manual page for more information.
- Add new [`lock:ipc`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#lock) mode
to allow sandbox configuration only through the IPC socket.
- Add new [`ipc`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#ipc) command to
create a UNIX socket for remote configuration of the sandbox.
- The [`root`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#root) command now
recognizes the special keywords _off_ and _none_ to unset a previously
set root directory. This is useful when stacking profiles.
- _syd_(2) API commands that do not work under _syd-oci_(1) now return
`EOPNOTSUPP` error at configure time. These commands are documented
with `oci: no` in _syd_(2) manual page.
- oci: Do not pass-through the capabilities specified by the container
engine. This is done to adhere the goal to be secure by default. To
honour the capabilities specified by the container engine, user may
configure Syd with `trace/allow_unsafe_caps:1`. The recommended way,
however, is to specify only the minimum needed set of capabilities
using the various "allow\_unsafe" options such as
`trace/allow_unsafe_bind:1` to retain `CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE`,
`trace/allow_unsafe_socket:1` to retain `CAP_NET_RAW`,
`trace/allow_unsafe_syslog:1` to retain `CAP_SYSLOG`,
`trace/allow_unsafe_time:1` to retain `CAP_SYS_TIME`.
# 3.35.1
- [`mask`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#mask) add operation now
accepts an optional, colon-separated mask path to be used instead of
the default `/dev/null`. This makes the
[`mask`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#mask) command,
functionally similar to the
[`bind`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#bind) with two advantages:
Unlike the `bind` command, the `mask` command does not require
creation of a mount namespace at startup, and `mask` commands
may be specified dynamically after startup using the _syd_(2) API.
- _syd-run_(1) learned the new namespacing options -c, -i, -m, -n, -p,
-u, and -U to specify the set of namespaces explicitly rather than
auto-detecting them which is the default.
- Fix build when the `log` feature is disabled.
- Fix a regression with PID sandboxing, which was introduced by
mistakenly changing the open mode of the static `/proc` file
descriptor to `O_PATH`. This made PID calculations return an error,
which in turn caused Syd to raise an incorrect PID access violation
before the maximum limit is actually reached.
- Harden the builtin `landlock` profile to remove access to the `/sys`
directory. Move the rule `allow/lock/read,readdir+/sys` to the
`paludis` profile for compatibility when stacked with the `landlock`
profile.
# 3.35.0
- Add information about HMAC-SHA256 kernel support in version output.
- Add information about AES-CTR kernel support in version output.
- Fix `riscv64` build with `musl` libc.
- Harden the `linux` profile, remove access to `/proc/filesystems`,
`/proc/mounts`, `/proc/stat`, `/proc/sys`, `/proc/self/mounts`,
`/proc/self/attr`, `/selinux`, `/sys`, `/var/cache`.
- Remove rule `allow/lock/read,write,truncate+/dev/fd` from the
`landlock` rule for portability.
- Remove rule `allow/lock/read,readdir,write+/selinux/context` from
the `landlock` profile for portability.
- Remove rule `allow/lock/read,readdir,exec+/snap` from the `landlock`
profile for portability.
- Teach _syd-lock_(1) the _-C_ option to specify Landlock compatibility
level. Default level has been changed from "best-effort" to
"hard-requirement". Make `ENOENT`, aka "No such file or directory"
errors fatal unless compatibility level is set to "best-effort".
- Add rule `default/lock:warn` to the `paludis` profile to set the
Landlock compatibility level to "best-effort" when stacked with the
`landlock` profile.
- Make `ENOENT`, aka "No such file or directory", errors fatal
for Landlock unless compatibility level has been set to
"best-effort" using `default/lock:warn`.
- Add new option
[`default/lock`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#default/lock)
to set [Landlock compatibility
level](https://landlock.io/rust-landlock/landlock/trait.Compatible.html),
where `kill` stands for
[`HardRequirement`](https://landlock.io/rust-landlock/landlock/enum.CompatLevel.html#variant.HardRequirement),
`deny` stands for
[`SoftRequirement`](https://landlock.io/rust-landlock/landlock/enum.CompatLevel.html#variant.SoftRequirement),
and `warn` stands for
[`BestEffort`](https://landlock.io/rust-landlock/landlock/enum.CompatLevel.html#variant.BestEffort).
The default level is `kill`. This change promotes the default compatibility level
from "best-effort" to "hard-requirement and adheres to the
principle of secure defaults. Users who want the previous behaviour
may use the rule `default/lock:warn` in their profiles.
- Grant read, stat, chdir and readdir accesses to the directory
`/etc/ld.so.conf.d` recursively for the `linux` profile.
- Make [`root`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#root) command change
root using _pivot_root_(2). Support the special keyword `tmpfs` as an
argument to `root` in which case an empty mount namespace may be built
from scratch under a private, temporary directory which is mounted on
_tmpfs_(5). [`bind`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#bind) command
has been extended to honour new `root` directory.
- Add new utility [`syd-fd`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd-fd.1.html)
to interact with remote file descriptors using _pidfd_getfd_(2).
- Give `security.` prefixed extended attributes, such as
`security.selinux`, `security.smack`, the same protection as the
`user.syd.` prefix: These prefixes can not be listed or tampered
by the sandbox process unless the sandbox lock is _off_ for the
respective process. This access can be permitted to the initial
sandbox process with `lock:exec` or to all sandbox processes with
`lock:off`.
- Add new builtin profile `readonly` to deny all write sandbox capabilities
to the entire root filesystem. You may refer to this profile shortly
as just `ro`. See the
[`PROFILES`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.5.html#PROFILES) section of
the _syd_(5) manual page for more information on builtin profiles.
- Add new sandbox capability aliases `rdset` and `wrset`, in addition to
`all`. `rdset` refers to the set of read-only sandbox capabilities,
whereas `wrset` refers to the set of write sandbox capabilities.
See the [`SHORTCUTS`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#SHORTCUTS)
section of the _syd_(2) manual page for more information.
- The `user` profile no longer includes the `landlock` and `immutable`
profiles. This is done for clear separation of core profiles and
make it easy to stack them for practical sandboxing.
- Stop pre-opening file descriptors to `/dev` and `/sys` directories
at startup.
- Remove the need to specify `CLONE_FILES` to share the file descriptor
space with the sandbox process at early startup. This ensures
hardening against file descriptor leaks.
- Fix file type check by running _statx_(2) directly on the file
descriptor, rather than using the directory and the base path in safe
canonicalizer. This is important to guard against TOCTTOU. File
type is used in sandbox access check and is therefore
security-critical.
- Add rule `trace/allow_unsafe_nomseal:1` to the `paludis` profile.
- Replace _syd_(2) parsers written using regular expressions with the
`regex` crate with parsers written using the `nom` crate. The `regex`
crate dependency has been removed. Notably, the new parser is not only
more efficient both wrt. binary size and performance, but also much
stricter than the regular expressions based parser.
- Fix mode and dev argument validation in _mknod_(2) and _mknodat_(2)
handlers. Previously invalid mode/dev was silently truncated. Found
by LTP test-suite.
- Fix flags validation in _sendto_(2), _sendmsg_(2) and _sendmmsg_(2)
handlers. Previously invalid flags were silently truncated. Found by
LTP test-suite.
- Fix flags validation in _{get,set,list,remove}xattrat_(2) handlers.
Previously invalid flags were silently truncated. Found by
LTP test-suite.
- Fix mode validation in _mkdir_(2) and _mkdirat_(2) handlers.
Previously invalid modes were silently truncated. Found by
LTP test-suite.
- Fix flags validation in _accept4_(2) handler. Previously
invalid flags was silently truncated. Found by LTP test-suite.
- Fix `AT_EXECVE_CHECK` flag check at _execveat_(2) boundary.
- Fix various issues with the _fanotify_mark_(2) handler by using the
new type-safe interface in `nix>=0.30.1`. Found by LTP test-suite.
- Fix file open mode in _inotify_add_watch_(2) handler
which resulted in incorrect watches.
Found by LTP test-suite.
- Fix various pid validation issues for signal handling
system calls. Found by LTP test-suite.
- Fix various syscall argument validation issues for open
family system calls. Found by LTP test-suite.
- Fix `linux` profile to grant `truncate` access in addition
to `write` access for the directory `/proc/self/fd` to avoid
confusion. Found by LTP test-suite.
- Fix stat handlers to return `EFAULT` when an invalid pointer
was passed as the stat argument. Found by LTP test-suite.
Note, for magic stat calls of _syd_(2) API, passing `NULL` as stat
argument is still allowed.
- Fix _access_(2), _faccessat_(2), _faccessat2_(2), _chmod_(2), _fchmod_(2),
_fchmodat_(2), _fchmodat2_(2), _fchownat_(2), _inotify_add_watch_(2)
_unlinkat_(2) handlers to return `EINVAL` on invalid, undefined, and unused
flags and/or mode. Previously these flags were silently truncated. Found by
LTP test-suite.
- Fix network syscall handlers to return `ENOTSOCK` early when the
file descriptor argument is not a socket. Found by LTP test-suite.
- Fix _symlink_(2) and _symlinkat_(2) handlers to validate current
process using seccomp request ID after memory read for the target
argument. Previously this was only done for the linkpath argument.
- The `readdir` access check is no longer done on _getdents64_(2)
boundary. This check is now only done at _open_(2) boundary when the
argument is an existing directory regardless of the `O_DIRECTORY`
flag.
- Fix _getdents64_(2) handler to correctly return `ENOTDIR` for
file descriptors that do not refer to a directory. Previously
this handler incorrectly returned `EBADF` for this case.
- Fix a file descriptor leak in PID file descriptor map.
- Upgrade `nom` crate from `7.1` to `8.0`. `nom` crate is currently used for
parsing some special procfs files efficiently. We plan to use it for
configuration parsing as well in future releases.
- Upgrade the vendored `landlock` crate from `0.4.1` to `0.4.2`. Note
Landlock ABI 6 support of Linux-6.12 had already been implemented as
of Syd-3.29.0, this upgrade brings in refactors and tests from
upstream. We continue to maintain our own version of the crate to
ensure static linking works, however we keep our changes to a minimum
and we intend to eventually submit our changes upstream.
- Add new utility [`syd-x`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd-x.1.html)
to check for file executability using the new
[`AT_EXECVE_CHECK`](https://docs.kernel.org/next/userspace-api/check_exec.html)
flag.
- Upgrade `crc` crate from `3.2` to `3.3`.
- Harden loop detection in sandbox configuration file includer by taking
into account the unique mount id of the file in addition to the inode.
- Upgrade `nix` crate from `0.29.0` to `0.30.1`. This version continues
to improve the API to use I/O-safe types thereby improving I/O safety
throughout the Syd codebase.
- Use the new `AT_EXECVE_CHECK` flag of _execveat_(2) to check
for exec access in the exec(3) syscall hooks.
- Add new option
[`proxy/ext/unix`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#proxy/ext/unix)
to set an external UNIX domain socket for [Proxy
sandboxing](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#Proxy_Sandboxing).
This option may also be set using the new environment variable
`SYD_PROXY_UNIX` and has precedence over the option
[`proxy/ext/host`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#proxy/ext/host)
- Teach _syd-tor_(1) to support external UNIX domain sockets when
submitted as an argument in the format of absolute pathname to the
`-o` option. This can be used coupled with the TOR feature to listen
on UNIX domain sockets which is supported for client sockets since
[Tor-0.2.6](https://blog.torproject.org/coming-tor-026/).
- Fix an error case in the path canonicalizer where an `EBADF` error
would be incorrectly returned in case of the correct `ENOENT`.
- Upgrade `ringbuf` crate from version `0.4.7` to `0.4.8`.
- Update links to point to `exherbo.org` rather than `exherbolinux.org`.
# 3.34.0
- Remove security policy cache for paths and IP addresses in
consistency with the sealing read-only the sandbox policy using
_mseal_(2) to mitigate potential cache poisoning attacks for a
compromised Syd process. The options `cache/capacity/path` and
`cache/capacity/addr` have been removed. The dependency on the
`quick_cache` crate has been removed.
- Print _mseal_(2) support information in version output.
- Add option
[`trace/allow_unsafe_nomseal`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#trace/allow_unsafe_nomseal)
to disable memory sealing of sandbox policy regions on sandbox lock.
- Bump MSRV from 1.70 to 1.73.
- Seal most critical sections of the sandbox policy as read-only using
_mseal_(2) when the sandbox is locked. This raises the bar for an
attacker who has compromised the Syd process and attempting to edit
the sandbox policy to access otherwise denylisted resources. In the
future, the range of the sealed regions is planned to be extended to
cover more of the sandbox policy. Refer to the ["Memory Sealing of Sandbox
Policy on
Lock"](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#Memory_Sealing_of_Sandbox_Policy_Regions_on_Lock)
section of the _syd_(7) manual page for more information.
- Document the option
[`trace/allow_unsafe_namespace`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#trace/allow_unsafe_namespace)
in the _syd_(2) manual page.
- Fix panic in _syd-read_(1) by initializing static file descriptors
using `syd::config::proc_init` which is a new requirement for
`syd::fs::safe_canonicalize`.
# 3.33.0
- Teach _syd-lock_(1) about the new refined Landlock sandbox categorization
using the `-l category[,category...]{+|-}path|port[-port]` argument.
See _syd-lock_(1) and _syd_(7) manual pages for more information.
- When run without arguments _syd-lock_(1) now prints help and exits,
rather than attempting to execute the default shell in vain.
- Move _kcmp_(2) from safe system calls to ptrace system calls. Among
with _ptrace_(2), _process_vm_readv_(2), and _process_vm_writev_(2),
this system call is now always denied unless
[`trace/allow_unsafe_ptrace:1`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#trace/allow_unsafe_ptrace)
is passed at startup. Previously _kcmp_(2) was always allowed. This is
consistent with the Linux kernel requirement of
`PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS` against both pids.
- Extend the `SCM_CREDENTIALS` process ID check to
check whether the argument pid shares the same
address space with the _seccomp_(2) request tid.
This fixes vala's dbus tests, see: #78.
- Check file descriptor argument early in _fallocate_(2),
_fstatfs_(2) and _ftruncate_(2) handlers. This is
consistent with the Linux kernel. See #224 for the
test failure identifying the bug.
- Add rule `allow/lock/readdir+/` to the paludis profile
to avoid test failures wrt. opening the root directory.
See #208, #212, and #219 for examples.
- Refine Landlock sandbox categories. Add the new [Lock
sandboxing](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#Lock_Sandboxing)
categories `lock/exec`, `lock/ioctl`, `lock/create`, `lock/delete`,
`lock/rename`, `lock/symlink`, `lock/truncate`, `lock/readdir`,
`lock/mkdir`, `lock/rmdir`, `lock/mkdev`, and `lock/mkfifo`. The
`lock/bind` category has been changed to accept an absolute path
name to confine UNIX domain socket creation, renames and links.
- Add new sandboxing category `rmdir` to confine directory deletion.
Previously, this type of access was confined with the `delete` category.
- Teach _syd-ls_(1) to list all the files in current working directory if no set
name is given. The file names are printed hex-encoded, delimited by newline.
Use the new stream mode of _syd-hex_(1) with `syd-hex -ds` to decode.
- Teach _syd-ls_(1) the new `ebpf` system call set.
- Teach _syd-hex_(1) to continue in case of stream mode errors with `-C` or
`--continue-on-failure`.
- Teach _syd-hex_(1) stream mode with `-s` or `--stream`.
- Polish seccomp filter exporting and support the new environment
variable `SYD_DUMP_SCMP` to export filters. This environment variable
is equivalent to the `-E mode` command line option.
- Preallocate per Syd syscall handler thread, ie `syd_emu`, directory
reading buffers to handle _getdents64_(2) system call at thread
startup to avoid repeated allocation costs.
- Store the salt for key derivation function for
[Crypt sandboxing](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#Crypt_Sandboxing)
in secure memory and clear it once Linux Kernel Cryptography API
(KCAPI) connection is established.
- Various minor fixes for profiling which uses `gperf` and `tcmalloc`
via the `prof` build feature.
- Start using the `nix` crate to set _errno_(3),
and drop the unused `errno` crate dependency.
- Support `features` subcommand for _syd-oci_(1).
This subcommand was introduced in _runc_(1) by
https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/pull/3296
It is documented here:
https://github.com/opencontainers/runtime-spec/blob/main/features-linux.md
- Add the new syscam call _uretprobe_(2) to the list of eBPF system
calls. eBPF system calls are only allowed if
[`trace/allow_unsafe_ebpf:1`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#trace/allow_unsafe_ebpf)
is set at startup.
- Add the new system call _map_shadow_stack_(2) to the list of safe
system calls. Safe system calls are passed directly to the host kernel
without any filtering.
- Revert back to using upstream `libseccomp` crate now that it
has support for `libseccomp-2.6`.
- List Linux Security Modules (LSMs) in `syd -V` output using the
new _lsm_list_modules_(2) system call available in Linux-6.10 and
newer.
# 3.32.7
- Keep IVs in secure memory for `ALG_SET_IV` control operations in
_sendmsg_(2) and _sendmmsg_(2) handlers.
- Return `EACCES` rather than no-opping `set_*id` calls which attempt to
transit to uids/gids below `UID_MIN` or `GID_MIN` respectively. This
is only fixed in the second layer in the _seccomp_unotify_(2) hook.
Syd's parent seccomp-bpf filter, which is the first layer, already
returns `EACCES` in these cases.
- Fix pid check in `SCM_CREDENTIALS` control message handler.
- Protect against unknown errnos from returning a no-op
in the _seccomp_unotify_(2) handler.
- Add `abort` to the list of actions in _syd_(2).
# 3.32.6
- Report the availability of the `log` feature in `syd -V` output.
- Revert `/proc/uptime` and `/proc/loadavg` randomization
which was broken due to the conflict with restricting
the _write_(2) system call in Syd emulator threads.
The _sysinfo_(2) system call is still randomized and
the `linux` profile no longer gives access to these
files. Finally the `paludis` profile has been changed
to allow access to these files.
- Remove the rule
[`trace/allow_unsafe_open_cdev:1`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#trace/allow_unsafe_open_cdev)
from the `paludis` profile.
- Document the new API commands for the new `abort` action
in _syd_(2) manual page.
- Do not drop the Linux capability `CAP_BPF` when
[`trace/allow_unsafe_ebpf:1`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#trace/allow_unsafe_ebpf)
is passed at startup.
- Remove the rule
[`trace/allow_unsafe_ebpf:1`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#trace/allow_unsafe_ebpf)
from the `paludis` profile.
- Add new environment variable `SYD_SKIP_SCMP` to skip _seccomp_(2)
confinement of per-Syd threads. This is unsafe and should only be used
for profiling. Syd will warn about this at startup. This was
previously only done in debug mode.
- Document the new
[`trace/allow_unsafe_chroot`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#trace/allow_unsafe_chroot)
in _syd_(2) manual page.
- Confine _fcntl_(2) operations of Syd emulator threads and the main
wait thread to `F_GETFD`, `F_SETFD`, `F_GETFL`, `F_SETFL`,
`F_OFD_SETLK` and `F_OFD_SETLKW` operations. Attempting to run any
other _fcntl_(2) operation results in an immediate termination of Syd
and all processes running under it.
- Confine _fcntl_(2) operations of Syd AES threads to `F_GETFD`,
`F_SETFD` and `F_OFD_SETLKW` operations. Attempting to run any
other _fcntl_(2) operation results in an immediate termination
of Syd and all processes running under it.
- Deny _write_(2) and _writev_(2) system calls to the Syd emulator
threads and the Syd main process using the per-thread _seccomp_(2)
filter unless `trace/memory_access` has been manually set at startup
to one of the modes that allow _proc_pid_mem_(5) access in which case
the _write_(2) system call is necessary. Note, _write_(2) calls to the
logging file descriptor are an exception to this rule and are allowed
in case logging is enabled at startup. Denying access to the
_write_(2) system call by default in Syd emulator threads raises the
bar for an attacker trying to exploit via BROP.
- Check and print support for `CONFIG_CROSS_MEMORY_ATTACH` option
in the running host Linux kernel in version output with `syd -V`,
and warn about the insecurity when the support is lacking.
- Add option `trace/memory_access:0` to the `paludis` profile to
fallback to _proc_pid_mem_(5) access automatically in case
`CONFIG_CROSS_MEMORY_ATTACH` is not enabled. The lack of page
protections is irrelevant in package build context and we care
more about compatibility across various Linux kernels in this
profile.
- Add new
[`trace/memory_access`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#trace/memory_access)
mode `2` which uses cross memory attach unconditionally. This is the
new secure default which used to be to fall back to _proc_pid_mem_(5)
if the host Linux kernel is not configured with the
`CONFIG_CROSS_MEMORY_ATTACH` option. _proc_pid_mem_(5) access is
dangerous because it does not honour the memory page protections
of the target process unlike the _process_vm_readv_(2) and
_process_vm_writev_(2) system calls, therefore Syd can be (ab)used
as a confused deputy to corrupt/control sandbox process memory in
this mode of access.
- Fix _proc_pid_mem_(5) write access which was broken in version 3.30.0,
during procfs hardening part of the new safe canonicalization.
# 3.32.5
- Make Syd's _kill_(2) family system call protector return `EACCES` on
failures rather than returning 0 to the system call therefore turning
the system call into a no-op. This is done regardless whether Syd is
pid=1 in a user-namespace and there's a kernel level _seccomp_(2) bpf
filter to allow system calls when the dummy signal 0 is specified.
- Detail "FILES" section of _syd-emacs_(1) manual page.
- Avoid an extra allocation during truncation in _getsockname_(2)
handler for UNIX socket _bind_(2) maps.
- Fix network address and length memory writes in _accept_(2), and
_accept4_(2) handlers. Without this fix, Syd could write up to
typically 112 (128 - 16) bytes of potentially user-controlled data,
which is partly initialized by the return address from the host Linux
_accept4_(2) system call and partly an undefined memory region into an
area in the address space of the same sandbox process. This happens in
unsafe code crossing FFI boundaries, `struct sockaddr_storage` which
is picked as "large enough to hold any `sockaddr` (except `AF_UNIX`)"
typically has a size of 128 bytes, meanwhile `struct sockaddr_in`
typically has a size of 16 bytes, therefore a vulnerable Syd can
potentially write up to 112 undefined bytes into an area potentially
out of bounds in sandbox process memory. The commit
[2cd7dccee](https://gitlab.exherbo.org/sydbox/sydbox/-/commit/2cd7dccee59069d79be1748fb9a6ba6e376c1651),
fixes the core issue, and
[b306703b3](https://gitlab.exherbo.org/sydbox/sydbox/-/commit/b306703b396575d1ea8a78190d0f4c4487c87da7)
further hardens the _accept_(2) and _accept4_(2) system call handlers
against unsafe behaviour during address truncation. **This is a
security issue and users are recommended to update asap.** Huge kudos
to kepstin and mixi for identifying and fixing the bug that originated
from a ftp test failure part of the test-suite of the
[`net-misc/wget`](https://summer.exherbo.org/packages/net-misc/wget/index.html)
[Exherbo Linux](https://www.exherbo.org/) package.
- Allow interrupt threads to run the _sigprocmask_(2) and
_rt_sigprocmask_(2) system calls.
- Allow interrupt threads to run the _sigaltstack_(2) system call.
- Add option `trace/allow_unsafe_prlimit:1` to the `debug` profile
to ease generating coredumps.
- Add option `trace/allow_unsafe_prctl:1` to the `paludis` profile
because perl tests checks setting process name using _prctl_(2)
`PR_SET_NAME` operation.
- Allow `read` and `stat` access to `/proc/uptime` and `/proc/loadavg`
files in the `linux` profile to provide the randomized versions of the
files by default.
- Provide virtualized versions of `/proc/uptime` and `/proc/loadavg`
files consistent with the _sysinfo_(2) randomizer. This access is
subject to sandbox policy check and can be disabled with
`trace/allow_unsafe_sysinfo:1`.
- Improve exit tracing in syscall monitor and emulator threads.
by proactively closing the seccomp-notify file descriptor.
- Grant `/proc` PID traversals, ie identifying fellow processes by
_readdir_(2)'ing `/proc`, for the `paludis` profile using the rule
`allow/stat+/proc/[0-9]*`. This is done because package tests often
assume they can identify fellow processes by _readdir_(2)'ing the
`/proc` directory. In contrast, the default secure `linux` profile
denies this access because it is an information leak.
- Grant `/proc` wide access to the `stat` files for the `paludis`
profile. This is often useful in package testing when packages
assume files such as `/proc/1/stat` is accessible.
- Grant `read` and `stat` access to `/proc/self/stat` and
`/proc/self/task/*/stat` files for the `linux` profile. This is
consistent with the file `/proc/stat` which is given `read` and `stat`
access in the `linux` profile.
- Add `trace/allow_unsafe_magiclinks:1` to the `paludis` profile.
- Improve initial core system call emulator thread spawning procedure.
- Add new environment variable `SYD_NPROC_MAX` to define the number of
maximum number of syscall handler threads. The number must be greater
than the value of `SYD_NPROC` which defaults to the number of CPUs.
The default value of `SYD_NPROC_MAX` is currently `usize::MAX`.
- Add `abort` to the list of available actions which causes Syd to deny
the system call, warn and send the sandbox process a `SIGABRT` signal.
This action is intended for _pledge_(2) compatibility.
# 3.32.4
- Add `trace/allow_unsafe_sysinfo:1` to the `paludis` profile.
- Add option `trace/allow_unsafe_sysinfo:1` to disable the _sysinfo_(2)
randomizer.
- Add `trace/allow_unsafe_chroot:1` to the `paludis` profile.
- Add option `trace/allow_unsafe_chroot:1` to turn the _chroot_(2)
system call into a no-op like it's done by default for the
_pivot_root_(2) system call.
- Add the new system calls _listmount_(2) and _statmount_(2) to
the set of the `mount` system calls.
- Add the system calls _lsm_get_self_attr_(2), _lsm_set_self_attr_(2),
and _lsm_list_modules_(2) to the list of `dead` syscalls. These system
calls will always error for sandbox processes and Syd.
- The system calls _setxattr_(2) and _setxattrat_(2) now deny access to
the `user.syd.*` xattr namespace with the errno `EACCES` rather than
`ENODATA`.
- Add handlers for system calls _getxattrat_(2), _setxattrat_(2),
_listxattrat_(2), and _removexattrat_(2) which are new in Linux>=6.13.
_getxattrat_(2) and _listxattrat_(2) are confined as part of `stat`
sandboxing, meanwhile _setxattrat_(2) and _removexattrat_(2) are
confined as part of `chattr` sandboxing. Syd's restrictions on
`user.syd.*` xattr namespace is applied for these system calls as
well.
- Add the new system call _mseal_(2) to the list of allowed system calls.
- Allow the flag combination `O_PATH|O_NOCTTY` in _open_(2) system call
handlers. Previously an `EINVAL`, aka "Invalid argument" error was
returned in this case which notably breaks on Alpine Linux.
- Remove the overly-complex and racy `path->O_PATH-fd` cache and the
configuration option `cache/capacity/fd`.
- Print the status of the kernel BPF JIT compiler in Syd version output.
- _syd-hex_(1) now refuses to output to standard output in case standard
output is attached to a TTY when decoding hexadecimal input. The new
command line flags `-f` and `--force-tty` may be used to
override this check.
- Mask control characters in pathnames listed in `/proc/pid/maps` for
logging.
- Set `log/verbose:false` for the `paludis` profile.
- Unmask the file `/proc/version` for the `paludis` profile. This
file is masked by the `linux` profile for consistency with _uname_(2)
restrictions.
- Fix adding watches for symbolic links in _inotify_add_watch_(2) handler.
- Fix adding watches for directories in _inotify_add_watch_(2) handler.
- Improve core thread spawn at startup for quicker boot times.
- Harden `syd::pool::ThreadPool` against DOS attacks utilizing blocking
_open_(2) calls.
- Avoid busy looping in Syd interrupt thread and wait on a condition variable.
- Refine Chroot sandboxing, see
[sandbox/chroot](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#sandbox/chroot)
section of the _syd_(2) manual page for more information.
- Remove the incorrect validation where setting both of the flags
`AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW` and `AT_EMPTY_PATH` would fail the respective
system call to fail with `EINVAL`.
- Grant `read` and `stat` access to the file `/etc/man_db.conf` for
the `linux` profile.
- Grant `read`, `stat`, `chdir` and `readdir` access to the directory
`/etc/groff` recursively for the `linux` profile.
- Grant `read` and `stat` access to the file `/etc/locale.conf` for
the `linux` profile.
- Setting the option `log/verbose:0` no longer implies line-oriented
JSON. Line-oriented JSON is controlled by TTY detection and can be
explicitly set using the environment variables `SYD_FORCE_TTY` and
`SYD_QUIET_TTY`.
- Change deny action for _dlopen_(3) on a library with executable stack
to `EACCES` rather than `kill`.
- Return `EACCES`, aka "Access denied", rather than `ENOENT`, aka "No
such file or directory" for PID mismatches in hardened procfs checks.
The old behaviour confused programs such as pipewire which check
for flatpak support using procfs magic symbolic links.
- Allow passing files of unknown types such as event fds and epoll fds
as part of the `net/sendfd` category. Notably, pipewire depends on
this functionality. File descriptors referring to block devices,
directories and symbolic links are still denied.
# 3.32.3
- Grant `read`, `stat`, `chdir` and `readdir` access to the
directory `/etc/ca-certificates` recursively for the `linux`
profile.
- Fix _sysinfo_(2) system call randomizer for musl systems.
- Fix a problem with fd-invalidation of fd-path cache. Notably, this
makes concurrent programs written in golang work under Syd without any
issues. Previously running such programs would give `EEXIST`, aka
"File exists", errors sporadically.
- Fix a race with concurrent exclusive creating _open_(2) calls.
- Refine file type validations in _open_(2) system calls.
- Use OS random number generator for FD randomization to mitigate races.
- Ensure no non-standard file descriptors are leaked into the process
executed by the command `cmd/exec`.
- Ensure the command executed by `cmd/exec` is correctly daemonized.
- Grant `read` and `stat` access to the files `/proc/{cpu,mem}info` and
`/proc/crypto` for the `paludis` profile.
- Refine access rights of the `/proc/self/fd` directory for the `linux` profile.
- Return `EISDIR` on attempted write opens on directories.
- Grant `stat`, `read`, `chdir` and `readdir` access to the
`/proc/sys/fs` directory recursively for the `linux` profile.
Note `linux` profile already allows `/proc/sys/kernel` and
`/proc/sys/vm` so this is consistent.
- Fix an issue with `l{get,set,remove}xattr` handlers. Previously these
system call handlers incorrectly returned `ENOTSUP` for paths whose
last component is a dot, aka `.`.
- Fix `trace/allow_safe_bind` option to correctly allow UNIX abstract
sockets and unnamed UNIX sockets.
- Fix an issue with setting open file resource limits. Notably, this
fixes the `test-dup2` test of gnulib.
- Fix an issue with path canonicalization regarding `procfs` files.
- Fix PID calculation for `procfs` in safe path checker.
- Fix access violation reporting for path hiding.
- Remove the _kill_(2) system call from the list of allowed system calls
in `syd_emu` emulator threads. Note, the `kill` action already uses
pidfds and _pidfd_send_signal_(2) for race-free signal delivery hence
_kill_(2) is not needed.
- vim: highlight the new option
[`trace/allow_unsafe_ebpf`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#trace/allow_unsafe_ebpf).
# 3.32.2
- Fix a build regression in `syd-test` on arm, loongarch64 and riscv64
due to missing _open_(2) syscall.
# 3.32.1
- Handle `EINVAL`, aka "Invalid argument" gracefully when loading
_seccomp_(2) filters for _syd-elf_(1).
- Remove the (now-defunct) utility _syd-chk_(1).
- Add the option `trace/allow_unsafe_ebpf:1` to the `paludis` profile.
- Add the option `trace/allow_unsafe_cbpf:1` to the `paludis` profile.
- Add option `trace/allow_unsafe_ebpf:1` to allow direct eBPF use.
- Deny _seccomp_(2) system call in per-thread seccomp filters of Syd's
emulator and encryptor threads to avoid potential confused deputy
problems.
- Deny sandbox processes from installing additional _seccomp_(2) cbpf
filters by default. This restriction can be lifted at startup with the
new option
[`trace/allow_unsafe_cbpf:1`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#trace/allow_unsafe_cbpf)
**This is a security issue, users are recommended to update asap:**
Lack of this mitigation potentially allows sandbox processes to
install more precedent actions than `seccomp-unotify` and thereby
bypass Syd's own _seccomp_(2) cbpf filters.
- _syd-ls_(1) learned the `futex` set to print the list of _futex_(2)
family system calls.
- Allow the _swapcontext_(2) system call by default. Syd used to deny
this PowerPC-only system call unconditionally.
- Allow _futex_requeue_(2), and _futex_wait_(2) system calls by default.
Note, Syd already allows the system calls _futex_(2),
_futex_time64_(2), and _futex_waitv_(2) so this is consistent.
- Return `EEXIST` in _mkdir_(2) handler if path exists after access check.
- Avoid raising `mkdir` access violations for paths that already exist.
# 3.32.0
- Add rules `allow/net/bind+!unnamed` and `allow/net/connect+!unnamed`
to the `linux` profile to grant network access to unnamed UNIX
sockets.
- Confine network system calls to unnamed UNIX sockets
using the dummy path "!unnamed" during access check.
Previously only the `net/sendfd` used this confinement,
meanwhile `net/bind` and `net/connect` groups always allowed access to
unnamed UNIX sockets.
- Prefix UNIX abstract sockets with the "@" character
before access check for clear distinction between
UNIX domain and abstract sockets.
- Fix build on libseccomp versions older than `2.6`.
# 3.31.0
- Fix an integer overflow in _sysinfo_(2) uptime randomizer.
- Rewrite option parsing to use the `lexopt` crate rather than `argv`
and `getargs` crates. Make option parsing [POSIXly
correct](https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/basedefs/V1_chap12.html#tag_12_02).
- Set option `trace/allow_unsafe_open_cdev:1` for the `paludis` profile.
- Add new option `trace/allow_unsafe_open_cdev` to access per-process
character devices, such as `/dev/kfd` of AMD GPUs. See [the
documentation of this
option](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#trace/allow_unsafe_open_cdev)
in _syd_(2) manual page for the security implications.
- Rename option `trace/allow_unsafe_open` to
`trace/allow_unsafe_open_path` for clarity.
- Ghost mode can now be entered even if Crypt sandboxing is on.
Previously the `ghost` command returned `EBUSY` in this case.
- Add the system calls _sched_setattr_(2) and _sched_setparam_(2) to the
list of nice system calls. See `syd-ls nice` for the complete list.
These system calls are denied unless `trace/allow_unsafe_nice:1` is
passed at startup.
- Add `nice` to the list of syscall groups listed by _syd-ls_(1).
- Move the rule `allow/net/sendfd+!unnamed` from the `paludis` profile
to the `linux` profile which is also included by the `user` profile.
- Change the dummy path to confine sending file descriptors
to unnamed sockets from "/dev/null" to "!unnamed" for clarity.
- Disallow sending file descriptors referring to block devices,
directories and symbolic links using the _sendmsg_(2) and
_sendmmsg_(2) system calls. This is in alignment with OpenBSD
_pledge_(2) which disallows file descriptors referring to directories
from being sent.
- Rename sandboxing category `net/send` to `net/sendfd` for clarity.
- Split `node` sandboxing category into two new categories: `mkdev` to
confine character device creation, and `mkfifo` to confine named pipe
(FIFO) creation.
- Split `attr` sandboxing category into three new categories: `chmod` to
confine mode changes on files, `chattr` to confine extended attribute
changes on files, and `utime` to confine last and modification time
changes on files.
- Add new sandboxing category `mkdir` to confine directory creation.
Previously, this type of access was confined with the `create` category.
- Rename sandboxing category `tmpfile` to `mktemp` for clarity.
- Rename sandboxing category `link` to `symlink` for clarity.
- Stop using the `os_rng` feature of the `rand_core` crate which would
cause Syd to leak a file descriptor to `/dev/random` or `/dev/urandom`
to the sandbox process in some cases. Instead, use the libc function
_getentropy_(3) to seed the PRNG. _getentropy_(3) is an OpenBSD
innovation, and is implemented in recent glibc and musl versions.
- Precompute the main _seccomp_(2) filter before loading it in the
sandbox process.
- Allow the system calls _atomic_barrier_(2), _atomic_cmpxchg_32_(2),
and _getpagesize_(2).
- Allow the new system call _set_mempolicy_home_node_(2). Note,
syd already allows _set_mempolicy_(2) so this is consistent.
- Allow `node` access to `/dev/shm`, `/var/cache`, `/var/tmp` and `/tmp`
directories for the `linux` profile.
- Grant read access to `/var/db/paludis` for the `paludis` profile.
- Add support for Loongarch64 architecture, 比赛开始了，革命万岁！
- Add support for MIPS architectures.
- Avoid hardcoding _fchmodat2_(2) syscall number in chmod handler.
- Upgrade `rand_hc` crate from `0.3` to `0.4`.
- Upgrade `rand_core` crate from `0.6` to `0.9`.
# 3.30.1
- Fix rootless container detection for _syd-oci_(1).
- Fix _connect_(2) on sockets with `AF_UNSPEC` specified as socket family.
- Fix an IPv6-only DNS-name resolution issue in `syd::dns` module.
- _syd-dns_(1) has been promoted to a core utility and installed without
the `utils` feature.
- _syd-dns_(1) learned _-R_ to do reverse-DNS lookups using the system's
DNS resolver.
- Allow _set_mempolicy_(2) system call by default which is used by FF.
- Handle `EINVAL` gracefully for _fdatasync_(2) system call during
logging. This error indicates the system call was called on a file
descriptor pointing to a special file (pipe, socket etc.)
- Allow access to `/etc/authselect/nssswitch.conf` file for the `linux`
profile.
- Allow access to `/etc/GREP_COLORS` file for the `linux` profile.
- Allow access to `/etc/terminfo` directory for the `linux` profile.
- Allow _bind_(2) calls with port zero for Landlock in the `paludis`
profile.
# 3.30.0
- Prevent repeated successful _bind_(2) calls to the same address
does from overflowing the sandbox policy with
`trace/allow_safe_bind:1`.
- Set option `trace/allow_unsafe_nice:1` for the `paludis` profile.
- Reintroduce nice and ionice restrictions. Add option
`trace/allow_unsafe_nice` to disable.
- oci: Upgrade `youki` and dependencies from to version `0.5`.
- Fix offset and length argument handling of the _fallocate_(2) handler
on 32-bit systems.
- Add new builtin profile `enforce` to easily set default
action back to `Deny`, useful in undoing `oci` and `trace`
profiles.
- The `load` command may now be used to load builtin profiles.
- Add the rule `trace/allow_unsafe_nopie:1` to the `oci` profile.
This is because most containers ship non-PIE binaries, and
the `oci` profile is only supposed to be run during container
learning mode.
- Harden the `user` profile by including the `immutable` profile.
- Set sandbox lock to `exec` for the `oci` profile.
- Make `oci` profile more useful utilizing the `trace` profile
with `trace/allow_safe_syslog:1`.
- Set `log/level:verbose` for the `user` profile.
- Add `trace/allow_safe_syslog:1` to the `user` profile.
- Add option `trace/allow_safe_syslog:1` to allow access to Syd's
_syslog_(2) emulation using _dmesg_(8). Without this option
a process needs access to the sandbox lock to use _dmesg_(8).
Note, this option has nothing to do with access to the host _syslog_(2)
which is never allowed.
- Allow read access to system shell initialization files for the `user`
profile.
- Use CPU pinning for emulator threads to improve performance.
- Replace `parking_lot` crate with stdlib locks.
- Add `trace/allow_unsafe_spec_exec:1` to the `paludis` profile.
- The `silent` profile has been renamed to `quiet`.
- Set `log/verbose` to off for the `trace` profile.
- The new `log/verbose` setting which is on by default may now be used
to reduce log size.
- The new `log/syslog` setting may now be used in configuration
to disable logging to host _syslog_(3). This is enabled unless
`SYD_NO_SYSLOG` is set at startup.
- The new `log/level` setting may now be used in configuration
to define the log level. Log level defaults to "warn" unless
`SYD_LOG` environment is set at startup.
- Implement a _syslog_(2) interface to maintain a ring buffer
of access violations. This allows the sandbox process to
access these logs using _dmesg_(1) from within the sandbox
given that the sandbox lock allows it. Above all, this
provides a practical way to use learning mode for containers
spawned with _syd-oci_(1).
- The environment variable `SYD_NPROC` can now be used to
define the number of core syscall handler threads. If unset,
this defaults to the number of CPUs on the system.
- Add rules `allow/lock/bind+1024-65535` and
`allow/lock/connect+1024-65535` to the `paludis` profile.
- Fix Landlock _ioctl_(2) request support which is new in Landlock ABI 5
and newer which requires Linux-6.10 or newer.
- Add option
[`trace/sync_seccomp`](http://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#trace/sync_seccomp)
to use synchronous mode for seccomp-notify which defaults to false
unless `SYD_SYNC_SCMP` environment variable is set at startup.
- Change Force sandboxing default action from `kill` to `deny`. Now that
we hook into entry of _execve_(2) we're able to deny execution before
it happens.
- Change SegvGuard default action from `kill` to `deny`. Now that we
hook into entry of _execve_(2) we're able to deny execution before
it happens.
- Abort with error if a specified configuration file has a symbolic
link in _any_ of its path components.
- Replace the `rustc-hash` crate with the `ahash` crate for hashmaps and
hashsets.
The former is not safe to run on untrusted input.
- Support arbitrarily long path names in syscall file descriptor
arguments, and sandbox process cwd. Notably, this fixes the
longstanding failure of gnulib's test-getcwd under Syd.
- Add new utility _syd-asm_(1) to disassamble raw bytes and print them
as a sequence of JSON lines. The disassembly is done natively for
architectures *x86*, *x86_64*, *x32*, *arm*, *aarch64*, and *riscv64*
and falls back to GNU _objdump_(1) for other architectures. There's no
support for LLVM _objdump_(1) yet.
- Add `trace/allow_unsafe_sigreturn:1` to the `paludis` profile.
- Add a mitigation to effectively [`detect and prevent
SROP`](http://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#Mitigation_Against_Sigreturn_Oriented_Programming_(SROP)).
- Confine _ioctl_(2) operations for Syd emulator threads to a restricted
set of seccomp operations on the seccomp-notify fd only.
- Confine _epoll_(7) operations for Syd emulator threads and the main thread
to a restricted set of epoll operations on the epoll fd only.
- Support the `SYD_PID_FN` environment variable to specify path to a pid
filename into which Syd will write its process ID at startup. The file
must not exist and is going to be created with user-only read
permissions.
- Add a pidfd cache to only ever open each pidfd once in its lifetime.
The file descriptors are retired effectively using _epoll_(7).
- Handle interrupts in blocking _creat_(2), _open_(2), _openat_(2),
_openat2_(2), _fallocate_(2), _ftruncate_(2), _fstatfs_(2), _accept_(2),
_connect_(2), _sendto_(2), _sendmsg_(2), and _sendmmsg_(2) system calls.
- Log path hiding with `info` level unless explicitly specified to warn.
- Add new sandboxing categories [`Rename
Sandboxing`](http://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#Create/Delete/Truncate/Rename/Link_Sandboxing)
and [`Link
Sandboxing`](http://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#Create/Delete/Truncate/Rename/Link_Sandboxing)
to confine file renames and symlinking. Previously these types of access was
checked under Create sandboxing.
- Workaround uninterruptible FIFOs by monitoring for signals in
the sandbox process.
- The option `trace/allow_unsafe_debug` has been replaced with two
more refined options `trace/allow_unsafe_ptrace` and
`trace/allow_unsafe_perf`. The meaning of `trace/allow_unsafe_exec`
has been changed.
- Add new sandboxing categories [`Chdir
Sandboxing`](http://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#Chdir_Sandboxing) and
[`Readdir
Sandboxing`](http://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#Readdir_Sandboxing)
to confine directory changes and listings.
- Harden the existing _exec_(3) ptrace hook, do checks
both at syscall entry and ptrace exec event so that
both scripts and binaries are covered.
- Implement a safe _chdir_(2) hook based on _ptrace_(2).
- Start hooking into _fchdir_(2) for stat sandboxing again.
- Bring back the `shellexpand` dependency, set
[`config/expand`](http://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#config/expand)
to zero seconds and use `shellexpand` rather than _wordexp_(3) unless
a timeout is set. This runs much faster as it does not require
confinement, however it does not support command substitution and
recursive environment variable expansion like _wordexp_(3) does.
- Fix `RESOLVE_BENEATH` handling in _openat_(2) handler.
- Start using a cryptographically secure random number generator that
uses the HC-128 algorithm rather than relying on _getrandom_(2)
with `GRND_RANDOM` which is slow and overkill.
- Stop hooking into _getrandom_(2) for Read sandboxing. Since
this system call is soon to be provided by VDSO, there's
little point.
- Fix a TOCTTOU vector in _mmap_(2) handler.
- Rework path canonicalization making it more efficient and secure
it against magic symbolic links.
- Rework the `syd::proc` module based on _openat2_(2) system call
for `/proc` access disabling symbolic link resolution where possible.
- Support the environment variables `SYD_FORCE_TTY` and `SYD_QUIET_TTY`
to fine tune log format. The former forces pretty-printed JSON,
whereas the latter disables TTY detection and forces line-oriented
JSON.
# 3.29.4
- Deny access to the files `/proc/sys/kernel/modprobe` and
`/sys/kernel/notes` for the `immutable` profile using bind
mounts. This is consistent with the `linux` profile which
masks these files.
- Fix bind mound error reporting on non-existent mount-points.
# 3.29.3
- Add new utility _syd-emacs_(1) which is a convenience
wrapper to run Emacs under Syd.
- Respect magic paths for _access_(2) family system calls.
- Add magic path `/dev/syd.el` to get `syd.el`.
- Add magic path `/dev/syd.sh` to get `esyd` helper function.
- Add CLI option `syd --el` to output `syd.el`.
- Start shipping `syd.el` with Syd rather than libsyd.
- Fix a regression of _stat_(2) handler in handling magic paths.
# 3.29.2
- Fix a regression in unit tests.
# 3.29.1
- Mask the file `/proc/sys/kernel/modprobe` in `linux` profile.
Modification of this file requires no capabilities (can cause
arbitrary code to be inserted into the kernel via a replacement
modprobe). See
for more
information.
- Add `FIBMAP` to the default _ioctl_(2) denylist. Coupled with the
`CAP_SYS_RAWIO` capability, this _ioctl_(2) operation which would
potentially allow for exploitation of the kernel via the handling of
input it doesn't expect from untrusted sources. See
for the reason for FIBMAP being privileged, and
for further discussion.
- Add `KDSETKEYCODE` to the default _ioctl_(2) denylist. Coupled with
the `CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG` capability, this _ioctl_(2) operation can be
used by an attacker to temporarily change the keyboard mapping of an
administrator's tty to cause a different command to be executed than
intended. See
for more information.
# 3.29.0
- Use TCP Fast Open for _syd-tor_(1).
- Add new utility _syd-pds_(1) to run a command with the parent death
signal set.
- Sync [`ioctl/allow`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#ioctl/allow),
and [`ioctl/deny`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#ioctl/deny)
defaults with Landlock ABI 5 ioctl device defaults.
- Confine abstract unix socket namespace and signaling with Landlock ABI
6 and later.
- The command
[`allow/lock/write`](http://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#allow/lock/write)
now includes _ioctl_(2) operations with Landlock ABI 5 and later.
- Add new command
[`allow/lock/connect`](http://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#allow/lock/connect)
to confine _connect_(2) ports using Landlock ABI 4 and later.
- Add new command
[`allow/lock/bind`](http://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#allow/lock/bind)
to confine _bind_(2) ports using Landlock ABI 4 and later.
- Support Landlock ABI v{4..=6}.
- `syd-lock` has been promoted to core tools and is now installed
regardless of the `utils` feature.
- Compare HMAC for Crypt sandboxing in constant time.
- Compare checksums for binary verification in constant time.
- Remove the unused `pandora` profile.
- Make wordexp proc mount non-fatal to avoid panics within
presence of SELinux.
- Allow access to `/proc/filesystems`, `/proc/loadavg`, `/proc/stat`
for the `linux` profile.
# 3.28.5
- Revert allowing _clone3_(2) for the Syd process, as such
a comprimised Syd process cannot create sub-namespaces,
and circumvent sandbox policy this way.
# 3.28.4
- Allow _clone3_(2) system call for emulator and aes threads.
- Fix hiding of unsafe filenames for the _getdents64_(2) handler.
- Fix `tmpfile` access for `/tmp` and `/var/tmp` for the `linux` profile.
- Allow access to the `FS_IOC_SETFLAGS` _ioctl_(2) request for
the `paludis` profile.
- Disallow access to the system console in `landlock` and `linux`
profiles.
- Harden `/etc` rules of the `linux` profile.
- Allow read access to `/var/lib/sss/mc/{passwd,group}` files for
`linux` profile. These files are needed for LDAP authentication.
- Log `/proc/self` in place of `/proc/${pid}` as necessary.
- Fix a minor bug with hidden check and `/proc` paths.
# 3.28.3
- Harden `linux` profile using stricter procfs rules utilizing
`/proc/self`. This means, the sandbox processes are confined
to access only their own per-process procfs directory.
- The identifier `/proc/self` may now be used in _glob_(3) rules, which
is dynamically updated to the PID of the sandbox process making the
system call. This allows for stricter procfs rules by simply using the
prefix `/proc/self` rather than `/proc/[0-9]*` in _glob_(3) rules.
- Grant access to `/proc/filesystems` file in the `linux` profile.
- Grant access to `/proc/pid/attr` directory in the `linux` profile.
- Move default mask rules to the `linux` profile.
- Filter process name change attempts for the `paludis` profile.
- Allow read and stat access to the files `/proc/pid/m{aps,ounts}` for
the `linux` profile. These files are masked by the `linux` profile.
- Provide more fields for _syd-stat_(1) using the file `/proc/pid/stat`.
# 3.28.2
- Fix permissions for `/var/tmp` for `landlock` and `linux` profiles.
- Log emulator panics.
- Crypt sandboxing now implies `trace/exit_wait_all:1` so as not
to leave any impartial encryption processes behind.
- Fix NULL path handling for _utimensat_(2) and _fanotify_mark_(2).
- Fix a concurrency issue with Crypt sandboxing.
- Log failed sandbox queries with the `info` level rather than `warn`.
- Allow file deletion under `/dev/shm` for the `linux` profile.
- Allow the system call _fallocate_(2) for system call handler threads,
so it can actually be emulated.
- Fix _ftruncate_(2) on encrypted files.
- Align _sysinfo_(2) random memory sizes with powers-of-two.
- Change safe file opener to do a turn of `O_PATH` _open_(2), followed
by a _statx_(2) and `/proc/self/fd` _open_(2). Previously Syd did a
single non-blocking _open_(2).
# 3.28.1
- Avoid binary search in _seccomp_(2) filters. Use manually set
priorities based on _strace_(1) count information.
- Fix a 32-bit compilation issue with the new _sysinfo_(2) handler.
- Fix a compilation issue on aarch64.
# 3.28.0
- Add new tool _syd-info_(1) to print system information.
- Add options `-c` and `-C` to _syd-path_(1) to calculate CRC32 and CRC64
checksums respectively.
- Add options `-c` and `-C` to _syd-sha_(1) to calculate CRC32 and CRC64
checksums respectively.
- Add `crc32` and `crc64` to the list of supported checksum algorithms
for Force sandboxing.
- Change project license from `GPL-3.0-or-later` to `GPL-3.0`.
- Implemented stricter filename validation to deny unsafe or malicious
filenames based on [Wheeler's Safename
LSM](https://dwheeler.com/essays/fixing-unix-linux-filenames.html).
- Make `AT_SECURE` setter work regardless of the number of arguments
passed to exec by the sandbox program. Previously if more arguments
than a certain threshold were passed to the program the setter would
fail with `EINVAL` and terminate the exec program.
- Update [Threat
Model](http://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#Threat_Model) section in
_syd(7)_ manual page to mention the sandbox lock and crypt sandboxing.
- Add new utility _syd-bit_(1) to flip random bits in files. We use this
tool in our test-suite to verify Crypt sandboxing is safe against
bit-flip attacks due to HMAC-SHA256 authentication.
- Prevent unsetting the `O_APPEND` flag using _fcntl_(2) `F_SETFL`
command for append-only files. This could be used to clobber
files which were marked `append` with Syd. Users are strongly
recommended to update.
- Add back the utility _syd-key_(1) which can be used to generate
random keys for Crypt sandboxing.
- Add back the utility _syd-aes_(1) which is an AES-CTR encryption and
decryption utility which uses the Linux Kernel Cryptography API.
- Add back Crypt sandboxing with a revised implementation that allows
for read-write and concurrent access. Encrypted files now have a magic
header to easily identify them. Random per-file IVs are now
prepended to files rather than stored in extended attributes
allowing for safe backups. Integrity checking is implemented by
adding a 32-byte HMAC-SHA256 tag which provides authentication and
safety against bit-flip attacks.
- Add _syd-sh_(1) which is a simple confined shell.
- Add new utility _syd-rnd_(1) to print `AT_RANDOM` bytes in various
formats.
- _syd-env_(1) has been promoted to a core tool and is now installed
even without the `utils` feature. We use _syd-env_(1) in our
test-suite to test environment expansion and command substitution.
- Implement a confined command substitution interface using
_wordexp_(3). Both syntaxes `$(cmd)` and ``cmd`` are supported.
Confinement is done using Landlock, namespaces, and seccomp.
- _syd-env_(1) learned the `-e eval-str` argument to perform environment
expansion and command substitution on the given string using
_wordexp_(3). _wordexp_(3) child process is executed in a confined
environment with a timeout of 3 seconds.
- _syd-hex_(1) learned the `-l limit` argument to exit after limit
number of characters are read and en/decoded.
- Set parent-death signal to `SIGKILL` as part of the confinement
procedure of _syd-tor_(1). This is a second layer that ensures
_syd-tor_(1) does not outlive the parent Syd process. The first layer
is the pid file descriptor of the Syd process that _syd-tor_(1) holds
and selects on as part of its epoll process.
- Make syd syscall emulator threads handle panics gracefully and deny
the syscall in progress to avoid sandbox process hangs. Added new
action `panic` to test this. This action is of little use outside
of testing.
- Add `all` keyword as a placeholder to disable all path/glob based
rules, e.g. `deny/all+${HOME}/.ssh/***` may be used to disallow
all access to user ssh configuration directory. We plan to add
this rule and more to the `user` profile for added hardening.
- Add new sandboxing type "tmpfile" to confine _open_(2), _openat_(2),
and _openat2_(2) calls with the `O_TMPFILE` flag. Previously this
access was checked under "write" sandboxing.
- Add new sandboxing type "attr" to confine changes to file attributes.
This includes extended attributes. Previously this access was checked
under "write" sandboxing.
- Add new sandboxing types "Create", "Delete", "Truncate" and "Node"
sandboxing. These types confine regular and special file
creation/deletion respectively. Previously this access was checked
under "write" sandboxing.
- Add new sandboxing type "net/send" which is to confine sending file
descriptors over UNIX sockets.
- Harden path canonicalization against symbolic link attacks.
- Paths in rules can now be specified as hex-encoded strings as well.
- Improve startup process utilizing `CLONE_FILES` avoiding a
_pidfd_getfd_(2) call.
- Harden the `immutable` profile by mounting the `/dev/shm` and `/tmp`
tmpfs mounts with the `nosymfollow` option.
- Harden the `linux` profile by deny-listing common sensitive /etc
paths, such as `/etc/crypttab`, and `/etc/shadow`.
- Support `nosymfollow` in
[bind](http://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#bind) options.
- The restriction to turn the system calls _sync_(2), and _syncfs_(2)
into no-operations (no-ops) can now be disabled with the new option
`trace/allow_unsafe_sync:1`. This is useful in scenarios where sync is
actually expected to work when sandboxing databases.
- Log and deny attempts to set process name with `PR_SET_NAME`
_prctl_(2) request. To disable logging use `filter/read+!proc/name`,
to allow setting process name inside the sandbox use
`trace/allow_unsafe_prctl:1`.
- Improve efficiency of signal protection for Syd tasks by avoiding
procfs reads during access check. Hook into _rt_sigqueueinfo_(2), and
_rt_tgsigqueueinfo_(2) for signal protection. These system calls may
be used to send signals to the Syd process and thereby interfere with
the workings of the sandbox so we now prevent this.
- Add new tool _syd-cap_(1) to print information on Linux capabilities.
- Mask the files `/proc/meminfo`, `/proc/loadavg` and `/proc/version`,
and return random data as return to _sysinfo_(2) system call to
prevent information leaks.
- Applied various minor fixes to path hiding.
- Start to log access violations of the `stat` type, aka path hiding.
- Honour the environment variable `SYD_PROXY_PORT` to override the
default value of `proxy/ext/port`.
- Honour the environment variable `SYD_PROXY_HOST` to override the
default value of `proxy/ext/host`.
- The environment variable to pick the default shell has been
changed from `SYD_SH` to `SYD_SHELL` for clarity.
- `proxy/ext/addr` option has been renamed to `proxy/ext/host` and
now it supports resolving hostnames using the system DNS resolver.
A random IP is selected in case of multiple responses.
- Add new utility _syd-dns_(1) to resolve hostnames to IP addresses
using the system DNS resolver.
- PID sandboxing is now checked at _ptrace_(2)
`PTRACE_EVENT_FORK|VFORK|CLONE` boundaries rather than at the entry of
system calls with _seccomp_(2).
- Improve the efficiency of the pid-limiter of PID sandboxing.
- Improve logging to make it more elaborate and readable.
- Enable `preserve_order` feature of the `serde_json` crate for more readable logs.
- Further harden procfs and devfs with various restrictions. See the
[Hardened procfs and
devfs](http://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#Hardened_procfs_and_devfs)
section of the _syd_(7) manual page for more information.
- The option `trace/force_cloexec` has been removed.
- Add new option `trace/allow_unsafe_magiclinks` to disable magic
symbolic link restrictions. By default, Syd does not follow /proc
magic symbolic links if the path process id does not match the caller
process id.
- Avoid caching paths with `/proc/$pid` prefix during access check.
- The `:action` part of `force+/path:hashhex:action` may now be omitted
in force rules in which case the action defaults to `kill`. This
allows for more readable rules.
- Check both the path `/dev/tty` and the original controlling process
terminal path for access for _open_(2), _openat_(2), and _openat2_(2)
handlers. The access check with the more critical action wins.
Previously only the original path was checked for access.
- Support the _openat2_(2) resolve flags `RESOLVE_BENEATH`,
`RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS`, `RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS`, and `RESOLVE_NO_XDEV`.
Make flag `RESOLVE_IN_ROOT` return `ENOSYS`. The `RESOLVE_CACHED`
option remains a no-op.
- Make `AT_SECURE` setter determine the address of stack using the
less-privileged `/proc/pid/stat` file rather than the
`/proc/pid/syscall` file whose access requires ptrace rights.
- Make `AT_SECURE` setter more efficient by reading less bytes from
child memory.
# 3.27.0
- Mask the file `/etc/machine-id` by default.
- The utility `_syd-tick_(1)` has been renamed to `syd-tck` to
reduce precious user typing time to invoke this utility.
- Enforce `AT_SECURE` in auxiliary vector at process exec. This
mitigation may be relaxed with the option `trace/allow_unsafe_libc:1`.
- Add new tool _syd-aux_(1) to print auxiliary vector information.
- Remove _pipe2_(2), from the allowed system call list of emulator threads.
- `trace/allow_safe_bind:1` no longer makes Syd skip the IP blocklist
check at _accept_(2) and _accept4_(2) boundaries.
- Do not check _accept_(2), and _accept4_(2) calls against the connect
sandboxing acl. These system calls are checked against the IP
blocklist only.
- Return `EACCES` rather than `ELOOP` error on procfs symlink
violations. This is in consistency with SELinux and works around
pipewire's broken flatpak detection logic.
- Add `trace/force_umask:7077` to the `user` profile. This setting has
been tested for a long time at the CTF server using the CTF profile.
- Ensure _syd-elf_(1) asserts a single path is required as argument
during option parsing. Previously, more than a single argument would
pass through but only the first path is parsed either way.
- Pass `CLONE_IO` to syscall emulator micro-threads in addition to
`CLONE_FILES`, `CLONE_VFORK`, `CLONE_VM`, and `CLONE_SIGHAND`.
- Use shared memory rather than pipes in syscall emulator micro-threads.
- Fix case-insensitivity of the _syd-err_(1) tool.
- Handle POSIX ACLs without reading on parent directory.
# 3.26.1
- Hook _getsockname_(2) and return correct path of UNIX domain sockets.
- Set `name/host` to `localhost` for the `paludis` profile.
- `name/host` and `name/domain` no longer imply `unshare/uts:1`. This
is going to allow profiles such as the `paludis` profile who don't
depend on namespaces to set a constant host-name and domain-name
without having to check whether namespaces are supported. The values
of these variables are inconsequential to the functioning of Syd
otherwise.
- Return `ENOTCONN` rather than `ECONNREFUSED` on _sendto_(2),
_sendmsg_(2), and _sendmmsg_(2) access violations. No changes in
_bind_(2) which returns `EADDRNOTAVAIL` and _connect_(2) which returns
`ECONNREFUSED`. Notably, this fixes python's `test_logging` under syd.
- Do not hook into _accept_(2) and _accept4_(2) system calls if the
option `trace/allow_safe_bind:1` was set at startup.
- Add new tool _syd-net_(1) to aggregate IP networks.
- Add `block` command to configure an IP blocklist range for Connect
network sandboxing. The range can also be populated by including
ipset and netset files.
- _syd-cat_(1) learned the `-m magic` argument to run a magic command at
init, and `-M magic` argument to run a magic command at exit.
- Implement rule de-duplication and aggregation when parsing ipset files.
- Replace the `ipnetwork` crate with the more versatile `ipnet` crate.
- _syd-cat_(1) now prints Syd configuration to standard output on
success. JSON output format may be used with the new `-j` option, and
compact JSON output format may be used with the new `-J` option. To
display rules of profiles the new `-p ` option is required.
- _syd-cat_(1) learned to parse multiple paths supplied as
command line arguments.
- _syd-cat_(1) learned to parse `.ipset` and `.netset` files.
- Added initial support for parsing `.ipset` and `.netset` files, which
are common formats for IP blocklists. These files may be included
with the `include` directive from within Syd configuration.
- File extension is now required in `include` paths. Currently,
the only supported file extension is `.syd-3`.
- The option `trace/allow_safe_bind:1` causes Syd to skip the access
check at _accept_(2)/_accept4_(2) boundary.
- Hook into _accept_(2) and _accept4_(2) system calls as part
of connect network sandboxing.
- Avoid micro-thread creation in _connect_(2), _sendto_(2), and
_sendmsg_(2) handlers.
- Reduce allocations when allocating buffers for paths.
# 3.26.0
- The `mimalloc` feature which was default to on has been removed. The
choice of allocator is no longer optional. There're two main reasons
for this: First, if you offer a secure allocator only optionally,
no-one enables it and this breaks the purpose. Second, supporting
two allocators introduces variance into test results and we don't
want to go down the rabbit hole of debugging/profiling an
allocator every time. We'd rather have a single, simple, efficient
allocator that we can forget about. `mimalloc` serves that purpose
well for now. Hiding this option from the user will also allow us to
change the allocator without too much hassle should the need arise in
the future.
- Change `mem/vm_max` default from `4GB` to `0`.
- Allow the extended attribute prefix `user.syd.*` for {get,list}xattr.
Access to `{set,rm}xattr` is still denied. This allows for practical
use of immutable extended attributes without privilege.
- Add the _ioctl_(2) request `KDSIGACCEPT` to the deny list.
- Add the _ioctl_(2) requests `FIOGETOWN`, `FIOSETOWN`, `SIOCGPGRP`,
and `SIOCSPGRP` to the allow list.
- Fix portability issues with `i586`, `ppc64le`, `riscv64`, and `s390x`
architectures. Syd passes tests on all now. We added them to our CI
and we will provide binary releases for them.
- Remove Crypt sandboxing and the utilities _syd-aes_(1), _syd-key_(1),
and _syd-cp_(1). Extensive testing over different architectures showed
various issues with the implementation: It was overly complicated,
racy, and could not offer full transparent encryption due to its
inability to handle read-write fds. Moreover, removing this sandboxing
type allows us to further confine emulator threads. Together with this
change we took the ability of emulator threads to call the syscalls
_accept4_(2), and _splice_(2). These system calls were used by
encryption only.
- Improve _socketcall_(2) handling using a seccomp-bpf filter for
selective socket subcall filtering.
- Improve _sendto_(2) handling and fix a TOCTTOU issue on architectures
which have the multiplexed _socketcall_(2) system call such as x86 and
powerpc.
- Drop `trace/allow_unsafe_kill:1` and allow _tkill_(2). Note,
this syscall is still subject to signal protections.
- Apply `trace/force_cloexec:1` to socket file descriptors.
- Hook the _socket_(2) syscall on 64-bit.
- Add `append` command to set files append-only.
- Revert the change which removes the syscall hooks `fallocate`,
`ftruncate`, and `ftruncate64`. Check these system calls for Write
sandboxing.
- Fix an IPv6 address parsing issue in _syd-tor_(1).
- Add option `proxy/addr` to specify alternative internal address for
Proxy sandboxing. This must be an IPv4 or IPv6 address and defaults to
127.0.0.1.
- `syd-cpu`, `syd-hex` and `syd-size` have been promoted to core tools
and are now installed regardless of the `utils` feature.
- Add new profile `off` as a shorthand to turn all sandboxing off.
- Add seccomp self-confinement to _syd-elf_(1).
- Add the path `/sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu*/cpufreq/scaling_cur_freq`
to the list of unsafe paths and deny access. See [this
article](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2404.10715) on how this file can be
(ab)used for dynamic frequency-based fingerprinting attacks.
- The option `trace/allow_unsafe_debug:1` makes Syd execute `syd-tor`
without confinement using the `-d` argument. This is useful for
debugging.
- Stop using the `const-syscall` feature of the libseccomp crate which
caused problems with new system calls such as _cachestat_(2) and
_fchmodat2_(2).
- To lock the sandbox, `-mlock` and `-ml` may now be used as aliases for
`-mlock:on`.
- Apply per-thread seccomp sandboxing to Syd threads post-exec. This is
an initial basic implementation, yet still it vastly reduces the
attack surface while being zero-cost user-space. More hardening in
this area will follow to further confine Syd threads. `syd -Epfc` may
be used to see the export of new seccomp filters.
- Fix a misaligned pointer dereference issue in getdents handler.
- Make _syd-path_(1) write Integrity Force rules for ELF files only.
Force Sandboxing is not applicable to scripts anymore as we apply
it only at `PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC` boundary and not at the seccomp hook
for _execve_(2).
- Remove `-d` option of _syd-path_(1) and set the default action to
`kill`. `deny` is not a valid action for Force Sandboxing for some time
as we apply it only at `PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC` boundary and not at the
seccomp hook for _execve_(2).
- Set the option `trace/allow_unsafe_dumpable:1` for the `paludis` profile.
- Set process dumpable attribute for Syd to false at startup unless
the new option `trace/allow_unsafe_dumpable:1` is given.
- Clean consecutive slashes from rule patterns before editing the
respective access control list. Patterns with consecutive slashes are
a common case of error as such patterns can _never_ match because
they're matched against canonicalized path names. Cleaning consecutive
slashes safely turns such patterns into valid patterns.
# 3.25.1
- Fix **a critical bug** with glob matcher when patterns ending with
triple-star preceded by globs would not match correctly. Notably, this
allowed editing of dotfiles for the CTF profile where there rule
`deny/write+/home/*/.*/***` no longer matched dotfiles as it should.
The `linux` profile included by the `oci`, `paludis`, and `user`
profiles also has rules which are affected by this bug. The users are
recommended to update as soon as possible.
# 3.25.0
- Sync _syd-mdwe_(1) with the hardening of memory-related syscalls.
- Kill rather than deny on executable stack violations at _mmap_(2)
boundary to be consistent with other memory-related seccomp filters.
- Avoid using lazy loading when loading libraries specified via the
command line.
- Improve SegvGuard logging.
- Kill process on _execve_(2) calls with NULL argv or envp rather than
denying with EFAULT. This gives the system administrator higher chance
to notice potentially malicious activity soon and repeated failures
are going to trigger SegvGuard.
- Memory protection seccomp filters now kill the process rather than
returning "EACCES". This gives the system administrator higher chance
to notice potentially malicious activity soon and repeated failures
are going to trigger SegvGuard.
- Allow _sched_setparam_(2) system call.
- Allow _sched_rr_get_interval_(2) system call on x86.
- Allow _fadvise64_64_(2) system call on x86.
- Handle the _chown32_(2) system call on x86.
- Allow the _waitpid_(2) system call on x86.
- Fix a panic in parsing control messages during _sendmsg_(2) syscall.
Spotted by trinity during fuzzing.
- Deny the _mincore_(2) system call by default which is typically not
needed during a normal run and has been successfully (ab)used for
[page cache attacks](https://arxiv.org/pdf/1901.01161). Should the
need arise, we may provide an unsafe option to allow this syscall
in the future.
- Sync syd-oci with
[youki-0.4](https://github.com/containers/youki/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md#v040---2024-08-23).
- Upgrade `indexmap` crate from `2.2` to `2.4`.
- Replace the `endorphin` crate used in SegvGuard implementation with
the `expiringmap` crate. `endorphin` has a lot of unsafe code, is hard
to audit and does not pass miri tests. In comparison, `expiringmap`
contains no unsafe code.
- Ensure Crypt sandboxing doesn't run out of memory when the sandbox
process does many sequential writes of small size (take 2, see 3.24.2
for take 1. Thanks wikky for the help!).
- Allow the _cachestat_(2) system call which is new in Linux>=6.5 and
works only on file descriptors and hence is not subject to access
check.
# 3.24.4
- Stop hooking into the system calls _fstat_(2) and _fstatfs_(2).
In the operation of Syd, read access implies stat, so this is
consistent with the general behaviour.
- Stop hooking into _chdir_(2) system call until [kernel bug
218501](https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=218501) is fixed.
- Stop hooking into _fchdir_(2) system call which is fd-only.
# 3.24.3
- Continue optimizing the thread pool implementation. Track
busy threads rather than idle threads. Improve efficiency in
spawning additional threads.
- Stop setting the CPU affinity of the syscall handler threads,
which contradicts with MT epoll and hurts performance. Drop
the `core_affinity` crate dependency.
# 3.24.2
- Continue optimizing the thread pool implementation, and
fix idle thread tracking. We're mostly at our natural limits
now as the majority of the overhead stems from kernel-space.
- Opening files marked for encryption by Crypt sandboxing for
read-write now returns `EINVAL` early on _open_(2).
- Use the flag `SECCOMP_ADDFD_FLAG_SEND` to reduce an _ioctl_(2)
request on system call handlers returning a file descriptor.
- Ensure Crypt sandboxing doesn't run out of memory when the sandbox
process does many sequential writes of small size.
- Deny `FS_IOC_SETFLAGS` _ioctl_(2) request by default. This ensures,
above all, that the "immutable" and "append-only" file flags cannot be
altered inside the sandbox. Read the [Denying FS\_IOC\_SETFLAGS
ioctl](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#Denying_FS_IOC_SETFLAGS_ioctl)
section of the _syd_(7) manual page for more information.
- Deny _execve_(2) and _execveat_(2) system calls when one of pathname,
argv or envp arguments is NULL. This ensures POSIX compatibility and
denies some simple Return-Oriented Programming (ROP) attacks. See
[Enhanced execve and execveat Syscall
Validation](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#Enhanced_execve_and_execveat_Syscall_Validation)
section of the _syd_(7) manual page for more information.
# 3.24.1
- Track `SIGKILL` as a coredumping signal as part of SegvGuard.
GrSecurity includes `SIGKILL`, however HardenedBSD does not.
- Read+Write _open_(2) calls are now only checked against the Write
sandboxing access list for simplicity. Previously these paths were
checked against both Read and Write access lists.
- The _readlink_(2) and _readlinkat_(2) system calls are no longer
checked for Stat sandboxing access. For hidden paths, these
system calls will return what looks like dangling symbolic links
and this, on its own, is not an information leak.
- Remove symlink restrictions, added as of version 3.12.0 akin to
`GRKERNSEC_LINK`, and remove the option `trace/allow_unsafe_link:1`.
This mitigation comes with considerable performance hit without too
much benefit and e.g. mounting private `tmpfs` over `/tmp`, and
`/dev/shm` utilizing mount namespaces is a much cheaper and simpler
way to avoid the same attack vectors which utilize following symlinks
in world-writable directories. The `immutable` profile already does
that.
- Raise MSRV from 1.69 to 1.70 to use `PathBuf::as_mut_os_string` for
efficient path operations.
- Start caching security policy decisions using the `quick_cache` crate.
There is one cache for path-based decisions and one cache for IP address
based decisions. The cache sizes can be customized at startup using
the new options `cache/path/icap:`, `cache/path/wcap:`,
`cache/addr/icap:`, and `cache/addr/wcap:`. "icap" stands for estimated
item capacity and is of type `usize`, whereas "wcap" stands for weight
capacity and is of type `u64`. See the _syd_(2) manual page for the
default values.
- Add `trace/allow_unsafe_time:1` to the paludis profile.
- Ensure fstatfs calls are compatible with 32-bit land.
- Workaround BTRFS reporting incorrect device IDs, like
we already do for overlayfs. People should seriously
stop using these junk.
- User-space SafeSetID filters now return EACCES,
rather than EPERM for consistency.
- Fix kernel level SafeSetID filters to return EACCES on error.
# 3.24.0
- Change multithreading architecture to use epoll instead of channels
and drop the `crossbeam-channel` crate dependency.
- Port rsync's glob matcher to rust and start using it instead of the
`globset` crate.
- Enforce non-executable stack restriction at _mmap_(2) boundary to
mitigate exploits that change stack to executable by _dlopen_(3)'ing a
library with executable stack. See
[CVE-2023-38408](https://www.qualys.com/2023/07/19/cve-2023-38408/rce-openssh-forwarded-ssh-agent.txt)
for a recent example.
- Fix ELF parser to detect executable stack correctly when the
`GNU_STACK` ELF header is missing when the loader defaults to an
executable stack.
# 3.23.18
- Add `trace/allow_unsafe_msgsnd:1` to the `paludis` profile.
- Deny _msgsnd_(2) system call by default to mitigate kernel heap
spraying attacks. This restriction may be disabled with the option
`trace/allow_unsafe_msgsnd:1`. See the [Mitigation Against Heap
Spraying](http://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#Mitigation_Against_Heap_Spraying)
section of the _syd_(7) manual page for more information.
- Optimize glob matcher to use much less memory and perform more
efficiently, by using pre-compiled accelerated DFAs rather than using
hybrid NFA/DFAs with a global cache.
- Ioctl sandboxing is no longer on by default, the _ioctl_(2) request
allowlist and denylist is processed regardless. Denylist is now
applied at kernel-level in the parent seccomp-bpf filter such that Syd
process is also included in the restriction.
- Short profile names may be stacked together as a single argument to
_syd_(1) `-p`.
- The `user` profile may be shortly referred as `u`.
- The `silent` profile may be shortly referred as `s`.
- The `noipv6` profile may be shortly referred as `4`.
- The `noipv4` profile may be shortly referred as `6`.
- The `landlock` profile may be shortly referred as `l`.
- The `immutable` profile may be shortly referred as `i`.
- The `container` profile may be shortly referred as `c`.
- Provide more accurate timing information in logs.
- Fix a segmentation fault in `syd::log` module.
- Add new profile `core` to practically allow generation of coredumps.
This profile may shortly be referred as just `C`.
- Add new profile `debug` to practically allow debuggers inside the
sandbox. This profile may shortly be referred as just `D`.
- Add new profile `noexe` to practically relax _exec_(3) restrictions
and disable Syd's usage of _ptrace_(1). This profile may shortly be
referred as just `X`.
- Add new profile `nomem` to practically relax MDWE restrictions. This
profile may shortly be referred as just `M`.
- Add new profile `nopie` to practically relax PIE restrictions. This
profile may shortly be referred as just `P`.
- Harden initial self-reexecution using `/proc/self/maps` with file
metadata verification instead of using `/proc/self/exe`. The former
method was vulnerable to filesystem TOCTOU.
- Replace the `perf` feature with the `-q` CLI option for _syd_(1), and
the environment variable `SYD_QUICK_BOOT` for _syd_(1), and
_syd-oci_(1). This may be used for faster startup times sacrificing
one layer of defense against some container breaks.
- oci: Honour environment variables passed by the OCI spec.
- oci: Improve Syd supervisor invocation.
- Handle `SIGPIPE` before configuring the allocator.
- Fix system call origin offset calculation.
- Optimize remote path reader utilizing the `memchr` crate for SIMD search.
- Optimize path canonicalizer utilizing the `memchr` crate for SIMD search.
- Optimize path canonicalizer by reducing allocations.
# 3.23.17
- Add chat banners to README to attract hippies and hipsters.
- Add more TOCTOU and execstack tests.
# 3.23.16
- Add `trace/allow_unsafe_stack:1` to the `paludis` profile.
- Require executables with non-executable stack by default. This
restriction can be relaxed with the option
`trace/allow_unsafe_stack:1`.
- _syd-path_(1) learned the option `-eX` to list ELF binaries with
executable stack under PATH.
- _syd-elf_(1) learned the option `-X` to exit with success if the given
ELF binary has executable stack.
- _syd-elf_(1) learned the option `-x` to exit with success if the given
executable is a script.
- ELF parser learned to detect executable stack for ELF binaries.
- Fix `getxattr` and `listxattr` system call hooks to correctly handle
paths with no read access.
- The sandbox process could previously bypass [Device Sidechannel
Mitigations](http://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#Device_Sidechannel_Mitigations),
by issuing a special _statx_(2) system call with at least one of the
flags `STATX_TYPE` and `STATX_MODE` unset. This is now fixed.
- Add `trace/allow_unsafe_link:1` to the `paludis` profile.
- Make it possible to disable [symlink
restrictions](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#Enhanced_Symbolic_Link_Validation)
with the option `trace/allow_unsafe_link:1`.
- _syd-elf_(1) now resolves symbolic links in path arguments.
- Optimise remote path reader for small paths which are the common case.
- Set CPU affinity of system call handler threads to reduce cache misses.
# 3.23.15
- Add the rule `allow/read,stat+/run/systemd{,/resolve,/resolve/*.conf}`
to the `linux` profile which is inherited by `oci`, `paludis` and
`user` profiles. Systemd may link a file from this directory to
`/etc/resolv.conf` and this file is already allowlisted by the `linux`
profile.
- Revert the change to put sandbox process into a new process group.
- Fix an infinite loop which happens at startup when sandbox process
fails early.
- Fix a startup error which happens under `systemd-run --pipe --pty`.
# 3.23.14
- Drop the `env_logger` crate dependency.
- Reduce MSRV from 1.71 to 1.69.
- Replace const-hex crate with hex-conservative crate.
- Root directory must now be an absolute path, relative paths are no
longer permitted.
- Bind mount target directory must now be an absolute path, relative
paths are no longer permitted.
- Symlinks in root directory path are no longer permitted. Path
traversal using `..` is also not permitted.
- Symlinks in bind mount source and target directory paths are
no longer permitted. Path traversal using `..` is also not
permitted.
- Fix a symlink TOCTOU in _open_(2) handler when handling magic
symlinks.
# 3.23.13
- Revert the change made in 3.23.9, to avoid increasing the _nice_(2)
value and setting cpu, i/o priority to idle for syscall handler
threads.
- Use the nix crate for _openat2_(2) system call and drop the `openat2`
crate dependency.
- Set the process group of the sandbox process the foreground process
group after putting it into a new process group.
# 3.23.12
- Disable the SROP mitigator when SafeSetID is active. This is needed
because NPTL uses real-time signals to ensure all threads share the
same UID/GID.
- Put sandbox process into a new process group with `setpgid(0,0)` at
startup. Unlike _setsid_(2), this call does not detach the process
from the controlling terminal.
- Do not check dynamic libraries on _mmap_(2) for exec access if
`trace/allow_unsafe_exec:1` was specified at startup.
- Fix Force sandboxing on _mmap_(2) for dynamic libraries.
# 3.23.11
- Do not change current working directory to `/` for `cmd/exec`
programs.
- Disable TPE sandboxing for the `paludis` profile.
- Handle EINTR in _stat_(2) and _statfs_(2) system call handlers.
- Skip executable device ID check on overlayfs which reports incorrect
device IDs on _stat_(2) and this is a [known
bug](https://github.com/moby/moby/issues/43512).
# 3.23.10
- Harden exec checks at `PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC` stop by verifying the device
id and inode of the executable and loader.
- Avoid Force Sandboxing TOCTOU in _mmap_(2) by using _pidfd_getfd_(2)
to get the remote FD and do verification on that.
- Log the path and offset of the memory mapping from which the system
call is called on access violations with the `src` key.
- Remove the option `segvguard/filter`.
- Allow read and stat access to `/home` directory in `user` profile.
- Fix valid file descriptor check in _mmap_(2), and _mmap2_(2)
seccomp-bpf rules.
# 3.23.9
- Fix set-id handlers to handle correctly the `-1` argument.
- Add `trace/allow_unsafe_nopie:1` to the `paludis` profile.
- The option `trace/allow_unsupp_exec` has been removed. Unsupported
executable formats are always denied. Support for new file formats
can easily be added to the `syd::elf::ExecutableFile` structure.
- Require PIE executables by default. This restriction can be relaxed
with the option `trace/allow_unsafe_nopie:1`.
- Enumerate ELF shared library dependencies by reading the
`/proc/$pid/maps` file on `PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC`. Previously we used the
[lddtree](https://crates.io/crates/lddtree) crate to read the ELF
dependency tree which was horribly inefficient in comparison.
- Add a new [minimal ELF
parser](https://gitlab.exherbo.org/sydbox/sydbox/-/raw/main/src/elf.rs)
to replace the [Goblin](https://crates.io/crates/goblin) crate
dependency. Goblin was problematic because it broke static-linking,
and it is somewhat of an overkill for our limited use case.
- Enable *SafeSetID* by default. Replace the option
`trace/allow_safe_setid` with the options `trace/allow_safe_setuid`
and `trace/allow_safe_setgid`.
- Turn unsafe set-id system calls into no-ops rather than denying with
`EPERM` for compatibility with daemons such as postgres which invokes
_setgroups_(2) before _setuid_(2) and aborts on failure.
- Mitigate
[SROP](https://llsoftsec.github.io/llsoftsecbook/#sigreturn-oriented-programming)
by denying access to the system calls _sigreturn_(2), and
_rt_sigreturn_(2) for _syd_(1), _syd-oci_(1) and _syd-tor_(1).
Given the lack of signal handlers, these system calls have no
legit use.
- Add new `kvm` profile which allowlists KVM _ioctl_(2) requests
without path check.
- Avoid increasing the _nice_(2) value and setting cpu, i/o priority to
idle for syscall handler threads.
- Add new `tty` profile which allowlists {T,P}TY _ioctl_(2) requests
without path check. This profile is included by `oci`, `paludis`,
and `user` profiles.
- Add `TIOCGETD` to the default allowlisted _ioctl_(2) requests set.
Note, `TIOCSETD` is already in the default denylisted set.
- Refactor common rules in `oci`, `paludis`, and `user` profiles into
the new profile `linux`. All three profiles inherit from `linux` now.
- Add `allow/net/link+route` to `oci`, `paludis`, and `user` profiles.
- Add `trace/allow_safe_kcapi:true` to the `oci` profile.
- Add `trace/allow_safe_bind:true` to the `oci` profile.
- Harden the _open_(2) handlers using the `RESOLVE_IN_ROOT` flag.
- Return the original file descriptor on `O_PATH` _open_(2) calls with
encrypted files as argument for Crypt sandboxing.
- Revert the faulty optimization to increase of `AF_ALG` socket buffer
sizes for Crypt sandboxing which fixes potential **data corruption**
under memory-constrained environments. Users of Crypt sandboxing are
highly recommended to update immediately and run _syd-test_(1) to
confirm the issue is fixed for them before using Syd.
- Relax xattr name restrictions when the Sandbox lock is off for the
respective sandbox process.
- Return `ENOTSUP` rather than `EACCES` on _setxattr_(2) family calls
for `user.syd.` name prefix for stealth. Note, unlike the previous
mitigation, this one may be easily bypassed by comparing results
with an allowlisted name prefix.
- Return `ENODATA` rather than `EACCES` on _removexattr_(2) family calls
for `user.syd.` name prefix for stealth.
- Return `ENODATA` rather than `EACCES` on _getxattr_(2) family calls
for `user.syd.` name prefix for stealth.
- Add `SIGTRAP` to the list of coredumping signals recorded by
SegvGuard.
# 3.23.8
- Handle `ENOMEM` gracefully during splicing for Crypt sandboxing which
fixes potential **data corruption** under memory-constrained
environments. Users of Crypt sandboxing are highly recommended to
update immediately and run _syd-test_(1) to confirm the issue is fixed
for them before using Syd.
- Harden SegvGuard for cases when the sandbox process receives a signal
with default action `Core` but does not generate a coredump which can
happen under various circumstances.
# 3.23.7
- Fix an issue with file locking of Crypt sandboxing without which concurrent,
or near-concurrent writes could cause **data corruption** in certain
scenarios. Users of Crypt sandboxing are highly recommended to update
immediately and run _syd-test_(1) to confirm the issue is fixed for them
before using Syd.
- Fix an issue with _stat_(2) handlers on 32-bit systems.
# 3.23.6
- Revert `oci-spec` crate update which broke `syd-oci`. Kudos goes to
`oci-spec` developers who broke API with a minor version bump...
- Harden
[SafeSetID](http://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#Changing_UID/GID_and_groups)
by dropping `CAP_SETUID` after the first successful UID transition,
and `CAP_SETGID` after the first successful GID transition.
# 3.23.5
- Fix an issue with the _open_(2) handler mishandling flags argument
when `O_PATH` is included in flags. This bug was introduced in
v3.19.0.
- Decouple `CAP_CHOWN` from SafeSetID and add the option
`trace/allow_unsafe_chown:1` to keep this capability.
- Set-id system calls are now allowed in the sandbox process when
[SafeSetID](http://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#Changing_UID/GID_and_groups)
is not on. In addition, apply a kernel-level _seccomp_(2) filter to
deny all UID transits to UIDs less than or equal to 11 (aka
*operator*), and all GID transits to GIDs less than or equal to 14
(aka *uucp*).
- Make the `cmd/exec` process the leader of a new session.
- Handle the `RENAME_NOREPLACE` flag of _renameat2_(2) system call.
- Enable the `local-dynamic-tls` and `skip-collect-on-exit` features on
the `mimalloc2-rust` crate.
- Revert back to using `mimalloc` as the default allocator.
- Add `TIOCSETD` request to the list of denylisted _ioctl_(2) requests.
- Add a _ioctl_(2) request allowlist in addition to the denylist. The
new command
[`ioctl/allow`](http://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#ioctl/allow)
may be used to interact with the allowlist.
- Reduce extra syscall handler thread keep alive timeout from 90 seconds
to 250 milliseconds. This can be changed by editing `config.rs` at
compile-time.
- Handle new syscall handler thread spawn errors gracefully.
- Deny the obsolete _sgetmask_(2), and _ssetmask_(2) system calls.
- Deny _pciconfig_iobase_(2), _pciconfig_read_(2), and
_pciconfig_write_(2) system calls.
- Deny the deprecated _ustat_(2) system call.
- Deny _oldfstat_(2), _oldlstat_(2), and _oldstat_(2) system calls.
- Deny _vmsplice_(2) by default.
- Replace vmsplice/splice usage in child init with read/write.
- Allow TTY, pipe and socket ioctls for the `oci` profile.
# 3.23.4
- Add `default/ioctl:filter` rule to the `paludis` and `user` profiles.
This is done to cut down the noise generated by Ioctl sandboxing.
Users may revert to the previous behaviour with
`-mdefault/ioctl:deny`.
# 3.23.3
- Stop using the insecure and unmaintained `chrono` dependency
in _syd-oci_(1). Users of _syd-oci_(1) are recommended to read
[RUSTSEC-2020-0159](https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2020-0159.html)
and update immediately.
# 3.23.2
- Improve memory efficiency of the _getdents_(2) system call handler.
- Improve memory efficiency of transparent decryption.
# 3.23.1
- Add the missing _fsync_(2) during last partial block reencrpytion
process of Crypt sandboxing without which encrypted file appends could
cause **data corruption** in certain scenarios. Users of Crypt
sandboxing are highly recommended to update immediately and run
_syd-test_(1) to confirm the issue is fixed for them before using Syd.
- Improve the efficiency of _syd-aes_(1) by avoiding _select_(2) calls
on the kernel crypto socket.
- Fix _syd-cp_(1) build on older Rust.
- Handle broken pipe gracefully in _syd-cp_(1).
- Deny reading the timestamp counter in _syd-tor_(1) as part of the
confinement procedure.
# 3.23.0
- Upgrade `nix` crate from `0.26` to `0.29`.
- Upgrade `procfs` crate from `0.15` to `0.16`.
- Upgrade `bitflags` crate from `1.3` to `2.6`.
- Add new option `time:` to set clock monotonic and boottime offset in
Time namespace. Implies `unshare/time:1`.
- Avoid self reexecution when entering namespaces.
- Support time namespace and add the option `unshare/time:1`. With
`unshare/time:1`, Syd resets the boot-time clock such that `uptime`
will report container uptime rather than host uptime.
- Deny access for the creation of namespaces by default, and
add `trace/allow_unsafe_namespace` to relax the restriction.
This option accepts a comma-separated list of namespace types
to allow.
- Add `segvguard/filter` to filter SegvGuard violations by globs.
- Add `default/` options for each sandboxing type and SegvGuard to
configure default action which typically defaults to Deny or Kill.
- Require absolute paths in globs.
- Extend sandbox actions with `warn`, `stop`, `kill`, and `exit`.
- Remove the option `trace/allow_safe_kvm`.
- Remove the option `trace/allow_unsafe_ioctl`.
- Implement [Ioctl
sandboxing](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#Ioctl_Sandboxing).
- Enable the [literal
separator](https://docs.rs/globset/0.4.14/globset/struct.GlobBuilder.html#method.literal_separator)
option on glob matching. This means a literal `/` is required to
match a path separator in globs. `*`, and `?` will not match `/`.
- Add
[`trace/force_cloexec`](http://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#trace/force_cloexec)
option to enforce the `O_CLOEXEC` flag on all _open_(2), _openat_(2),
and _openat2_(2) calls. Refer to the [Force
Close-on-Exec](http://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#Force_Close-on-Exec)
section of the [_syd_(7)](http://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html)
manual page for more information.
- Ensure open and socket handlers always opens files with the `O_CLOEXEC` flag.
- Improve _syd-tor_(1)'s socket performance by setting `TCP_NODELAY`,
`SO_KEEPALIVE`, `TCP_QUICKACK`, and buffer sizes for reduced latency
and improved data transfer efficiency.
- Ensure no file descriptors leak from the Syd process into the
_syd-tor_(1) process other than the fds specifically passed.
- Deny syscalls for Memory protection keys by default, and add the
option
[`trace/allow_unsafe_pkey`](http://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#trace/allow_unsafe_pkey)
to relax the restriction. Refer to the [Restricting Memory Protection
Keys System
Calls](http://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#Restricting_Memory_Protection_Keys_System_Calls)
section of the [_syd_(7)](http://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html)
manual page for more information.
- Deny syscalls for Kernel keyring access by default, and add the option
[`trace/allow_unsafe_keyring`](http://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#trace/allow_unsafe_keyring)
to relax the restriction. Refer to the [Kernel Keyring Access
Restriction](http://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#Kernel_Keyring_Access_Restriction)
section of the [_syd_(7)](http://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html)
manual page for more information.
- Deny syscalls for CPU emulation functionality by default, and add the
option
[`trace/allow_unsafe_cpu`](http://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#trace/allow_unsafe_cpu)
to relax the restriction. Refer to the [Restricting CPU Emulation
Syscalls](http://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#Restricting_CPU_Emulation_System_Calls)
section of the [_syd_(7)](http://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html)
manual page for more information.
- Fix a race condition in Crypt sandboxing which causes **data
corruption** when handling concurrent writes to the same encrypted
file. Encrypted files affected by the issue have corrupt
blocks which are in a practically unrecoverable state.
To reduce the likelihood of the issue reappearing
in later versions, we have written [82 integration
tests](https://gitlab.exherbo.org/sydbox/sydbox/-/blob/b332c892c504cef3f1205c386b760d6a8d5e73e9/src/t/test.rs#L337-418)
to verify correct functioning of Crypt sandboxing. However, users
should know this is only tested on the architectures "x86\_64",
"x86", "aarch64", and "armv7". Users running Syd on other architectures
are _strongly recommended_ to run integration tests using the tool
[_syd-test_(1)](https://man.exherbo.org/syd-test.1.html)
before any usage of Syd. In addition, package maintainers are
_strongly recommended_ to install Syd's installable integration
tests by installing the two utilities "syd-test" and "syd-test-do"
along with Syd and advise the user to run the tests with a
post-install message. This ensures Syd is, to the
extent possible, verified to work on the target system. These
utilities come with no additional dependencies and their size
is negligible taken into account the total size.
- Fix an issue with _utimensat_(2) handler on 32-bit systems.
- Fix an issue with _truncate_(2) handler on 32-bit systems.
- _syd-cp_(1) no longer overwrites the destination file by default.
The command line argument `-f` can be used to force overwrite.
- _syd-cp_(1) learned to read from standard input when only the
destination file is passed via command line parameters.
- Make the encryption thread more efficient and drop the _write_(2)
batching workaround which is no longer necessary.
- Block Crypt readers/writers when a subsequent write is in progress
rather than failing with `EBUSY`.
- _syd-aes_(1), _syd-cp_(1), and _syd-tor_(1) have been promoted to core
tools, as such they're installed even with the utils feature disabled.
- _syd-aes_(1) learned `-v` argument to periodically print progress
report on standard error.
- Ensure files configured for encryption are processed even
if Read & Write sandboxing is off.
- Increase stack size of encryption threads from 4k to 64k.
- Improve lock usage in `ptrace` exit handler.
- Improve lock usage in `stat` system call handlers.
- The setting `trace/force_umask` no longer applies to
directory creation for convenience.
- Make `trace/force_umask` override POSIX ACLs during
_umask_(2) calculation.
- Hook into `fchmod` and `fchown` and check for write access.
In addition `trace/force_umask` is applied for `fchmod`.
- Add `-b ` argument to _syd-tor_(1) to specify pipe
buffer size.
- Improve Crypt sandboxing and _syd-tor_(1) throughput by setting pipe
buffer sizes to the maximum value allowed by the system where errors
are handled gracefully and reverts to the old default `PIPE_BUF` which
is typically 4096 bytes.
- Apply the noexec-memfd restriction regardless of the state
of sandboxing.
- Fix a TOCTOU in socketcall (32-bit) handler when handling
the _socket_(2) subcall.
- Add Netlink support to Network sandboxing which allows
the user to filter on netlink family. The new
[`allow/net/link`](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#allow/net/link)
setting can be used to add/remove items to the allowlist.
- Confine _syd-tor_(1) process further utilizing namespaces
if available and permitted.
- Fix PID recycling issue of clone which happens during
re-exec when namespaces are enabled.
- Sanitize environment of the _syd-tor_(1) process.
- Make file descriptor tracking of _syd-tor_(1) more efficient.
# 3.22.0
- Implement [Proxy
sandboxing](https://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#Proxy_Sandboxing).
- Add new utility [syd-tor](https://man.exherbo.org/syd-tor.1.html)
which is a secure and efficient SOCKS proxy forwarder.
# 3.21.4
- Stop using the `inline-more` feature of the vendored `endorphin`
crate.
- Revert panic strategy back to `abort` for release builds now that we
don't depend on libunwind.
- Stop using the `std` feature of `anyhow` crate which depends
on std::backtrace and therefore libunwind.
- Avoid mixing mutexes of `stdlib` with `parking_lot` crate.
- Reduce stack size of syscall handler threads from 2M to 128k.
- Avoid leaking AES Key and IV into insecure memory during random Key/IV
generation.
# 3.21.3
- Change panic strategy from `abort` to `unwind` for release builds.
- Drop the rule `allow/read,stat+/proc/version` from the `user` profile.
- Randomize the contents of the stack for the initial _clone_(2).
- Use a stack size of 4k instead of 8k for micro-threads spawned during
system call emulation. This can be changed by editing the
`THREAD_STACK_SIZE` constant in `config.rs` during compilation.
- Use a stack size of 128k instead of 8k for the initial _clone_(2).
This can be changed by editing the `FCLONE_STACK_SIZE` constant in
`config.rs` during compilation.
- Deny `mmap` and `mmap2` calls which create executable anonymous
memory. This restriction can be relaxed with
`trace/allow_unsafe_memory:1`.
- Drop the `PROC_BTI|PROC_EXEC` workaround in mprotect filter on arm64,
which makes the filter weaker and is [no longer
needed](https://sourceware.org/pipermail/libc-alpha/2020-November/119305.html).
- Check libraries dynamically loaded at runtime via _dlopen_(3) for Exec
access by hooking into _mmap_(2) and _mmap2_(2) system calls.
# 3.21.2
- Document [uninteruptible
FIFOs](http://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#Uninterruptible_FIFOs)
under BUGS section of the _syd_(7) manual page.
- Deny `execve` and `execveat` system calls for the Syd process when the
sandbox is locked during runtime with a kernel-level seccomp filter.
This was already done when sandbox is locked at startup and the reason
to skip is to allow the Syd command `cmd/exec`.
- Use the flag `MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL` when opening memfds for transparent
decryption for Crypt sandboxing to ensure transparent decryption can
not be abused to bypass Exec, Force and TPE sandboxing. This flag
requires Linux-6.3 or newer. On older kernels, a backing directory
must be specified with `crypt/tmp` for transparent decryption to work.
- Handle the CLI arguments `--help`, `--version`, and `--sh` before
self re-execution for convenience.
- Strip `MFD_EXEC` and add `MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL` to flags of `memfd_create`.
This ensures memory file descriptors are not executable and cannot be
made executable. This requires Linux-6.3 or later. The option
`trace/allow_unsafe_memfd:1` is provided to relax this restriction.
This option, when enabled, also allows the `memfd_secret` system call.
See the [Enhanced Security for Memory File
Descriptors](http://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#Enhanced_Security_for_Memory_File_Descriptors)
section of the _syd_(7) manual page for more information.
# 3.21.1
- Deny `open_by_handle_at` system call. Since we already deny the
`name_to_handle_at` system call, there is little sense in allowing
`open_by_handle_at`.
- Start sandboxing `memfd_create` call as part of Read, Write and Exec
sandboxing. The name argument is prepended with `/memfd:` before
access check. Use e.g. `deny/read,write,exec+/memfd:*` to deny access
to memory file descriptors globally.
- Deny `memfd_secret` system call. This system call requires the boot
option `secretmem.enable=1` and is rarely used. Disabling this system
call adheres to the goal to be secure by default: Although file I/O is
not allowed to secret memfds, this still provides an attacker a way to
execute denylisted code by writing their payload into the memfd and
mapping it as executable. Should there ever be a legitimate need to
use this system call inside a Syd sandbox, it is trivial to add a flag
to allow it on demand.
- Allow read, write and stat access to memfds in the Paludis profile.
- Stop using `mimalloc` as the default allocator. Notably mimalloc
breaks build with LTO and maintaining the rust crate for mimalloc is
an additional burden for us.
- Avoid a bug in network system call handlers that caused them to return
`EBADF` when when `/proc` is mounted with hidepid=2.
- Avoid a bug in fd-only xattr handlers (`fgetxattr`, `fsetxattr`,
`flistxattr`, and `fremovexattr`) that caused them to return
`EBADF` when when `/proc` is mounted with hidepid=2.
- Correct file open mode in xattr handlers, use `O_RDONLY` rather than
`O_PATH` file descriptors as required.
- Fix a DOS in [PID
sandboxing](http://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#PID_sandboxing)
with `pid/kill:1` when Syd shares the process group with the sandbox
process. To reproduce do `syd -plib -msandbox/pid:on -mpid/kill:1
syd-fork` when a vulnerable Syd will kill itself along with the
sandbox process.
# 3.21.0
- Skip applying umask when the parent directory has POSIX ACLs defined.
- Fix symlink handling in `chown` and `chmod` handlers.
- Add `trace/allow_unsafe_env:1` to the `paludis` profile.
- Mask the paths `/dev/kmsg`, `/proc/kmsg` by default and allow read,
and stat access to these files in `paludis` and `user` profiles. This
is done to prevent the _dmesg_(1) tool from falling back to the
denylisted _syslog_(2) system call which will fail with `ENOSYS`.
- Fix an UB in the utime syscall handlers.
- Ensure the virtual stat API returns `EBUSY` for all settings that must
be set at startup.
- Align stack pointer to 16 bytes for the clone that spawns the sandox
process to ensure proper memory alignment.
- Fix PID recycling issues of clones in `l*xattr` and network syscall
handlers.
- Emulate xattr calls on symbolic links in a safe way and drop the
setting `trace/allow_unsafe_xattr`.
- Fix a FS TOCTOU in network system call handlers when using UNIX domain
sockets and mitigate another.
- Upgrade the crate `mimalloc2-rust v0.3.1 -> v0.3.2` which updates
the vendored `mimalloc` from 2.1.4 to 2.1.7.
- Do not hook into `fchmod`, `fchown` `fallocate`, `ftruncate`, and
`ftruncate64` anymore. These system calls operate on file descriptors
only and the file must be opened for write so Write sandboxing checkes
them on open.
- Add `/proc` to the read allowlist of Lock sandboxing by default. Syd
is included in the Landlock sandbox and Syd requires this directory to
function.
- Add `/dev/null` to the write allowlist of Lock sandboxing by default.
Syd is included in the Landlock sandbox and Syd requires this file to
function.
- Allow read access to `/dev/random` in `paludis` and `user`
profiles. Read access to `/dev/urandom` was already granted.
- Check for invalid socket descriptors early in network calls.
- Drop `trace/allow_safe_setid:1` from the `paludis` profile.
- Fix symbolic link handling in `stat` handlers.
- Fix symbolic link handling in `utimensat` handler.
- Implement sidechannel mitigation by adjusting timestamps on
sidechannel devices and stripping access and modify flags
of _fanotify_(7)/_inotify_(7) calls on such devices.
- Enhance security by denying symlink resolution in insecure writable
directories.
- Avoid double open in `fchdir`, `fchmod`, `fchown`, `fgetxattr`,
`fsetxattr`, `flistxattr`, `fremovexattr`, `fstatfs`, `fstatfs64`, and
`truncate` system call handlers.
- Keep `CAP_CHOWN` when SafeSetID is enabled.
- Make SafeSetID continue system calls when there's no change in {u,g}id.
- Start sandboxing `fanotify_mark` and `inotify_add_watch` system calls
as part of Stat sandboxing.
- Respect the `AT_EMPTY_PATH` flag in the `faccessat2` handler.
- Avoid double open in `getxattr`, `setxattr`, `listxattr`, and
`removexattr`.
- Deny `ghost`, `panic`, and `reset` commands when Crypt sandboxing is
on with `EBUSY` for safety.
- Publish [the CTF
profile](https://gitlab.exherbo.org/sydbox/sydbox/-/raw/main/data/ctf.syd-3)
for transparency.
- Enable TPE sandboxing for the `user` profile and set trusted GID to
sandbox process' current effective GID.
- Enable TPE sandboxing for the `paludis` profile.
- Make the ptrace Exec sandboxing check honour filtered paths to avoid
reporting access violations.
- Implement [Trusted Path Execution (TPE)
sandboxing](http://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#TPE_sandboxing).
- Remove the setting `exec/kill`.
- Ensure the `lib` profile sets the sandbox lock to `exec` as `exec` is
not the default anymore since 3.17.0.
- Make the `ghost` command imply `reset` to ensure no run-away exec
processes after the invocation of the `ghost` command.
- Avoid panic when unsetting `SYD_` environment variables when the
environment key or value contains invalid UTF-8.
- Fix undefined behaviour when unsetting `SYD_` environment variables in
the child by moving the unset logic to the parent right before process
spawn.
# 3.20.1
- vim: add syntax highlighting for Crypt Sandboxing and Ghost mode.
- Require absolute paths for `crypt/tmp` for safety.
- Fix out of memory error on encrypted file descriptor when writing
with very small batch sizes.
# 3.20.0
- syd-err can now be used to match errno descriptions as well as names.
- _open_(2) calls with mode read-write was only checked for write
sandboxing and not read sandboxing. This is now fixed.
- Open a memfd rather than a tmpfile for `open(/dev/syd, O_RDONLY)`.
- syd-err now accepts an errno name glob rather than an errno regex.
- syd-sys now accepts a system call name glob rather than a name regex.
- syd-sys learned `-g` argument to enable Ghost mode prior to probing.
- syd-sys learned `-p` argument to probe the matching system calls.
- Implement [Ghost mode](http://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#Ghost_mode).
- Close standard input and standard output after we pass the file
descriptors to the sandbox process.
- Clear all environment variables that start with `SYD_` from the
environment of the sandbox process, rather than just the specific Syd
environment variables. This allows the user to safely set an
environment variable for the Syd process only and can e.g. be used to
safely set an AES-CTR key with `config/key:${SYD_KEY}` having set the
environment variable `SYD_KEY` set on Syd invocation.
- Add new utility `syd-key` to generate AES-CTR key and iv using `/dev/random`.
- Add new utility `syd-cp` for efficient file copying using _splice_(2).
- Add new utility `syd-aes` to encrypt/decrypt files akin to openssl-enc.
- Implement [Crypt
sandboxing](http://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#Crypt_Sandboxing) for
transparent file encryption using AES-CTR.
- oci: Configure tracing when log feature is on, and disable properly when off.
- oci: Honour capabilities specified by the container engine.
- oci: Avoid hitting `UNIX_PATH_MAX` on tenant socket paths.
- oci: Remove unnecessary chdir from init and start which fixes:
[youki#2772](https://github.com/containers/youki/issues/2772).
- Update: `libcgroups v0.3.2 -> v0.3.3`
- Update: `libcontainer v0.3.2 -> v0.3.3`
- Update: `liboci-cli v0.3.2 -> v0.3.3`
# 3.19.0
- Add new utility `syd-poc` to demonstrate proof of concepts for various
sandbox break vectors.
- Add `trace/allow_unsafe_debug:1` to the `paludis` profile.
- Add `trace/allow_safe_kvm:1` to allow a predefined set of KVM ioctls.
This is necessary to run _qemu_(1) under sandbox with hardware
acceleration. Previously this was only possible with the unsafe
`trace/allow_unsafe_ioctl:1` which allows the whole ioctl request
space.
- Make `trace/allow_unsafe_debug:1` imply `trace/allow_unsafe_memory:1`
in addition to `trace/allow_unsafe_exec:1`. This is necessary to make
_valgrind_(1) work in the sandbox.
- Unify `trace/allow_unsafe_p{erf,trace}` options into
`trace/allow_unsafe_debug`. This option is going to be a general way
to allow debugging and tracing tools such as gdb, perf, strace,
valgrind in the sandbox. The manual page clearly states they should
only be used in trusted environments as it allows the sandbox process
to trivially break from the sandbox.
- Re-add `trace/allow_unsafe_perf` command to allow perf inside the sandbox.
- Re-add `trace/allow_unsafe_ptrace` command to allow ptrace inside the sandbox.
- oci: Do not pass-through the capabilities specified by the container
engine. This is done to adhere the goal to be secure by default. To
honour the capabilities specified by the container engine, user may
configure Syd with `trace/allow_unsafe_caps:1`. The recommended way,
however, is to specify only the minimum needed set of capabilities
using the various "allow\_unsafe" options such as
`trace/allow_unsafe_bind:1` to retain `CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE`,
`trace/allow_unsafe_socket:1` to retain `CAP_NET_RAW`,
`trace/allow_unsafe_syslog:1` to retain `CAP_SYSLOG`,
`trace/allow_unsafe_time:1` to retain `CAP_SYS_TIME`.
- Add `trace/allow_unsafe_open:1` to the `paludis` profile.
- Mitigate _open_(2) `O_PATH` TOCTOU by turning `O_PATH` into `O_RDONLY`
by default and add `trace/allow_unsafe_open:1` to disable this. See
[BUGS](http://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#BUGS) for more
information.
- `trace/allow_unsafe_tkill` has been renamed to
`trace/allow_unsafe_kill` which is a **breaking change**.
- `trace/allow_unsafe_adjtime` has been renamed to
`trace/allow_unsafe_time` which is a **breaking change**.
- Extend ptrace detection mitigator seccomp filter to turn all ptrace
operations into no-ops rather than just `PTRACE_TRACEME`.
- syd-test and syd-test-do learned `-h` CLI argument to list test cases.
- Drop `CAP_CHOWN` even with SafeSetID. `CAP_SET[UG]ID` is still kept
for SafeSetID.
- Ensure ptrace is not in ambient and inheritable caps before fork.
- test-do: sort tests by name in help output.
- More than one namespace can be turned on/off using the syntax
`unshare/type,type...:state` and queried using the syntax
`unshare/type,type...?` now (e.g.: `unshare/user,pid:1`,
`unshare/mount,net?`).
- More than one sandboxing type can be turned on/off using the syntax
`sandbox/type,type...:state` and queried using the syntax
`sandbox/type,type...?` now (e.g: `sandbox/read,stat,write:on`,
`sandbox/net,lock:off`). This is simple, intuitive and similar to the
syntax for specifying multiple glob rules with e.g:
`allow/read,stat,exec+/usr/***`. See the
[SHORTCUTS](http://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html#SHORTCUTS) section
of the [_syd_(2)](http://man.exherbo.org/syd.2.html) manual page
for more information.
# 3.18.13
- Improve the efficiency of post-exec sandboxing checks.
- Rename option `trace/allow_unsupp_binfmt` to `trace/allow_unsupp_exec`
and extend it to cover direct shared library execution.
- Deny direct shared library execution by default to prevent the typical
exec sandbox escape with `/lib/ld-linux.so.1
/deny/listed/binary`.
# 3.8.12
- The unsafe path check was missed in the `getdents` handler which
caused it to list unsafe paths. This is now fixed.
- Deny unsafe paths with `ENOENT` rather than `EACCESS` in path canonicaliser for stealth.
# 3.8.11
- Extend signal protections to guard against group signaling the Syd process group.
# 3.18.10
- Add `trace/allow_unsafe_tkill:1` to the `paludis` profile.
- Add `trace/allow_unsafe_xattr:1` to the `paludis` profile.
- Turn the deprecated `tkill` system call into a no-op for safety
against PID-recycling. The option `trace/allow_unsafe_tkill:1` is
provided to relax this restriction.
- Deny system calls which work with extended attributes on symbolic
links by default as they are vulnerable to filesystem TOCTOU. The
option `trace/allow_unsafe_xattr:1` is provided to relax this
restriction. See "syd-ls xattr" for the list of system calls in this
set.
- Protect Syd against signals from the same process group.
- Fix an issue with chmod syscall handler wrt. symbolic links.
- Make syscall path handler TOCTOU-free, see #123 for a list of effected
system calls.
- Fix an issue with fchmodat handler wrt. symbolic links.
# 3.18.9
- syd-oci no longer honours the environment variables `SYD_OCI` and
`SYD_OCI_PROFILE`. This ensures sandbox status is invariant once
container is started (unless lock is off, then sandbox can be
dynamically edited at runtime).
- vim: Highlight 0 and root in the destination field of set{u,g}id as Error.
# 3.18.8
- Set the sticky bit for /dev/shm and /tmp mounts of the `immutable` profile.
# 3.18.7
- Improve the syd-oci manual page.
# 3.18.6
- Fix the list of io-uring system call list. This list incorrectly
included the system calls of the POSIX async API before. This means
the system calls `io_cancel`, `io_destroy`, `io_{p,}getevents`,
`io_setup` and `io_submit` are now allowed.
- Add `trace/allow_unsafe_filename:1` to the `paludis` profile.
- Add `trace/allow_unsafe_filename:1` to allow creation of files with
control characters in them.
- Change syd-oci init process name from `youki:INIT` to `syd_init` to avoid confusion.
- Fix an issue with opening the container runtime log file that broke docker.
# 3.18.5
- oci: Do not attempt to log to syslog. Logs go to container runtime log file.
- Log correct UID after user switch.
- Do not truncate the log file if it exists.
- oci: Preserve Syd's log file descriptor inside the container so that access
violations are correctly sent to the container runtime log file.
# 3.18.4
- oci: Honour log path and debug arguments passed by the container engine.
- Prioritise domain names over host names during configuration parsing for syd-oci.
# 3.18.3
- syd-oci incorrectly tried to keep `CAP_SYS_PTRACE` in rootless
containers, which resulted in permission denied error on container
start. This is now fixed.
# 3.18.2
- Update features in version output.
- Do not leak the `SYD_LOG_FD` environment variable to the sandbox process.
# 3.18.0
- Add run subcommand to syd-oci, this completes the set of common subcommands.
- Add exec subcommand to syd-oci.
- Add checkpoint subcommand to syd-oci.
- Add update subcommand to syd-oci.
- Add events subcommand to syd-oci.
- Add pause and resume subcommands to syd-oci.
- Add spec subcommand to syd-oci.
- Add list subcommand to syd-oci.
- Add ps subcommand to syd-oci.
- Add features subcommand to syd-oci.
- Syd configuration files now support the `include_profile` clause to
include a Syd profile into the configuration. See `syd-cat list` for a
list of profiles.
- New utility syd-oci which is a container runtime for syd based on yaouki.
Currently the standard set of subcommands create, start, state, delete,
and kill are implemented.
- Fix an issue with SegvGuard and realtime signals.
# 3.17.5
- Add `PTRACE_ATTACH` to the kill list of sydbox' own process seccomp
filter so that a compromised syd process can never attach to another
process.
- Fix the path control character checker to work with the open syscall
hook which was missed before.
# 3.17.4
- Deny paths with control characters at the time of sandbox access check.
- Mask control characters when logging paths.
# 3.17.3
- Add initial vim syntax highlighting file for Syd profiles.
- Make configuration parsing more robust by rearranging conditionals.
- Fix handling of paths with spaces in include paths.
# 3.17.2
- Attempt to set the soft limit of the maximum number of open file
descriptors to the corresponding hard limit on startup for
convenience.
# 3.17.1
- Add mprotect hardening for the syd process as part of the EEC.
This helps mitigate ret2mprotect in a compromised syd process.
# 3.17.0
- Add `lock:exec` to the paludis profile for `esandbox`.
- The default of "lock" setting has been changed from "exec" to "unset",
where unset means lock will be set to on automatically by syd unless
no lock clause was specified upon process execution allowing prior
sandbox edits by configuration files, profiles and CLI arguments.
- Improve lock efficiency in SegvGuard crash recorder.
- Fix `trace/exit_wait_all:1` and write integration tests to verify.
- Harden the syd process by denying non-native syscalls. This pertains
to the syd process only: Non-native syscalls are still supported for
the sandbox process.
- Harden the syd process by applying a kernel level seccomp-bpf filter
to deny exec system calls after the successful exec of the
sandbox process. As such a compromised syd process cannot use these
system calls.
- Add a parent seccomp filter to restrict socket system call
based on sandbox flags.
- Reduce locking in open handler.
# 3.16.11
- Work on logging to make log messages consistent.
- Fix regression in sandbox locking causing hang.
# 3.16.10
- Avoid polling the seccomp file descriptor, block on receive ioctl instead.
- Do not allow `PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC` in seccomp mprotect hardener.
- Check for a capability before dropping it.
- Print GNU build id in version output.
- syd-elf learned `-b` to print the GNU build id of a file.
- Improve sandbox lock usage in stat handler.
- syd-elf learned `-v` to print the version of a file.
- syd-elf learned `-t` to print the type of a file.
- syd-elf learned `-r ` to resolve the name of the symbol at the given address.
- syd-elf learned `-n ` to list the addresses and names of all symbols in the file whose name match the given pattern.
- syd-elf learned `-l` to list the addresses and names of all symbols in the file.
- syd-elf root parameter `-r` has been renamed to `-R`.
# 3.16.9
- Fix a syntax issue in syd.7 manual page.
# 3.16.8
- Add `trace/allow_unsupp_binfmt:1` to the `paludis` profile.
- Add `trace/allow_unsafe_exec:1` to the `paludis` profile.
- Handle dangling `/proc/pid/exe` gracefully.
- Remove deny mode from Force sandboxing, only warn and kill are supported.
- Remove `trace/allow_unsafe_binfmt`.
- Exclude scripts from Force sandboxing for performance.
- Make the script interpreter parsing API safe against filesystem attacks such as replacing the script with a FIFO.
- Make the ELF parsing API safe against filesystem attacks such as replacing a library with a FIFO.
- Check for dynamic library injection once post-exec rather than twice pre and post-exec.
The pre-exec check was broken and did not work at all due to
`/proc/pid/environ` not being populated at the time (size=0).
- Improve musl detection in `ldd` function and remove excessive globbing.
- Avoid opening the file twice in exec handler.
- Fix an issue with `ldd` causing it to return elf-interpreter paths without canonicalization.
This affects Exec and Force sandboxing.
- Add `trace/allow_safe_setid:1` to the `paludis` profile.
- Implement SafeSetID. Use `trace/allow_safe_setid:1` to enable,
`setuid+:`, and
`setgid+:` to define allowed transitions.
- Fix a regex issue in sandbox config parser which caused invalid ops to match.
- Return correct error code for non-executable files in exec handler.
- Handle too short files gracefully when determining script interpreter path.
# 3.16.7
- Implement [Path Masking](http://man.exherbo.org/syd.7.html#Path_Masking).
- Upgrade from mimalloc-2.1.2 to mimalloc-2.1.4.
# 3.16.6
- Fix parsing multiple control messages in 32-bit sendmsg emulation.
- `syd-test` learned to randomize the order of integration tests. The
default seed can be overridden with `SYD_TEST_SEED` to replicate a
previous order.
- Add `trace/allow_safe_kcapi:1` to the `user` profile.
- Add `trace/allow_safe_kcapi:1` to the `paludis` profile.
- Implement `trace/allow_safe_kcapi:1` to allow safe access to kernel
crypto API without having to specify `trace/allow_unsupp_socket:1`.
- Fix `ALG_SET_IV` operation in sendmsg emulation.
- Return an empty file for `/proc/cmdline` rather than denying access to
it outright for compatibility.
- Drop the `trace/force_restart:1` workaround to inject `SA_RESTART`
to sigaction flags.
- Mention elf feature in version output.
# 3.16.5
- Allow socket configuration control ioctl getters
to make libc functions such as `if_indextoname`,
`if_nametoindex` etc. work.
- Drop perf ioctls from the default ioctl allowlist.
- Fix handling of LDD errors in exec-TOCTOU-mitigator.
# 3.16.4
- Prevent denylisted dynamic library injection using `LD_{AUDIT,PRELOAD}` on exec.
- Prevent denylisted dynamic library injection using `LD_LIBRARY_PATH` on exec.
- Make the ELF parser optional via the `elf` feature which defaults to on.
Turning this feature off allows linking syd statically.
- Add `-s` flag to syd-elf to exit with success if the given binary is
statically linked.
- Add `-d` flag to syd-elf to exit with success if the given binary is
dynamically linked..
- Add `-6` flag to syd-elf to exit with success if the given binary is 64-bit.
- Add `-3` flag to syd-elf to exit with success if the given binary is 32-bit.
# 3.16.3
- Plug a file descriptor leak during init with `unshare/user:0`.
- Prevent ptracer detection via failing `PTRACE_TRACEME` by turning this
ptrace operation into a no-op.
- Enable `union` feature on the smallvec crate. When the union feature is
enabled smallvec will track its state (inline or spilled) without the use of
an enum tag, reducing the size of the smallvec by one machine word. This means
that there is potentially no space overhead compared to Vec. Note that
smallvec can still be larger than Vec if the inline buffer is larger than two
machine words.
- New command `trace/deny_elf_static:1` to deny execution of statically linked binaries.
- New command `trace/deny_elf_dynamic:1` to deny execution of dynamically linked binaries.
- New command `trace/deny_elf32:1` to deny execution of 32-bit binaries.
- New command `trace/deny_script:1` to disable execution of scripts.
- Deny access to non-{elf,script} interpreter paths (e.g. binfmt with
wine and java) by default. This may be disabled with `trace/allow_unsupp_binfmt:1`.
- Deny access to relative #! interpreter paths and paths with ".." in
them by default. This may be disabled with `trace/allow_unsafe_binfmt:1`.
- New tool `syd-elf` which is a barebones `ldd(1)` alternative.
- Do not pipe `esyd info` output to PAGER.
- Utilize `lddtree` crate to check dynamic libraries for Exec and Force Sandboxing.
- Implement SegvGuard utilizing `PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT`. The implementation
is inspired by and closely resembles that of HardenedBSD.
- Fix signal forwarding on ptrace-stops.
- Add `filter/net/connect+/run/systemd/userdb/io.systemd.DynamicUser` to
the paludis profile to reduce noise during package builds. Note, this
only prevents the reporting, access to the socket is still denied.
- Apply a seccomp filter to deny mount(2) system call after bind mounts
such that a compromised syd process cannot call mount.
- Improve error handling in initial re-execution.
- Apply a seccomp filter to the syd process to deny `PTRACE_SEIZE` operation,
after the only necessary call to attach to the child for exec-TOCTOU
mitigation. This ensures a compromised syd process cannot attach to other
processes in the system.
# 3.16.2
- Drop `CAP_SETPCAP` capability by default.
- Drop `CAP_MKNOD` capability by default.
- Drop `CAP_FOWNER` capability by default.
- Drop `CAP_FSETID` capability by default.
- Drop `CAP_CHOWN` capability by default.
- Drop `CAP_AUDIT_WRITE` capability by default.
- Drop `CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE` capability regardless of unshare/user.
Previously we only dropped this capability when we're entering
a user namespace.
- Drop `CAP_KILL` capability by default.
- Handle realtime signals gracefully in wait loop.
- Add `trace/allow_unsafe_exec:1` to disable exec-TOCTOU mitigator.
This allows `strace -f syd` to work.
# 3.16.1
- Bypass libc and call waitid syscall directly to workaround a glibc bug.
- Drop the mount, umount, umount2 hooks and deny these syscalls.
- Add code name to --version output.
- Prefix default NIS/YP domainname with `syd-` for UTS namespace.
- Use `lexis` crate to auto-generate default hostname for UTS namespace.
- Use `lexis` crate to log human-readable names generated from process IDs in logs.
# 3.16.0
- Execute `cmd/exec` commands in a new process group.
- Send SIGKILL to offending process' process group on pid access violations.
- Implement an effective `execve(2)` TOCTOU mitigator utilizing `PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC`.
- Sync get shebang program function with the kernel implementation.
- Enable `trace/force_restart:1` for the paludis profile.
- Add `trace/force_restart:1` to inject `SA_RESTART` to sigaction flags.
# 3.15.8
- Drop `CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE` by default and add `trace/allow_unsafe_bind` to retain it.
- Implement `trace/allow_unsafe_syslog` command to allow privileged syslog operations.
- Drop /proc/kmsg from the list of unsafe paths (required to sandbox syslogd).
- Set panic=abort for release builds.
- Make MDWE errors non-fatal.
- Fix allowing FIOASYNC ioctl (fixes nginx under syd).
# 3.15.7
- Fix a regression in wait handler that caused syd not to reap zombies properly.
# 3.15.6
- Use `PIDFD_THREAD` flag to save a `/proc/pid/status` read if supported.
- Avoid a process reusing the exec pid through a recycle from taking over the
sandbox by signaling the pidfd to ensure the correct process is still alive.
- USE `CLONE_PIDFD` on initial spawn to avoid wait races and to spare a
`pidfd_open` to get the seccomp notify fd.
- Fix handling of deleted proc magic symlinks.
- The file creation mode set by `trace/force_umask` is now honoured by
_chmod_(2) family system calls for added hardening.
- Guard against CVE-2019-5736 by copying /proc/self/exe to an anonymous file
descriptor, sealing it and re-executing it. Note due the syd's procfs
protections this was not exploitable so this feature acts as an extra layer of
defense.
- Configure release script to compress release tarball with XZ rather than GunZip.
# 3.15.5
- Fix statx alignment on 32bit (ARMv7 compat).
- Fix syscall allow on sandbox/{mem,pid}:off.
- Handle `64` and `_time64` versions of various system calls (ARMv7 compat).
- Handle deleted paths gracefully when resolving /proc/self/fd symlinks.
- Add `PR_SET_VMA` to the list of allowed prctls.
- ldd: do not set default log level to error and do not disable syslogging.
# 3.15.4
- Teach mount handler to handle fd= in mount options.
- Fix mount handler to correctly handle filesystem type argument.
- landlock: fix opening paths with `O_PATH`.
- Pass the correct pid in `SCM_CREDENTIALS` with sendmsg.
- Fix root: to correctly imply unshare/mount:1 and unshare/pid:1.
- Fix signal protector to correctly handle negative pid arguments.
# 3.15.3
- **Milestone**: Exherbo system set builds under syd-3 with tests on.
- Fix symbolic link handling in mknod and mknodat handlers.
- Drop `trace/allow_unsafe_sendmsg` command.
- Start sandboxing _sendmmsg_(2) calls.
- Start sandboxing _sendmsg_(2) calls.
# 3.15.2
- The utility **syd-lock** has learned to run a command under landlock. The
old check mode is available using the `-c` parameter.
- `trace/deny_dotdot` now handles chdir, fchdir calls as well as open calls.
- Allow the system calls sgetmask, ssetmask, signal, sigaction, sigpending,
sigprocmask, sigsuspend and sigreturn (X86 compat).
# 3.15.1
- New utility **syd-mdwe** to run a command under Memory-Deny-Write-Execute protections.
- New utility **syd-load** to load a dynamic library like syd for testing.
- New utility **syd-tick** to measure command runtime in hardware ticks.
- Support include directives in config files.
- Support environment variable and tilde expansion in config files.
- Add hardware ticks in log output if available (x86-64 and arm64).
- Allow `PROC_BTI|PROT_EXEC` for mprotect on arm64.
- Logs of level error are now also sent to syslog similar to warn.
- Add `trace/force_umask` to set an umask at startup and make umask(2) a noop.
- Add `trace/deny_dotdot` to deny .. in path resolution for open calls.
- Cover many more tty types in proc ttyname function borrowing code from procps-ng.
- Fix proc ttyname function not to choke when spaces are in arg0.
- Deny access to directories `/sys/kernel/{boot_params,debug,irq,slab,tracing}`.
- Deny access to `/sys/kernel/notes` and `/sys/kernel/vmcoreinfo`.
- Replace hex crate with const-hex crate.
- Deny bind calls with EADDRNOTAVAIL rather than EACCES for syd-1 compat.
- Add `PR_{G,S}ET_MDWE` to the list of allowed prctls.
- Add support to load a dynamic library at startup and execute the function `syd_main` in it.
- Remove `deadlock_detection` feature and enable functionality by default.
The deadlock detector thread is only spawned if `SYD_LOCK` is set at
startup.
- Support non-multiplexed network calls on X86.
- Check for execute rights before continue in exec handler to make TOCTOU attacks harder.
- Add a hook to the -1 system call and return API number if the lock allows.
- New tool **syd-cpu** to print the number of CPUs.
- Check shebang program for scripts in force sandboxing.
- Check shebang program for scripts in exec sandboxing.
- Fix git versioning issues breaking paludis interaction.
- Fix the capability drop regression which broke `trace/allow_unsafe_caps:1`.
- Deny executable+shared memory by default, can be relaxed with
`trace/allow_unsafe_memory:true`.
- Deny /proc/version and add an uname hook to wipe the OS version field.
- Add files /proc/cmdline, /proc/config.gz, /proc/dma, /proc/interrupts,
/proc/iomem, /proc/ioports, /proc/key-users, /proc/keys, /proc/kmsg,
/proc/modules, /proc/mtrr, /proc/partitions, /proc/softirqs,
/proc/sysrq-trigger, /proc/vmallocinfo and directories /proc/fs, /proc/irq,
and /proc/tty to the list of unsafe paths.
- Revert back to denying PID sandboxing violations with `EACCES` rather than `EAGAIN`.
- Optimize seccomp filter with binary tree sorting.
- Deny access to `/proc/kallsyms` and `/proc/kcore`.
- Deny access to `/dev/mem`, `/dev/kmem`, `/dev/port` and `/dev/cpu/*`.
- Prevent `mmap(NULL, MAP_FIXED)` using a parent seccomp filter.
- syd-path learned `-s` to prefix rules with `/dev/syd/`.
- esyd.sh: Add force sandboxing functions.
- List force sandboxing rules in `/dev/syd/stat` output.
- List force sandboxing rules in `/dev/syd` JSON output.
- Add `arm_fadvise64_64` and `arm_sync_file_range` into the set of safe system calls (ARM compat).
- Add `mq_timedsend_time64` system call into the set of safe system calls (ARM compat).
- Add `send` system call into the set of safe system calls (ARM compat).
- Add `recv` system call into the set of safe system calls (ARM compat).
- Set `SIGPIPE` handler to default at startup for helper tools.
- Implement `syd::fork_fast` for x86 and arm.
- New tool **syd-fork** to fork fast in an infinite loop.
# 3.15.0
- Fix error return when the initial exec fails.
- Fix capability drop when run as root.
- New tool **syd-hex** to hex encode/decode input.
- The new command `force/default` may be used to define the default action for Force sandboxing.
- The new command `sandbox/force` may be used to turn Force sandboxing on or off.
- New tool **syd-path** to write Integrity Force rules for binaries under PATH.
- Implement force sandboxing, which is similar to HardenedBSD's integriforce.
This sandboxing can be used to verify binaries prior to execution.
- New tool **syd-sha** to calculate md5, sha1, sha3-{256,384,512} checksums.
- Extend the list of unsafe environment variables.
- Allow /sys/bus/cpu for read,stat in paludis profile.
- Start sandboxing `fallocate` system call.
# 3.14.5
- Start sandboxing `statfs`, `statfs64`, `fstatfs` and `fstatfs64` system calls.
- Start sandboxing `ftruncate` and `ftruncate64` system calls.
- New `deadlock_detection` feature to spawn a background thread which polls
for and reports deadlocks using the API provided by parking\_lot crate.
- Enable `hardware-lock-elision` feature of the parking\_lot crate which
is supposed to give performance benefits on x86.
- Sync paludis and user profiles with hardened procfs to perform added hardening.
- Deny unconditionally sensitive /proc/pid paths such as "maps" and "mem".
- Drop `trace/allow_unsafe_ptrace` command, ptrace is always denied.
- Drop `trace/allow_unsafe_perf` command, perf is always denied.
- Fix a minor bug in open handler wrt. `O_TMPFILE` flag handling.
- Make magic symlink protection unconditional, previously only readlink
and open handlers were unconditional.
- Deny PID sandboxing violations with `EAGAIN` rather than `EACCES` for compat.
# 3.14.4
- Fix glibc-2.9 compatibility issues wrt. fchmodat2.
- Deny bad/unknown system calls with `ENOSYS` rather than `EACCES`.
- Enable fchmodat2 handler, skip libseccomp unsupported syscalls gracefully.
- Fix lstat on magic proc symbolic links to work correctly.
# 3.14.3
- Make magic symlink protection of readlink and open handlers unconditional.
This protection will continue to work even if sandboxing is off.
- Make namespace reexec race less likely by opening an `O_PATH` fd to `/proc/self/exe` at startup.
- Do not search for PATH when reexecuting syd.
- Rework mounts and chroot, syd is reexecuted outside chroot so there is
no more any requirement to have syd in PATH under the new root
directory. This makes chrooting much more practical with syd.
- Improve cmd, cmdline and cwd logging.
- Change root directory can now be specified as a relative path.
- Fix return code handling wrt. signal termination when syd is executed in a namespace.
- Process bind mounts after syd reexec for safety and flexibility.
# 3.14.2
- Fix the long standing bug caused by UNIX domain sockets' `UNIX_PATH_MAX` length restriction.
# 3.14.1
- **Milestone**: 15 years of sydbox and version π!
- `trace/private_tmp` has been removed, use `bind+tmpfs:/tmp:nodev,nosuid` instead.
- `trace/private_shm` has been removed, use `bind+tmpfs:/dev/shm:nodev,nosuid,noexec` instead.
- `bind` can now be used to mount special filesystems such as `tmpfs`.
- Report target cpu count in -V/--version output.
- Use `PR_MDWE_NO_INHERIT` flag on `trace/allow_unsafe_memory`. This way
syd process gets the MDWE protections regardless of the setting.
- Print target persona in `-V/--version` output.
- Print target information in `-V/--version` output.
- Add `trace/lock_personality` to lock `personality(2)` changes.
- Add `trace/allow_unsafe_memory:true` to the Paludis profile.
- Add `trace/allow_unsafe_memory` to bypass MDWE protections.
- Enhance security by applying Memory-Deny-Write-Execute (MDWE) protections.
- Fix mknod handlers to return `EPERM` rather than `EACCESS` on invalid file type for compatibility.
- Drop `trace/allow_unsupp_socket:true` from user profile.
- Drop `trace/allow_unsafe_socket:true` from user profile.
- Denylist `sendmsg` and `sendmmsg` system calls which can be used to circumvent
network sandboxing. Use `trace/allow_unsafe_sendmsg` to relax this
restriction.
- Stop sandboxing `recvfrom` calls, this is the same behaviour as syd-1.
- Plug a sandbox break where mkdir/mknod calls' `EEXIST` return value may be
misused to locate hidden paths.
- Add new profile **privileged** which is a shorthand for `trace/allow_unsafe_caps:1`.
- Check for request validity before sending SIGKILL to process for safety against PID reuse.
- Rework /proc/sys permissions in `immutable` profile.
- Make immutable profile stricter by bind mounting `/var/empty` over `/sys/fs/{bpf,ext4,fuse,pstore,selinux,smackfs}`.
- Return the errno `ECONNREFUSED` rather than `EACCES` for connect/sendto calls.
- Correct IPv6 loopback address to ::1/128 from ::1/8 in network aliases.
- Fix an UB in xattr handlers causing bad data to be used in value field.
- Fix mknod handler to properly treat zero file type as regular file.
- Add `trace/allow_unsafe_setid` config to relax setid restrictions.
- Allow relative pathnames in rules as UNIX socket path matches.
- Fix a bug with umask handling in open handler.
- Optimize current working directory handling in canonicalize function.
- Allow the ioctl operation `FS_IOC_GETFLAGS`.
- Open the /dev/syd virtual `O_TMPFILE` under /tmp rather than current directory.
- Refine handling of CAP_SYS_PTRACE.
- Optimize path component handling in canonicalize function.
- **syd-stat** learned to list blocked, ignored, caught and pending signals.
- Avoid restoring signal masks needlessly in the child process.
- Process bind mounts after chroot.
- Improve the ends with dot check in read path.
- Start using mimalloc with the secure feature as the default allocator.
The feature flag **mimalloc**, which defaults to on, can be used to turn it off.
- Send seccomp denies to kernel log only if log feature is enabled.
- Various small improvements to the path canonicalizer.
- **syd-mem** now correctly reports errors.
- Ensure config parser gracefully handles binary files.
- **syd-cat** now accepts a path argument to validate the given syd profile.
- Fix tests to run under docker, note `--cap-add CAP_SYS_PTRACE` is
necessary.
# 3.14.0
- Plug a socket leak bringing loopback device up in net namespace.
- Drop sendfd crate dependency.
- Use a pipe pair rather than a socket pair to transfer seccomp fd.
- Set `trace/allow_unsafe_prlimit:true` for Paludis profile.
- Do not drop `CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE` unless entering a user ns.
- Increase thread pool keep alive timeout from 15 seconds to 90 seconds.
- Drop the capability `CAP_SETFCAP` at startup by default.
- Drop the capability `CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH` at startup by default.
- Drop the capability `CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE` at startup by default.
- Drop broken /dev/syd handling in getdents handler.
- Detect and handle mapped IPv4 addresses for IPv6 addresses.
- Fix a minor bug with rule parsing for rules with a trailing slash.
- Fix a minor bug with rule parsing for allow/denylists.
- Harden the getdents handler by making an initial access check for the dir before entries.
- Rework network sandboxing, fix recvfrom handler to properly check for source address.
- Do not validate the address length argument network system calls as
they cannot be fully trusted.
- PID sandboxing can now only be turned on at startup for performance reasons.
- Memory sandboxing can now only be turned on at startup for performance reasons.
- Fix **syd-read** from failing on existing entries.
- Do not do a preliminary normalize pass before canonicalize, breaks
paths with both symlinks and dots in them.
- The tool **syd-norm** has been removed.
- Trim trailing nul-bytes in UNIX domain sockets before canonicalization.
- Harden landlock profile by allowing /proc read-only rather than read-write.
- Canonicalize paths of UNIX domain sockets.
# 3.13.4
- Revert: Harden `private_tmp` and `private_shm` by bindmounting
/var/empty over /var/tmp. Breaks Paludis.
# 3.13.3
- Fix mkdir handler to return EEXIST on existing dirs rather than
raising an access violation.
- Mask kernel filesystems in immutable profile.
- Mount private proc before bind mounts to allow mounting over proc entries.
- Continue execution in case a bindmount fails with ENOENT indicating
source or target does not exist. This way profiles can provide
limitations without failing on systems that don't have the respective
files.
- syd will now fail early if `root:` is specified with one of
`trace/private_shm` or `trace/private_tmp` as these features
contradict with each other and do not work together.
- Fix chroot failing in mount namespace due to non-recursive bindmount.
- Harden `private_tmp` and `private_shm` by bindmounting /var/empty over /var/tmp.
- Harden `private_tmp` by mounting private /tmp with nodev and nosuid options.
- Harden `private_shm` by mounting private /dev/shm with nodev, nosuid and noexec options.
- Improve symlink loop detection in path canonicalizer.
# 3.13.2
- Various minor performace improvements to path canonicalizer and normalizer.
- Improve syscall handler lookup, avoid string match on each syscall.
- Fix logging not to create json objects if the log level is disabled.
# 3.13.1
- Fix empty path handling in readlink handlers.
# 3.13.0
- Add handlers for `readlink` and `readlinkat` for stat sandboxing.
- Bump MSRV from 1.70 to 1.71.
- Improve /proc/self, /proc/thread-self magic link handling, fixing a
known sandbox break, see the integration test
`procself_escape_symlink` for more information.
- Improve handling of the magic /proc/pid/fd symbolic links, return
ELOOP if the path does not belong to the current process akin to
`RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS`. Such fds are often misused to break out of
containers which makes this an important hardening.
- consolidate error logging in json logs.
- pass `RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS` along with `RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS` to the
openat2 calls in open and stat handlers for added security.
- new tool **syd-open** to lookup open flags by number or name.
- improve the efficiency of the stat handler
- improve open handler and fix handling of dir file descriptors in openat{,2}.
- drop noatime from immutable profile mounts to allow unprivileged mount.
- ldd: fix determining syd path on Exherbo.
- Implement `trace/allow_unsafe_perf` command to allow perf inside the sandbox.
- Implement `trace/allow_unsafe_ptrace` command to allow ptrace inside the sandbox.
- Drop `O_PATH` stat sandbox special casing.
- Add setting `trace/allow_unsafe_caps` to skip dropping Linux capabilities on startup.
- Rename `trace/allow_unsafe_socket_families` `trace/allow_unsafe_socket`.
- Rename `trace/allow_unsupported_socket_families` `trace/allow_unsupp_socket`.
- Rename `trace/allow_successful_bind` `trace/allow_safe_bind`.
- Rename `trace/allow_unsafe_environment` `trace/allow_unsafe_env`.
- Improve getdents handler by skipping dot entries from access check.
- Improve proc umask function.
- Add an improved proc tgid get implementation.
- Start using missing mode handlers for path canonicalization.
- Improve the /proc fd check in path canonicalizer.
- Improve the efficiency of `syd::proc::proc_cmdline` function.
- Verify process using seccomp-id-valid after `pidfd_open` calls.
- Drop excessive seccomp-id-valid calls.
- Avoid a needless `faccessat` in path canonicalizer.
- Improve path sandboxing implementation to reduce the number of syscalls.
- Avoid another needless canonicalize in read path function.
- Keep `CAP_FSETID` capability at startup.
- Keep `CAP_FOWNER` capability at startup.
- Keep `CAP_SETPCAP` capability at startup.
- Keep `CAP_MKNOD` capability at startup.
- Keep `CAP_AUDIT_WRITE` capability at startup.
# 3.12.4
- Avoid needless path canonicalization in getdents handler
- Simplify and improve process read directory function
# 3.12.3
- syd-tty no longer prints the tty of the current process when no pid is given.
- Improve process tty function
- syd-ldd: fix issue determining which syd to execute
- Avoid needlessly determining thread group id once per syscall
- Improve process umask function
# 3.12.2
- Drop `CAP_NET_BROADCAST` capability at startup.
- Do not drop the `CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE` and `CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH` capabilities
which may be necessary during path resolution.
- Remove needless, special casing **faccessat** calls for **EEXIST**
check in **mkdir** and **mknod** handlers.
- Refactor path sandboxing to reduce allocations.
- Improve the path canonicalizer performance by allocating the symlink
loop detection set only when really necessary.
- Add initial manual page for `syd.7`.
# 3.12.0
- Add initial manual page for `syd-cat`.
- Add initial manual page for `syd-env`.
- Add initial manual page for `syd-err`.
- Add initial manual page for `syd-exec`.
- Add initial manual page for `syd-ldd`.
- Add initial manual page for `syd-lock`.
- Add initial manual page for `syd-log`.
- Add initial manual page for `syd-ls`.
- Add initial manual page for `syd-mem`.
- Add initial manual page for `syd-norm`.
- Add initial manual page for `syd-read`.
- Add initial manual page for `syd-run`.
- Add initial manual page for `syd-size`.
- Add initial manual page for `syd-stat`.
- Add initial manual page for `syd-sys`.
- Add initial manual page for `syd-test`.
- Add initial manual page for `syd-tty`.
- `syd-ls` learned the new sets **setid**, **time**, and **uring**.
- New sandbox command `trace/allow_unsafe_uring` to allow io_uring
interface.
- Improve symlink loop detection in path canonicalization.
- Consolidate boolean parsing in sandbox commands.
- Add initial `syd.1`, `syd.2`, and `syd.5` manual pages.
- Add initial manual page for `syd-chk`.
- New tool `syd-env` to run a command with the environment of a process.
- Helpers now support `-h` to print help.
- Add sample OpenNTPD profile.
- `syd-ls setid` now lists the setid system calls.
- Add `setgroups` and `setgroups32` to `SETID_SYSCALLS`.
- Add [Known Bugs](#known-bugs) section to the readme.
- Extend the parent seccomp filter, denying many unused system calls.
- Turn `chroot` and `pivot_root` into no-ops rather than denying them with
`EACCES` for compatibility with daemon which change root into an empty
directory once all path access is done.
- Include `O_PATH` open requests into access check for stat sandboxing.
# 3.11.4
- Fix a regression caused by the recent `AT_EMPTY_PATH` path fix.
Notably this makes fstating special files such as pipes and sockets
work correctly again under syd.
# 3.11.3
- Vendor in the caps crate and avoid using **thiserror** which breaks static
linking.
# 3.11.2
- Do not resolve symbolic links with `AT_EMPTY_PATH` flag in newfstatat
and statx handlers. Notably, this fixes tar unpacking symbolic links
pointing outside tar root.
- Improve path exists check in mkdir, mknod handlers by using access
instead of stat.
- Fix a symlink TOCTOU in symlink and symlinkat handlers.
- Fix a symlink TOCTOU in open handler.
- Do not prevent access to device special files in open handler. Use
`bind` with `nodev` for a secure alternative.
- Add sample ntpd profile.
- Drop the `is-terminal` crate dependency.
- Fix an issue with stat handler which caused it to fail with a
permission error when called with `AT_EMPTY_PATH` in a user namespace
(but _not_ in a pid namespace), with /proc mounted with the option
`hidepid=2`.
- Mount private procfs with `hidepid=2` for additional hardening.
- Keep capabilities through user namespaces, this makes `unshare/user:1`
functionally identical to `unshare -U --keep-caps`.
- Use binary system rather than decimal when parsing human-formatted sizes.
- New tool `syd-mem` to calculate the memory usage of a process.
- Do not drop `CAP_SYS_PTRACE` capability on startup as it is necessary
to call the system calls `process_vm_readv` and `process_vm_writev`.
- Drop `CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE` capability on startup.
- Drop `CAP_IPC_OWNER` capability on startup.
- Drop `CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG` capability on startup.
- Start using the `caps` crate to interact with Linux capabilities.
- New tool `syd-stat` to print detailed statistics about a process in JSON.
- unshare: call `PR_SET_KEEPCAPS` after clone.
- Set `trace/allow_unsafe_socket_families:1` **paludis** and **user**
profiles.
# 3.11.1
- New sandbox command `trace/allow_unsafe_socket_families` to keep the
`CAP_NET_RAW` capability. Useful to allow `ping` in the sandbox.
- New sandbox command `trace/allow_unsafe_adjtime` to keep the
`CAP_SYS_TIME` capability and allow the system calls `adjtimex` and
`clock_adjtime`. This is mostly useful when sandboxing an ntp daemon.
- `-e var=` may be used to pass-through an unsafe environment variable.
- Clear unsafe environment variables, may be disabled with
`trace/allow_unsafe_environment:1` on startup.
- New tool `syd-run` to run a program inside a syd container.
- `syd-ldd` now uses the `immutable` profile rather than the `container`
profile.
- Fix `unshare/pid:1` to properly imply `unshare/mount:1`.
- New tool `syd-tty` to print the controlling terminal of the given PID
or the current process.
- Simplify symlink loop detection in path canonicalizer.
- Fix a panic in bind config code path.
- Do not send logs to syslog for `-x`.
- Parse user profile on `-f` for login shell compat.
# 3.11.0
- `-f` argument has been renamed to `-P`. `-f` is now ignored for login
shell compatibility.
# 3.10.2
- Fix a regression with user profile parsing for the login shell.
# 3.10.1
- Clean up temporary tmp and shm directories at exit.
- New sandbox command `trace/private_shm` to mount private /dev/shm in
the new mount namespace.
- Fix a regular expression issue in **syd-err**, and **syd-sys** helpers.
# 3.10.0
- New sandbox command `trace/private_tmp` to mount private /tmp in the
new mount namespace.
- Add new profile **immutable** to create immutable containers.
- Command line option `-C` has been renamed to `-f`.
- Simplify command line option parsing and avoid double parsing to
prioritize CLI options when the user profile is parsed.
- `allowlist/` and `denylist/` prefixes on sandbox commands have been
changed to `allow/` and `deny/` respectively.
- Move auxiliary functionality into separate binaries:
- syd-cat profile-name
- syd-chk
- syd-err number|name-regex
- syd-exec
- syd-lock
- syd-log
- syd-ls allow|deny|hook|ioctl|prctl
- syd-norm path
- syd-read path
- syd-size size|human-size
- syd-sys [-a list|native|x86|x86_64|aarch64...] number|name-regex
- The short form `-v` has been renamed to `-V` for consistency.
- Fix default arg0 for the login shell.
- `SYD_SH` now defaults to `/bin/sh` rather than `/bin/bash`.
- The environment variable `SYD_UNSHARE_MOUNT` is no longer honoured.
- The environment variable `SYD_UNSHARE_UTS` is no longer honoured.
- The environment variable `SYD_UNSHARE_IPC` is no longer honoured.
- The environment variable `SYD_UNSHARE_USER` is no longer honoured.
- The environment variable `SYD_UNSHARE_PID` is no longer honoured.
- The environment variable `SYD_UNSHARE_NET` is no longer honoured.
- The environment variable `SYD_UNSHARE_CGROUP` is no longer honoured.
- `--domainname` has been dropped in favour of the new sandbox command
`name/domain`.
- `--hostname` has been dropped in favour of the new sandbox command
`name/host`.
- `--unshare-mount` has been dropped in favour of the sandbox command
`unshare/mount`.
- `--unshare-uts` has been dropped in favour of the sandbox command
`unshare/uts`.
- `--unshare-ipc` has been dropped in favour of the sandbox command
`unshare/ipc`.
- `--unshare-user` has been dropped in favour of the sandbox command
`unshare/user`.
- `--unshare-pid` has been dropped in favour of the sandbox command
`unshare/pid`.
- `--unshare-net` has been dropped in favour of the sandbox command
`unshare/net`.
- `--unshare-cgroup` has been dropped in favour of the sandbox command
`unshare/cgroup`.
- The long version `--config` has been removed, use `-C`.
- The long version `--magic` has been removed, use `-m`.
- The long version `--arg0` has been removed, `-A` has been renamed to
`-a`.
- The long version `--env` has been removed, `-E` has been renamed to
`-e`.
- The `--lock` option has been removed, use the sandbox command
`lock:on` instead.
- The environment variable `SYD_FAKEROOT` is no longer honoured.
- Change `--root` command line option to `root/fake` sandbox command.
- Change `--map-root` command line option to `root/map` sandbox command.
- Implement `root` sandbox command to change root directory before
starting the process.
- Implement the `bind` sandbox command to recursively bind mount
directories on startup.
- Upgrade `smallvec` crate from `1.11` to `1.13`.
- Upgrade `env_logger` crate from `0.10` to `0.11`.
- Drop `trace/allow_unsafe_getrandom` command and make `getrandom`
system call part of read sandboxing. `getrandom` with the flag
`GRND_RANDOM` is treated equivalent to calling open on
`/dev/random`, and without this flag is treated as open on
`/dev/urandom`.
- Drop the setuid/setgid `chmod` restrictions and remove the sandbox
command `trace/allow_unsafe_chmod`. Since syd always calls
`PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS` this restriction did not provide any added
security and caused issues with e.g. sticky bits on directories.
- `-E` uses the lib profile rather than the Paludis profile now.
- Allow comma delimited list for read, write, exec, stat as capability
in allow/denylists and filters, see [Command Shortcuts](#command-shortcuts)
for more information.
- Implement initial trace aka "dry run" mode, activated with `-x`.
# 3.9.14
- Build release binaries with the log feature.
- Add `SYD_LOG_FD` environment variable to override log file descriptor.
- Add --domainname option to set NIS/YP domain name in the UTS namespace.
- Add --hostname option to set host name in the UTS namespace.
- Drop the broken `--chroot` option.
- Add command line option -E to set/unset environment variables.
- Implement sandbox command `trace/deny_tsc` to disable reading timestamp
counter on x86.
# 3.9.13
- Fix regression causing syd not being able to locate the login shell.
- No longer use nightly rust and `-Zbuild-std` when building release binaries.
# 3.9.12
- Drop `allowlist/lock/write+/dev/std{in,err,out}` from landlock and user
profiles. This caused landlock to fail on user profile when running
without a TTY.
- Do not respect `HOME` environment variable when figuring out user home
directory for added security when used as a login shell.
- Fix user profile parsing on `-c` and `-l`.
- Fix regression causing make not to work under syd due to the
`setresuid` system call getting denied with the wrong errno.
- Use nightly rust and `-Zbuild-std` when building release binaries.
# 3.9.11
- Fix `--chroot` to work with `--unshare-user` correctly again,
this was broken by the user subnamespace safety restriction.
# 3.9.10
- When `unshare/user` is active, enter into a sub usernamespace
after setting the `user.max_user_namespaces` to 1 to ensure
sandbox process can not do further namespace modification.
This is similar to bubblewrap's `--disable-userns` option.
- Respect the value of `--arg0` when spawning a login shell.
- Respect `HOME` environment variable when figuring out user home
directory.
- The user profile is parsed early for login shells now such that
overriding the configuration using command line parameters is
possible.
- Fix undefined behaviour when forking into the new pid namespace
with `unshare/pid:1`.
# 3.9.9
- Errors on disabling of coredumps is no longer fatal.
- Drop the experimental init daemon `syd-init`.
- Relax signal protection such that sending signal 0 (ie check for
existence) to syd threads are permitted.
- Allowlist `/proc/sys/{fs,kernel,vm}` directories recursively for read
and stat sandboxing in **paludis** and **user** profiles.
- Fix ioctl allowlisting failing on musl builds.
- Fix an issue with allowlisting TTY devices in **paludis** and **user**
profiles.
# 3.9.8
- syd now registers itself as a child subreaper unless it is already
pid1. This fixes issues with background processes getting reparented
to the actual pid1 after which it is going to require ptrace rights
to read /proc/pid/mem. With this change, syd works fine as a
regular user with the sysctl `yama.ptrace_scope` set to 1.
# 3.9.7
- Set CPU scheduling priority to idle for syscall handler threads.
- syd no longer sandboxes **ftruncate** as it is impossible
to call without bypassing `open()`.
# 3.9.6
- syd now by default disable setting process resource limits for
sandbox process. Moreover syd also disables coredumps for the
sandbox process. This may be disabled on startup with the sandbox
command `trace/allow_unsafe_prlimit:1`.
- Set `SIGPIPE` to defalt earlier so `--syscall`, `--errno` etc. can
benefit from it.
# 3.9.5
- Add new sandbox command `mem/kill` which may be set to true to kill
offending processes in Memory sandboxing.
# 3.9.4
- Add new sandbox command `pid/kill` which may be set to true to kill
offending processes in PID sandboxing.
- Remove the background interrupt handler thread which is not necessary
with the `WAIT_KILLABLE_RECV` flag.
- Optimize pid sandboxing such that it's much more resillient
against rapid PID starvation.
- Enable `unshare/net:1` in **container** profile. Now that syd
brings the loopback interface up, this is actually useful.
# 3.9.3
- Drop the interrupt workaround in the bind handler which is no longer
necessary.
- Do not check target argument of **symlink**, and **symlinkat** system
calls. This is consistent with the original system calls.
- Fix **fchmodat** and **faccessat** handlers failing on proc fd links.
- Use OwnedFd more widely to ensure no FDs are leaked.
# 3.9.2
- Mention Sandboxing Emacs with syd asciicast in README.
- Preserve child pid information on **reset** sandbox command.
- Fix case insensitive matching for `--syscall` and `--errno`.
- Implement -R, --chroot=root to change root directory.
- Allowlist `/sbin` for **landlock** profile.
- Allowlist `/sbin` for **paludis** profile.
# 3.9.1
- Make open handler handle `/dev/syd` when both the sandbox lock and
read sandboxing is off.
- Make getdents handler list `/dev/syd` when both the sandbox lock and
stat sandboxing is off.
- Fix a segfault on musl during reading `/dev/syd`.
# 3.9.0
- New profile **lib**, the LibSyd helper profile, turns all sandboxing off.
Useful to configure syd in the application using LibSyd.
- Upgrade **regex** crate from `1.9` to `1.10`.
- Upgrade **once\_cell** crate from `1.18` to `1.19`.
- Upgrade **nonempty** crate from `0.8` to `0.9`.
- The `access`, `faccessat`, and `faccessat2` are handled as part of **stat**
sandboxing now. Previously the type of sandboxing depended on the access flags
`R_OK`, `W_OK`, and `X_OK`.
- new tool **syd-ldd** which is a safe `ldd(1)` wrapper.
- use **smallvec** crate to efficiently handle path operations.
- use **itoa** crate to efficiently convert integers to paths (take 2).
# 3.8.9
- Return `EACCES` rather than `ENOSYS` on block device access.
- Use **itoa** crate to efficiently convert pids and file descriptors to
paths.
- Avoid canonicalizing the current working directory on network calls
with UNIX domain sockets. Fixes `ENAMETOOLONG` error in some cases.
- Optimize prioritization of syscall handler threads such that
it only runs once on thread start.
# 3.8.8
- Make the **sync** and **syncfs** calls no-op under syd for added safety.
- Make the **paludis** profile stricter by refining access to `/`.
# 3.8.7
- Further restrict the parent syd process by disallowing **ptrace**,
**chroot**, and **pivot\_root**.
- syd now brings the loopback interface up with `unshare/net:1`.
- Implement the **load** sandbox command.
- Implement the **panic** sandbox command.
- Implement the **reset** sandbox command.
- Remove the is-terminal check from error, warn level logs.
# 3.8.6
- Set i/o priority of system call handler threads to idle.
- Set parent-death signal to SIGKILL in syd process rather than the
child for added safety and security.
- Drop Linux capabilities in syd process rather than the child for
added security.
- Fix unicode issue in regex builder for `--error` and `--syscall` options.
- Reduce the default threadpool keepalive timeout from one minute to 15
seconds so that syd becomes more reliable during pid starvation.
- Apply a seccomp filter to the syd process such that all set*id
system calls return 0 without doing anything. This is an important
security hardening.
# 3.8.5
- Enable debugging information in release mode to help with profiling.
- Use optimization level `3` rather than `z` in release mode.
- Use `unwind` rather than `abort` for panics in release mode.
# 3.8.4
- Implement virtual memory usage limiting for memory sandboxing, the
command `mem/vm_max` may be used to configure the limit which defaults
to 4GB.
- Exit with eldest process by default, add `trace/exit_wait_all` sandbox
command to change behaviour.
# 3.8.3
- Optimize smaps lookup by stopping at the point the memory limit is reached.
# 3.8.2
- Implement `syd --parse human-size` to parse human-formatted size
strings into bytes.
- Implement [Memory Sandboxing](#memory-sandboxing).
# 3.8.1
- Include build host information into `--version` output.
- Ignore `EACCES` and `ESRCH` errors in proc task counter, we already ignore
`ENOENT` and `EPERM` so this is consistent.
- Slightly optimize the task limit check of PID sandboxing.
- Remove the broken **kill** mode for PID sandboxing and rename **deny** to
**on**.
- Set system call handler threads' nice value to 19 to help prevent CPU
starvation.
# 3.8.0
- Add new operator `^` to remove all matching elements from an allowlist,
denylist or a filter.
- New sandboxing type called [PID sandboxing](#pid-sandboxing) to set a limit on
the maximum number of tasks. This is best coupled with a pid name space.
- Guard the parent process with a tight seccomp filter when using namespaces.
- Use the `sendfd` crate and a safe `UnixStream` based socketpair implementation
to send/receive the seccomp notification fd rather than the non-portable
internal alternative.
- Avoid loading landlock twice on startup when namespaces are at play.
- `--arch ` may now be specified with `--syscall num|regex` to lookup the
system call for the specified architecture rather than the native
architecture. `--arch list` may be used to print the list of supported
architectures.
- Denylist `/proc/1/***` for read, stat and write sandboxing in **container**
and user profiles.
# 3.7.3
- Fix build on musl broken by recent 32-bit compat changes
# 3.7.2
- Write a socketcall hook for 32-bit systems.
- Optimize seccomp request preparation slightly by avoiding an ioctl call per
request.
- Fix 32-bit build
- Allowlist the system call `mmap2` and `ugetrlimit` system calls.
- Fix an issue determining the syscall handler for non-native architectures
(e.g. 32bit sandbox process with 64bit syd)
# 3.7.1
- Make the busy-wait in the background monitor thread less heavy by inserting a
wait after each request reap cycle.
- Optimize pidfd handling.
- Optimize the `syd::fs::FileInformation::from_path` function which is used very
frequently in path canonicalization.
# 3.7.0
- Increase the threadpool keepalive timeout from 7 seconds to a minute.
Benchmarks have shown 7 seconds is actually too short and we're overloading
the threadpool.
- Make the background monitor thread wait on a `Condvar` rather than waking up
every n seconds and looping through the whole list of requests. The handler
thread notifies the `Condvar` which wakes up the background monitor thread to
handle interrupts for blocking system calls (e.g. interrupted open on a FIFO)
- Improve seccomp syscall priorities to better match a typical build process.
- Protect syd process and their threads from signals. Hook `kill`, `tkill`,
`tgkill`, and `pidfd_open` calls and return **EACCES** in case sandbox process
tries to send a signal to a process id related to syd.
# 3.6.6
- Avoid waiting for threads in Supervisor::wait avoiding hangs in some cases.
# 3.6.5
- New profile **container** to activate Linux namespaces. This is currently
equivalent to `--unshare-mount,uts,ipc,user,pid,net,cgroup`.
# 3.6.4
- Exit with 128 plus signal value rather than **EFAULT** when the sandbox
process is killed by a signal.
- syd process is included into the namespace now so that it has identical
view of /proc.
- Mount /proc inside the mount namespace as necessary.
- Return proper exit codes on early spawn failures.
- Allowlist the directory `/sys/devices/system/node` recursively for read & stat
sandboxing in **paludis** profile.
# 3.6.3
- Fix an issue with symbolic loop detection in path canonicalizer and make it
more robust. **Milestone** Paludis' tests pass under syd now.
- Ensure seccomp sender and receiver socketpair is closed properly which avoids
hangs when there is an error spawning the sandbox process.
# 3.6.2
- New `landlock` profile to make practical use of LandLock.
- Drop the interrupt workaround for kernel misbehaving with
`WAIT_KILLABLE_RECV` seccomp flag.
- Stat handler incorrectly returned a directory when the sandbox process stats
one of the magic symlinks `/proc/self`, `/proc/thread-self`, `/dev/fd`,
`/dev/stdin`, `/dev/stderr` and `/dev/stdout`. This is now fixed. Notably,
this makes `ps` work under syd.
- Report running kernel version and landlock status in `--version`
- Add `--landlock` which checks if LandLock ABI v3 is fully supported.
# 3.6.1
- The `-` op on magic commands now removes the most recently added matching item
rather than all matching items for predictability.
- Fix `esyd disable` subcommand.
- Allowlist /dev/stdin for landlock read/write in user profile. /dev/stdout and stderr
were already allowed.
# 3.6.0
- Stat sandboxing can no longer be bypassed by attempting to read, write or
execute a denylisted/hidden path.
- Log messages with process IDs are enriched using `/proc/pid/comm` rather than
`/proc/pid/cwd` and `/proc/pid/cmdline` when the **log** feature is disabled
(default). This is much lightweight since it avoids filesystem access.
- Implemented various small usability improvements for `syd-test`.
- Ioctl restrictions was not applied correctly when syd was built with musl.
This is now fixed.
- New feature `log` to include debug logging into the program. By default
logs of severity debug and trace are compiled out. This was previously
dependent on debug build mode.
- `esyd enable`, `enabled`, `enable_path`, `enabled_path`, `disable`,
`disabled`, `disable_path`, and `disabled_path` now works for read, write and
stat sandboxing rather than just write sandboxing. use the `_write` suffixed
versions of the subcommands for write-only.
- `esyd deny`, `deny_path`, `nodeny`, and `nodeny_path` now works for read,
write and stat sandboxing rather than just write sandboxing, use `esyd
deny_write`, `nodeny_write` to add/remove from the write-only denylist.
- `esyd allow`, `allow_path`, `disallow` and `disallow_path` now works for read,
write and stat sandboxing rather than just write sandboxing, use `esyd
allow_write`, `disallow_write` to add/remove from write-only allowlist.
- Allowlist the directory `/proc/sys/vm` for read & stat sandboxing in
**paludis** and **user** profiles.
- Allowlist files with CPU information under `/sys/devices/system/cpu`
for read & stat sandboxing in **paludis** profile.
- Allowlist the directory `/proc/pid/attr` for read & stat sandboxing in
**paludis** and **user** profiles.
- Reduce the severity of sandbox config change logs from **warn** to **info**.
- `sandbox/stat`, aka Stat Sandboxing, defaults to **on** rather than **off**
now.
- `sandbox/read`, aka Read Sandboxing, defaults to **on** rather than **off**
now.
- `sandbox/exec`, aka Exec Sandboxing, defaults to **on** rather than **off**
now.
- `trace/allow_unsupported_socket_families` defaults to **false** rather than
**true** now.
- `trace/allow_successful_bind` default to **false** rather than **true** now.
- Mention asciicasts in README.
# 3.5.2
- Fix various issues with /proc handling of stat and open handlers.
- Support Linux-specific statx flags in statx handler.
# 3.5.1
- Make mkdir, mkdirat, mknod and mknodat handlers more resillient to interrupts.
- Make connect handler more resillient to interrupts.
# 3.5.0
- Make expensive tests usable (preparation for `src_test_expensive` on Exherbo).
- Rename **local** alias to **local4**, define the new **local** alias an union
of **local{4,6}**.
- Rename **any** alias to **any4**, define the new **any** alias as an union of
**any{4,6}**.
- Rename **loopback** alias to **loopback4**, define the new **loopback** alias
as an union of **loopback{4,6}**.
- Add **linklocal**, **linklocal4**, and **linklocal6** network aliases.
- Network aliases are now case-insensitive.
- Support Plan9 style network addresses such as `1.1.1.1!80`. This is the format
we're going to use moving forward. `@` is still supported as a split character
for backwards compatibility.
- Make bind handler more resillient to interrupts.
# 3.4.3
- Fix **allowlist/net/bind-**, **allowlist/net/connect-**,
**denylist/net/bind-**, **denylist/net/connect-** sandbox commands to
correctly remove the address when the port is given as a single port rather
than a port range.
- Fix a bug with seccomp request tracking of the background syd::m☮☮n thread
causing spurious signals to be sent to system call handler threads.
# 3.4.2
- Start making binary releases
# 3.4.1
- Replace `threadpool` crate with the `rusty_poll` crate
# 3.4.0
- Teach syd::m☮☮n thread the ability to resize the syscall handler threadpool
size upon investigating the current active, queued and maximum count of
the threadpool. This makes syd automatically adapt when there's a sudden
burst of blocking system calls (e.g. opening a FIFO, or binding a socket)
and avoid deadlocks. When the burst is gone, syd::m☮☮n kicks in again and
decreases the pool size back to a normal state. Since the handling is
completely automatic, the environment variable `SYD_NPROC` to set the size of
the system call handler thread pool is no longer supported. The value defaults
to the number of CPUs on startup and is adapted automatically according to the
needs of the sandbox process.
- Fix various issues with UNIX domain socket handling.
- Honour process umask properly in bind handler.
- Make the bind syscall handler much more resillient to quickly restarting
interrupted syscalls.
- Improve interrupt handling by spawning a background thread called syd::m☮☮n,
to reap invalidated seccomp requests and interrupt respective syscall handler
threads.
# 3.3.4
- Fix a bug in symlink loop handling of path canonicalization and make it more
efficient.
- Simplify FIFO handling using a thread rather than forking. Credit goes to
**Johannes Nixdorf** for coming up with the idea and testing a POC.
# 3.3.3
- Fix handling of unix domain socket connections with relative paths.
- Drop the umask lock and support input/output to FIFOs.
# 3.3.2
- Handle the virtual paths **/dev/stdin**, **/dev/stdout**, and **/dev/stderr**
specially during syscall emulation.
- Fix fgetxattr handler to correctly determine the path to the file descriptor.
- Fix an issue with fgetxattr handler where the handler would erroneously return
EFAULT on some valid fgetxattr calls.
- Fix an issue emulating newfstatat calls with `AT_EMPTH_PATH` flag.
# 3.3.1
- Fix another bug with ends with dot check in path canonicalizer which
caused some paths to erroneously return ENOENT rather than EEXIST.
- Fix the ends with dot check in path canonicalizer which caused
creating/removing directories with a dot in the name fail with EINVAL.
- Improve handling of the special paths `/dev/fd/$fd` and `/proc/$pid/fd/$fd`.
- Improve path canonicalizer by avoiding double stat on symlinks.
- Allow **TIOCSCTTY** ioctl by default.
- Rather than disallowing access to `/dev/tty` with **ENXIO** unconditionally,
try to determine sandbox process' controlling terminal and use it.
- New command `syd-init` which is a simple init system to run under syd.
- Switch fuzzer to use afl++ rather than libfuzzer
- Document **-c** and **-l** options correctly. Ignore **--login** as well for
login shell compatibility.
- Add a CTF guide section in the README
# 3.3.0
- `-r` short option of `--root` has been removed for consistency.
- `-l` option is a no-op now rather than being a short option for `--lock` for
login shell compatibility.
- `-c` short option has been changed to `-C` for **--config**. **-c** causes
command to be executed under a shell for login shell compatibility
# 3.2.11
- Announce the CTF game in the README.
- Move the system calls **getxattr**, **lgetxattr**, **fgetxattr**,
**listxattr**, **flistxattr**, and **llistxattr** from read sandboxing to stat
sandboxing for consistency with **stat** calls.
- Do not replace `/proc/self` with `/proc/pid` on stat with nofollow. This fixes
`ps` to work under syd above all.
# 3.2.10
- `syd --read` now works with relative paths as well as absolute paths.
- New profile `silent` to silence all access violations.
- Fix a bug with path normalization where double dots at root position were
erroneously removed resulting in path not found errors during syscall
handling.
# 3.2.9
- Drop trailing slash from paths before matching.
- Update bpftrace scripts
- Fix /dev/pts glob in `paludis` and `user` profiles.
# 3.2.8
- Disallow access to `/dev/tty` with `ENXIO` as syd cannot safely emulate
access to the controlling terminal.
- Implement `syd --syscall number|name-regex` to search for syscall numbers and
names.
- Fix stat handler from erroneously returning ELOOP on symbolic links with a
trailing slash.
- Fix a bug with symbolic link loop detection in remote path canonicalization.
- Properly exit with EBUSY when seccomp filter cannot be loaded on startup.
- Print libsecc☮mp version, api version and native architecture in `syd --help`
output.
- Print libsecc☮mp native architecture in `syd --version` output.
- Implement `syd --arch` to print the name of the native libsecc☮mp
architecture.
- Implement `syd --errno number|name-regex` to search for errno numbers and
names.
# 3.2.7
- Move esyd.sh from data/ to src/ as another attempt to fix `cargo install`.
- Use openat2 with `RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS` when stating in fs::canonicalize
function removing another potential TOCTOU vector.
# 3.2.6
- Do not call `include_str!` with a relative path which breaks `cargo install`.
Use cargo build environment variables instead.
- Always deny access violations with EACCES. Previously syd would deny
silently with ENOENT if the path does not exist. This was a feature to ease
test/dev cycle in early stages of syd-3 but it creates confusion, so it is now
removed.
# 3.2.5
- Fix a file descriptor leak in stat handler. Credit goes to **Johannes
Nixdorf** for identifying the bug.
- Report libsecc☮mp API in `syd --version`
- `syd-test` now lists known failures at the end of the test run.
- Ensure restarted open system calls with `O_EXCL` flags succeed. With this fix
`git clone` works under syd.
- Fix parsing of LOCAL and LOCAL6 network aliases.
# 3.2.4
- Fix tests
# 3.2.3
- Ensure opening directories in write mode fails with EISDIR in open handler.
- Deny mknod for fifos and block devices with ENOSYS rather than ENOPERM
correctly signaling the sandbox process the lack of support for named pipes.
- Do not follow symbolic links in chmod handler.
- Preserve `O_CLOEXEC` flag as necessary in the added fd for open system call
handlers.
- Ensure system call emulators fail with ENOTDIR when fd argument is a regular
file and the path argument is a dot.
- Avoid updating file access times during remote path canonicalization which may
break expectations of sandbox processes.
- open handlers now return ENOENT when the path argument is an empty string.
- unlink, unlinkat, rename, renameat, and renameat2 handlers now return EINVAL
when the last path of the component is a dot.
- Fix a regression in recvfrom remote socket address writing. This caused UDP
connections, such as DNS to fail under syd.
- Handle task death between seccomp notify poll event receive and seccomp
request receive gracefully.
# 3.2.2
- Add statistics about the file in reports for path access violations.
- Access violation returns EACCES if file exists and the errno if the file does
not exist. Previously it would always return ENOENT in the latter case.
- Do not follow symbolic links in mkdir and mkdirat handlers.
- Lift chmod and getrandom restrictions for the paludis profile.
- `trace/allow_unsafe_getrandom` sandbox command may be used to lift getrandom
restrictions and allow the use of `GRND_RANDOM` flag with getrandom which
accesses `/dev/random` under the hood.
- `trace/allow_unsafe_chmod` sandbox command may be used to lift chmod
restrictions and allow the creation of setuid/setgid files.
- Return correct errno on open errors due to remote path canonicalization
failures.
- System call handlers properly return EBADF on invalid fd arguments now.
- Fix symbolic link handling in open syscall handlers.
- Fix symlink loop detection in remote path canonicalization.
- We issue continue syscall for connection-mode sockets in recvfrom/sendto
system calls. Since the pointer argument is NULL in these cases we're safe
from TOCTOU.
- Do not follow symbolic links in rename, renameat, and renameat2 handlers.
- Return correct errno on failures from statx and newfstatat handlers.
- Use original target argument in symlink, symlinkat handlers so that creation
of relative symbolic links is now possible under syd.
- Honor sandbox process umask in link and linkat system calls.
- Honor sandbox process umask when creating UNIX sockets.
- Honor sandbox process umask in mkdir, mkdirat, mknod, and mknodat syscall handlers.
- Trailing slash handling has been improved across all system call handlers.
- link, and linkat handlers no longer follow symbolic links in newpath as
mandated by POSIX.
- linkat now honours `AT_SYMLINK_FOLLOW` correctly when following symlinks.
- link no longer follows symbolic links on its first argument as it should.
- open, and openat with `O_CREAT` now properly returns ENOENT on paths ending
with a trailing slash.
- Handle mkdir, mkdirat, rmdir, and unlinkat correctly and return EINVAL when
the last component is a dot.
- Fix a path canonicalization bug to follow symbolic links in the last component
in case the component ends with a slash, ie if it has to be a directory.
- Simplify stat handling.
- Various fixes for xattr related system call handlers, above all handle value
argument being NULL gracefully.
- Avoid resolving target path in **symlink** and **symlinkat** emulators.
# 3.2.1
- Fix handling of `lchown{,32}` emulators where we mistakenly followed symbolic
links before.
- Use use a fd with `O_PATH+RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS` during syscall emulation for
safety against symlink attacks, we hard require Linux-5.6 or newer with this.
- Sandbox **ftruncate**, **fgetxattr** and **lgetxattr**.
- Call renameat2 directly as a syscall as musl libc is lacking this function at
the moment and their usage breaks musl builds.
# 3.2.0
- Numerous minor fixes to path normalization and canonicalization.
- Emulate all sandboxing calls but **exec**, and **chdir**.
- Handle symbolic links and the `AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW` flag correctly.
- Handle empty paths and the `AT_EMPTY_PATH` flag correctly in system calls.
- `trace/allow_successful_bind` is now fixed to correctly allow successful bind
calls.
- syd now emulates all the respective system calls for network sandboxing
**making network sandboxing completely TOCTOU-free.**
- syd no longer allows the opening of existing device special files or named pipes.
- syd no longer allows the creation of device special files or named pipes.
# 3.1.11
- Fix an issue with network address filtering causing some filters to match
regardless of their port restrictions.
- Fix an issue with network address matching causing some rules to match
regardless of their port restrictions.
# 3.1.10
- Add sample user configuration file under `data/user.syd-3`.
- Use `/etc/user.syd-3` rather than `/etc/rc.syd-3` which is more consistent.
- syd now properly spawns the underlying shell as a login shell when syd
itself is invoked as a login shell.
- Add sandbox commands **unshare/{mount,uts,ipc,user,pid,net,cgroup}** which are
equivalent to the command line options
`--unshare-{mount,uts,ipc,user,pid,net,cgroup}`. In addition they may be
queried using the stat interface during runtime, e.g. `test -e
/dev/syd/unshare/user?'
- Implement `trace/allow_unsafe_{io,pr}ctl` sandbox commands which may be
used to lift the restrictions on the respective system calls.
- The function `syd::proc::proc_cmdline` now trims overly long command lines.
- Simplify capabilities handling. Drop `CAP_BPF`.
# 3.1.9
- The lock is honoured during initial configuration updates so e.g.
setting the sandbox lock in the file `/etc/rc.syd-3` will prevent
`~/.user.syd-3` from loading. This is useful to enforce site-wide
configuration.
- **user** profile now parser `/etc/rc.syd-3` before `~/.user.syd-3`.
- syd now honours the environment variables
`SYD_UNSHARE_{MOUNT,UTS,IPC,USER,PID,NET,CGROUP}` to create namespaces.
- You may now use syd as your login shell by adding it to `/etc/shells`. The
actual shell to execute under syd defaults to `/bin/bash` and can be
changed on runtime via `SYD_SHELL` environment variable or during compile time
by changing the variable `SYD_SH` in `src/config.rs`.
- Fix a bug with path normalization to handle double dots at root position
correctly.
- The set-id family calls are now no-ops under syd.
- The `/dev/syd` may be read to get syd state in JSON in case sandbox is
unlocked.
- Better ZSH compatibility for the `data/esyd.sh` script which is also available
via `esyd --sh`.
# 3.1.8
- Fix linkat, renameat, and renameat2 system call handlers' argument handling.
- Fix dropping of capabilities with `--map-root`.
- Listing `/dev` now lists `/dev/syd` in case the sandbox lock is off.
- Simplify handling of the special paths `/proc/self` and `/dev/fd`.
- syd now properly returns `ENAMETOOLONG` for too long paths.
- Ensure the validity of the sandbox process is checked using
`SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ID_VALID` after every interaction with the sandbox
process memory.
- syd now allows **ioctl** requests for **PTY** handling.
- syd now properly closes the seccomp notify file descriptor after poll
errors.
- syd now sets the **no\_new\_privs** attribute for the syd process as
well as the sandbox process. Previously we only set this in the child process.
- Fix a bug in path canonicalization function preventing an infinite loop,
when following certain symbolic links.
# 3.1.7
- Vendor in the caps crate and avoid using **thiserror** which breaks static
linking.
# 3.1.6
- Stop using the **thiserror** crate which breaks static linking.
# 3.1.5
- Stop using the `derive` feature of the **serde** crate which breaks static
linking.
# 3.1.4
- Allow the system calls **setgid**, **setgriups**, **setregid**, **setresgid**,
**setresuid**, **setreuid**, **setuid** inside the sandbox. Since we drop the
capabilities `CAP_SETUID` and `CAP_SETGID` on startup this is safe.
- Vendor in the landlock create, use bitflags rather than enumflags2 which
depends on emumflags2\_derive crate and that used to break both static linking
and address sanitizer.
- Reading from files under `/dev/syd` succeeds with the lock off. This is to
provide consistency with the stat interface. The open system call handler just
opens `/dev/null` instead under the hood.
- Handle pipes under `/proc/pid/task/fd` directories correctly.
- `syd-test` now honours the **SYD\_TEST\_VALGRIND** environment variable to run
syd under valgrind during integration tests.
- syd now logs the current user id with the log messages.
- The stack size of the syd execve child has been increased from 4k to 128k.
- Block **getrandom** calls with **GRND\_RANDOM** flag. Sandbox processes are
not allowed to access **/dev/random**. Access to **/dev/urandom** is fine.
- Fix environment clearing code which fixes the broken functionality of
`SYD_NO_SYSLOG` and `SYD_NO_CROSS_MEMORY_ATTACH` environment variables.
- The **stat** system call handler now properly handles symbolic links.
- **paludis** and **user** profiles allow access to files `/proc/version` and
`/proc/pid/map`.
- Fix and document **ioctl**, **prctl** restrictions.
- syd now writes "deny" to `/proc/pid/setgroups` before writing the `gid_map`
file. This way `setgroups(2)` is permanently disabled in user namespace and
writing to the gid map file can succeed without having the `CAP_SETGID`
capability.
# 3.1.3
- syd restricts prctl usage with a list of allowlisted prctls. This prevents
potentially dangerous prctls such as **PR_SET_MM** which can create
self-modifying executables. The list of allowlisted prctls can be listed using
`syd --list prctl`.
- syd restricts ioctl usage with a list of allowlisted ioctls. This prevents
sandbox escapes such as utilizing **TIOCSTI** to write to the controlling
terminal. The list of allowlisted ioctls can be listed using `syd --list
ioctl`.
- Use the errno **EACCES** rather than **EPERM** on access violations.
- **paludis** profile disables read access to `/dev/random`. stat access to this
file is granted. Read access to `/dev/urandom` works too.
# 3.1.2
- The stat system call handler now handles deleted files correctly and fstats on
the fd rathet than the dangling /proc symlink
- The stat system call handler now handles special files such as sockets or poll
file descriptors correctly and fstats on the fd rather than the dangling
/proc symbolic link.
- **paludis** and **user** profiles allow read/stat access to `/proc/stat` now
so that `ps` works correctly in the sandbox.
- Add `--sh` option which makes syd drop a shell script to standard output
which defines **esyd** the sandbbox helper.
# 3.1.1
- CGroups support has been dropped, use other means to create CGroups and then
spawn syd inside.
- The *paludis* and *user* profiles now allow read/stat access to
the files `/proc/sys/kernel/osrelease` and `/proc/uptime`.
- Fix a panic trying to log paths with non UTF-8 pathnames.
# 3.1.0
- The **stat** system call emulator no longer fails to fstat on pipes.
The solution is **TOCTOU-free**, when we hit on a pipe fd, we get the
file descriptor, fstat it and close it, then return the stat buffer.
- Add support for CGroups via `--limit-{cpu,io,mem,pid}`. The command-line
arguments have conservative defaults. RTFM for more information.
- Disallow the system calls **bpf**, **ioperm**, **iopl**, **setgid**,
**setgroups**, **setregid**, **setresgid**, **setresuid**, setreuid**, and
**vhangup** inside the sandbox to improve security.
- Improve architecture-dependent code, improve support for ARM and S390.
- Edit **paludis** and **user** profiles to have a "deny-by-default and
allowlist known goods" strategy for the directories `/dev` and `/proc`. This
brings added safety as it adds read restrictions and hides many sensitive
paths such as `/dev/kmem` or `/proc/pid/mem`.
- The **memfd_secret** system call is now allowed in the sandbox.
- The **act** and **syslog** system calls are no longer allowed in the sandbox.
- syd drops some capabilities on startup which provides added safety to the
sandbox. The list of dropped capabilities are listed under
[Security](#security).
- Implement **--map-root** command line flag to map current user to root in the
sandbox. This implies **--unshare-user**.
- Fix the prevention of **setuid**/**setgid** files to be created in the
sandbox.
# 3.0.16
- syd now allows the system calls **setdomainname**, **sethostname**,
**syslog**, and **signalfd4** system calls inside the sandbox.
- The **stat** family system calls are no fully emulated and do not suffer from
**TOCTOU** issues.
- syd no longer allows the `TIOCSTI` **ioctl** call which can be used to
write to the controlling terminal for added security.
- When syd is invoked with `--unshare-user` option to create a new user
namespace, the creation of new user namespaces inside the sandbox is no longer
allowed for added security.
- syd now allows the system calls **pidfd\_open** and **unshare**.
- syd no longer allows the system calls **mbind**, **migrate\_pages**,
**move\_pages**, **perf\_event\_open**, **set\_mempolicy**, and
**userfaultfd** inside the sandbox for added security.
- syd no longer allows setuid/setgid files to be created inside the sandbox.
- **fchmod**, and **fchown** system calls are now sandboxed.
# 3.0.15
- Turn on the [empty
alternates](https://docs.rs/globset/latest/globset/struct.GlobBuilder.html#method.empty_alternates)
building Globs such that `foo{,txt}` in a pattern will match both `foo` and
`foo.txt`.
- Take advantage of **globset** crate's ability to match a set of patterns at
once. This way regardless of how many rules are present in a glob pattern
list, such as allowlist/read, denylist/stat, syd does a single pattern
match during access control. This increase performance considerably,
especially for very long rulesets.
- replace **glob-match** crate with **globset** crate. **globset** can work
directly on `Path`s and requires no `String` conversion.
- Use `Path`/`PathBuf` rather than `&str`/`String` in many places where we
handle path names. This ensures path names with invalid UTF-8 in their names
are handled correctly.
# 3.0.14
- syd now uses Landlock ABI version 3 rather than version 1. A Linux kernel
running version 6.2 or newer is required to get the most out of it. However
older versions also work quite well. See [this
table](https://man.archlinux.org/man/landlock.7.en#VERSIONS) for an overview
on Landlock features and the corresponding kernel version when they were
implemented.
# 3.0.13
- **esyd check** now utilizes `syd --check` rather than stating the file
`/dev/syd`. This way it can still detect if the process is running under
syd despite the sandbox lock being on.
- **esyd exec** subcommand has been fixed.
- The **user** profile added `/dev/tty` to the list of read-write allowed paths
for LandLock sandboxing.
- The **user** profile now allows read access to **/var/log/journal** for
systemd journal access.
- **esyd dump** subcommand now forwards it command line arguments and pipes its
output to **jq** if it's available.
- **Security**: Start emulating **creat** system call which prevents the
`TOCTOU` scenario where an attacker can create a denylisted file by
editing the dereferenced pointer argument after the access control but
before the system call actually happens. We have an integration test,
called **ptrmod_toctou_creat** which confirms the fix.
- The **esyd** helper saw some fixes, fixing `deny*` subcommands.
# 3.0.12
- syd now logs sandbox command attempts so as to better couple with **esyd**.
- Many improvements, fixes and documentation for the **esyd** helper.
# 3.0.11
- Added new network aliases `ANY` and `ANY6` which match the whole Ipv4 and Ipv6
address spaces respectively.
- **Security**: Add `NULL` guards to all system call hooks which prevents
potential crashes if one of the pointer arguments is 0, one of which was
discovered by trinity on the getdents handler here:
https://builds.sr.ht/~alip/job/1077263
- **Security**: Fix a crash in getdents handler discovered by trinity fuzzer in
this build: https://builds.sr.ht/~alip/job/1077263
- Support compatible system call ABIs as necessary, e.g. on `x86-64`, we now
support `x86`, and `x32` ABIs, on `aarch64` we support `arm` too etc. With
this out of the way, the default bad architecture action has been changed to
"kill process".
- Added helper script `data/esyd.bash` which when sourced into a bash
environment, defines the convenience function `esyd` to interact with syd
sandbox commands.
- Stat'ing the magic path `/dev/syd/stat` prints the syd status on standard
error.
- Reading from the magic path `/dev/syd/dump` returns the current syd
state as JSON. This is only available when the sandbox is not locked, or
it's only available to the syd execve child via `lock:exec`.
- `syd --read path` may be used to canonicalize a path.
- Log messages with process ID information are now enriched with the current
working directory of the process.
- **lchown**, and **lgetxattr** system calls are now sandboxed.
- Implement `--list set` to display the list of system calls in the given set.
The supported sets are **allow**, **deny**, and **hook**.
- Fix BusyBox compatibility issues in integration tests.
# 3.0.10
- Fix unit tests
# 3.0.9
- Fix yet another case where a path with invalid UTF-8 would make syd panic.
- **Security**: syd now normalizes the **path** argument of the emulated
**open** system call which prevents some jail breaks, the simplest being to
invoke `cat /proc/./self/status` inside syd which erroneously opens the
proc directory of syd rather then that of the process. We have added about
80 integration tests which test various relative paths to break the sandbox
and syd passes all these tests after this fix.
- Use the **paludis** profile rather than the **user** in tests to improve
reproducibility. Since the **user** profile parsers `~/.user.syd-3` this could
cause random test failures.
- Calling a system call in an inaccessible directory would fail with `EACCES`
even if the path argument is an absolute path. This is now fixed.
# 3.0.8
- Fix a panic in open system call hook for invalid UTF-8 paths.
- Add `/home` to the list of read-only directories for Landlock for `user`
profile.
- `SYD_NPROC` environment variable can be used to configure the number of system
call handler threads.
- Command options are now pretty printed in `test -e /dev/syd/dump` output.
- Reduce the duration of write lock contention in open system call handlers.
- Consider open calls with the flag `O_CREAT` for write sandboxing regardless of
access mode.
# 3.0.7
- Use `epoll` rather than `poll` in the syd poll thread.
- Ensure the syd process supervisor does not leak the seccomp file descriptor
on error conditions.
- syd's thread group id determiner function which reads `/proc/pid/status`
would hang forever in case the process exits after we open the file but before
we're finished with reading. This is now fixed.
- The --print-profile CLI option has been renamed to --print.
- Added `syd --check` to check if the process is running under syd.
# 3.0.6
- syd now honors the umask of the environment rather than setting a strict
umask.
- Fix the open emulator to properly handle open calls with `O_TMPFILE` flag.
# 3.0.5
- Handle **AT\_EMPTY\_PATH** flag properly in **execveat**, **fchownat**,
**linkat**, **statx**, **newfstatat**, and **utimensat** syscall hooks.
# 3.0.4
- The system call hook of **open** family system calls now properly sets umask
to that of the process before emulating open so the umasks in sandbox are now
properly honoured.
- Properly handle system calls with a file descriptor and an empty path as
argument.
- Follow symbolic links in path resolution regardless of the system call.
- New command line option **--print-profile** to print the rules of the given
sandbox profile.
- The sandbox profiles **paludis** and **user** have been hardened by utilizing
[Read Sandboxing](#read-sandboxing) and [Stat Sandboxing](#stat-sandboxing).
Many sensitive paths such as **/proc/pid/mem**, **/dev/mem** are both hidden
and denylisted for read.
- **Landlock** errors are no longer fatal.
- **syd** has now basic support for UID/GID mapping inside user namespaces,
where by default the current user is mapped with the same UID/GID inside the
container.
- **syd-test** now changes its current working directory to a temporary
directory before running integration tests. There is also a new validation in
place when **syd-test** will refuse to run as root. This is due to the fact
that the integration tests will fail randomly when run with elevated
privileges.
- Use **SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ADDFD** in **open**, **openat** and **openat2**
calls to close the **TOCTOU** window, providing security. Once POC for
**open** system call which utilizes pointer modification to break out of jail
has been included in the test suite and is fixed with this change.
# 3.0.3
- **Security**: syd did not check the target argument of **symlink** and
**symlinkat** system calls which makes a jail break possible through a symlink
attack. Two POCs, one for each system call respectively, are included in the
test suite. With syd checking the target argument these breaks no longer
work.
- `syd -t`, and `syd-test` now accept many of either a name regex, a test index,
or a test index range as arguments to filter which integration tests to run.
# 3.0.2
- `-H, --hostname name`, `-D, --domainname name` added to set host, domain name
of sandboxed process. This requires `--unshare-uts`.
- `-u name, --uid=name` and `-g name, --gid=name` options have been added to run
the sandboxed process as another user.
- `-A alias, --arg0=alias` has been added to set an alias for the sandbox
process.
- `-W dir, --work-dir=dir` option has been added to change into a directory before
executing sandbox process.
- `-C dir, --chroot=dir` option has been added to chroot into a directory before
executing sandbox process.
- `--unshare-pid,net,mount,uts,ipc,user` command line arguments have been added
for namespaces support.
- `--export pfc` now has detailed information about the seccomp rules, and lists
of allowed and notified system calls.
- The old and unused **_sysctl** system call is no longer allowed by syd.
- syd now reports libsecc☮mp version in `--version` output.
- Remove read beneath /home for landlock in user profile.
- Clean syd related environment variables from the environment of the
sandboxed process.
# 3.0.1
- New sandboxing type [Lock Sandboxing](#lock-sandboxing) to utilize
[Landlock](https://landlock.io/)
[LSM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux_Security_Modules).
- syd no longer sets umask to 077 for the sandbox process.
- Disable **setuid** system call in the sandbox for added security. Since this
system call normally requires an environment with new privileges, this is not
possible under syd as the sandbox has "no new privileges" flag set.
# 3.0.0
- **Milestone**: Paludis builds under syd with recommended tests using this
[MR](https://gitlab.exherbo.org/paludis/paludis/-/merge_requests/86).
- Sandbox command lock now defaults to **exec** rather than **off** for added
security.
- `allowlist/successful_bind` was broken by a recent change. This is now fixed.
- The `trace/memory_access` command is fixed, `strace -c` confirms the results
# 3.0.0-beta.15
- Test suite now properly recognizes that it is running under syd and skips
the integration tests.
- syd now properly exits with the exit code of the sandbox process and exit
codes for error conditions are documented in `--help`.
- Fix an issue with triple star extension in path glob matches.
# 3.0.0-beta.14
- Fix an issue with /proc/pid/cmdline reader.
- `symlink` and `symlinkat` system call interceptors no longer check the target
for access.
- Skip running integration tests when running under syd.
- `lock:exec` no longer waits for the initial **exec** call to lock the sandbox
for all processes except the syd exec child.
# 3.0.0-beta.13
- Drop the `built` crate dependency.
- Drop the `procfs` crate dependency.
- Use the `built` crate without the `git2` feature.
- Don't use `snmalloc` as the global allocator anymore. This fixes issues with
static linking on Gentoo.
# 3.0.0-beta.12
- Fix an issue of **stat** sandboxing with path hiding.
- The environment variable **SYD\_NO\_CROSS\_MEMORY\_ATTACH** may be set to
disable using cross memory attach and fallback to `/proc/pid/mem`.
- The environment variable **SYD\_NO\_SYSLOG** may be set to disable logging to **syslog**.
- Canonicalize UNIX socket addresses before sandbox access check.
- Add common system directories to the allowlist in **user** profile to make
usage more practical.
- Add `--export` argument to export secure computing rules in binary **Berkeley
Packet Filter** format and textual **Pseudo Filter Code** formats.
- System call hooks now use system call name and arguments to determine whether
remote path canonicalization should resolve symbolic links.
- bump MSRV from `1.69` to `1.70`.
- `error` and `warn` level logs are not written to standard error unless
standard error is a terminal. Since logs of these levels also go to **syslog**
this is no loss for the user. This is merely to provide convenience when
running terminal user interfaces under syd.
- `user` profile now enables `stat` sandboxing with the user home directory
allowlisted.
# 3.0.0-beta.11
- Added `stat` sandboxing which can be used to hide files and directories from
the sandboxed process.
- The sandbox command `denylist/network` has been renamed to `denylist/net`.
- The sandbox command `allowlist/network` has been renamed to `allowlist/net`.
- The sandbox command `filter/network` has been renamed to `filter/net`.
- The sandbox command `sandbox/network` has been renamed to `sandbox/net`.
- `user` profile now properly allowlists screen and tmux connections.
# 3.0.0-beta.10
- When debug mode is enabled with `SYD_LOG=debug`, syd now logs all system
calls with seccomp action other than `Allow` to the kernel log. This is useful
in tackling problems with build failures.
- System calls with bad architecture know return `ENOSYS` rather than syd
killing the thread.
- Disallowed system calls are now denied with `EACCES` rather than `ENOSYS`.
- syd now sets seccomp system call priority of hotter system calls to a
higher value to improve performance.
- Fix a potential panic with `/proc/self` -> `/proc/pid` handling in remote
paths.
# 3.0.0-beta.9
- Fix an issue with remote path canonicalization.
# 3.0.0-beta.8
- Consolidate error handling, making it faster and more robust.
- Various fixes and improvements for the remote path canonicalization code which
makes it faster and more robust with regards to error handling.
# 3.0.0-beta.7
- syd now ignores the signals `SIGHUP`, `SIGTSTP`, `SIGTTOU`, and `SIGTTIN`
for uninterrupted tracing.
- The **user** profile now sets the environment variable
`GIT_CEILING_DIRECTORIES` to `HOME` to save the user from some useless and
annoying access violations.
# 3.0.0-beta.6
- Make the **user** profile Exherbo friendly.
# 3.0.0-beta.5
- The `user` profile now has **read** and **exec** sandboxing enabled as well as
**write** and **network** sandboxing.
- The **triple star** extension is applied to glob patterns, ie `/dev/***`
matches both `/dev` and any file recursively under `/dev`.
- When run without arguments, the home directory of the current user is now
looked up from `passwd(5)` data rather than using the `HOME`
environment variable.
- The clause **last matching rule wins** was not honored at all times. This is
now fixed.
# 3.0.0-beta.4
- The `user` profile now also parses the file `~/.user.syd-3` if it exists.
Note, syd uses this profile when invoked without arguments. This provides an
easy way to spawn a working shell under sandbox.
- Fix UDP network sandboxing which was broken due to invalid error handling for
connection-mode sockets.
- Some glob patterns in sandbox profiles `paludis`, and `user` have been fixed.
# 3.0.0-beta.3
- Run tests as integration tests, drop the `test-bin` development dependency.
# 3.0.0-beta.2
- Added the new `user` sandbox profile which allows access to user-specific
directories such as `HOME`, and connections such as `X`, `screen`, `tmux` etc.
When invoked without arguments, `syd` now drops to a shell with this profile.
- Replace `regex` crate with the more lightweight and performant `regex-lite`
crate.
- Implement the `cmd/exec` sandbox command and the `syd exec` subcommand.
- Switch from `glob` crate to the `glob-match` crate for matching glob patterns.
- Fallback to `/proc/$pid/mem` if cross memory attach is not enabled in the
kernel. Use `SYD_PROC_MEM` environment variable or the sandbox command
`trace/memory_access:1` to force `/proc` fallback.
- `exec/kill_if_match` has been renamed to `exec/kill` which is a **breaking
change**.
- Set `panic = abort` in release builds for reduced binary size.
- Name the polling thread `syd-poll`.
- Better error handling, and cleaner code.
- Use `parking_lot` crate for `Mutex`, and `RwLock`.
- The default magic virtual device path has been updated from `/dev/syd` to
`/dev/syd` saving three letters on each typing!! This is a **breaking
change**.
- The `core/` prefix has been removed from the configuration items
`core/sandbox`, e.g use `sandbox/exec:on` rather than `core/sandbox/exec:on`.
`allowlist/successful_bind` has been renamed to `trace/allow_successful_bind`,
and `allowlist/unsupported_socket_families` has been renamed to
`trace/allow_unsupported_socket_families`. Moreover the config item
`core/trace/magic_lock` has been renamed to simply `lock`. This is a
**breaking change**.
- The prefixes `unix:`, `unix-abstract:`, `inet:`, `inet6:` are no longer used
in network addresses. Instead the pattern is treated as a UNIX shell style
pattern if it starts with `/`, and as an IP address otherwise. There is no
distinction between unix sockets and abstract unix sockets anymore. This is a
**breaking change**. Check the `data/` subdirectory for a `syd.bash` for
use with `Paludis`.
- Fix a bug with remote path canonicalization.
- Access violations are logged to syslog now. Use, e.g. `journalctl
SYSLOG_IDENTIFIER=syd` to view them.
# 3.0.0-alpha.2
- When run without arguments, `syd` now drops into user's current running
shell allowlisting the `HOME` directory.
- Document the CLI option `-p`, `--profile` and add `noipv4` and `noipv6`
profiles in addition the `paludis` profile. These profiles may be stacked by
specifying more than one `-p` arguments.
- Use a Seccomp `BPF` filter rather than a `Notify` filter for fakeroot mode.
- Improve logging to achieve consistency. We have a very simple Logger which logs
to standard error in format `JSON` lines. There are some common keys `id` is
always `syd`, `l` gives the `Log::Level` as an integer whereby the lower the
value of the integer the more severe is the log condition. `t` gives a UNIX
time stamp in seconds, and `ctx` has short context on the log entry. Errors are
represented with the `err` key, and system call names are given with the `sys`
key.
- The `--profile ` and `--config @` is now
supported. `Paludis` uses the former so it is important for compatibility.
The profile file is **no longer** installed under `${sharedir}/syd` where
`{sharedir}` is usually `/usr/share` and is kept as a static array in the
program itself. In the future when `syd-3` has an exheres we can improve on
this but for now this gets us going.
- The `setuid` system call is now allowed in the sandbox.
- Use `snmalloc` as the global allocator for improved performance.
# 3.0.0-alpha.1
- **New**: Added `core/allowlist/successful_bind`.
- Utilizes `getsockname` hook, `pidfd_getfd`, and `process_vm_writev` for complete emulation.
- Features a `TTL` of 3 mins for tracking addresses to manage zero port arguments in `bind()` system calls.
- **Improved**: Refined read, write, network/{bind,connect} sandboxing.
- Simpler implementation, yet compatible with `Paludis` via `esandbox`.
- No per-process sandboxing or process tree tracking; uses `/proc/$pid/cwd` when required.
- Single set of sandbox rules with configurations pushed upfront.
- **API Change**: Replaced `allow`, `deny` modes with simpler `on/off` toggle.
- `core/sandbox/network` can be set to `bind` or `connect` for selective sandboxing.
- Rule matching favors the latest rule for configuration stacking.
- Streamlined `core/trace/magic_lock:exec` due to lack of parent/child tracking.
- **New**: Introduced `seccomp` process supervision.
- Implemented primarily in `syd::hook` and `syd::remote`.
- Derived from the `greenhook` crate, but with a deny-by-default `seccomp` policy.
- Allowlisted system calls maintained in `syd::config` (currently immutable by users).
- Notable system calls like `ptrace`, `process_vm_writev`, and `io-uring` are disabled to counteract `TOCTOU` vulnerabilities.
syd-pandora-0.15.0/Cross.toml 0000664 0000000 0000000 00000003052 15055626765 0016025 0 ustar 00root root 0000000 0000000 # Cross.toml for syd
[target.mips64el-unknown-linux-gnuabi64]
dockerfile = "dev/Dockerfile.mips64el"
[target.mips64el-unknown-linux-gnuabi64.env]
passthrough = [
"LIBSECCOMP_LINK_TYPE=static",
"LIBSECCOMP_LIB_PATH=/usr/mips64el-linux-gnuabi64/lib",
"PKG_CONFIG_PATH=/usr/mips64el-linux-gnuabi64/lib/pkgconfig",
]
[target.mips64el-unknown-linux-muslabi64]
dockerfile = "dev/Dockerfile.mips64el.musl"
[target.mips64el-unknown-linux-muslabi64.env]
passthrough = [
"LIBSECCOMP_LINK_TYPE=static",
"LIBSECCOMP_LIB_PATH=/usr/local/mips64el-linux-muslsf/lib",
"PKG_CONFIG_PATH=/usr/local/mips64el-linux-muslsf/lib/pkgconfig",
"RUSTFLAGS=-Cpanic=abort -Ctarget-feature=+crt-static",
]
[target.mipsel-unknown-linux-gnu]
dockerfile = "dev/Dockerfile.mipsel"
[target.mipsel-unknown-linux-gnu.env]
passthrough = [
"LIBSECCOMP_LINK_TYPE=static",
"LIBSECCOMP_LIB_PATH=/usr/mipsel-linux-gnu/lib",
"PKG_CONFIG_PATH=/usr/mipsel-linux-gnu/lib/pkgconfig",
]
[target.m68k-unknown-linux-gnu]
image = "local/cross-m68k:trixie"
[target.m68k-unknown-linux-gnu.env]
passthrough = [
"LIBSECCOMP_LINK_TYPE=static",
"LIBSECCOMP_LIB_PATH=/usr/m68k-linux-gnu/lib",
"PKG_CONFIG_PATH=/usr/m68k-linux-gnu/lib/pkgconfig",
]
###
#[target.m68k-unknown-linux-gnu.env]
#passthrough = ["RUST_MIN_STACK=16777216",
# "CARGO_TARGET_M68K_UNKNOWN_LINUX_GNU_LINKER=m68k-linux-gnu-gcc",
# "CARGO_TARGET_M68K_UNKNOWN_LINUX_GNU_AR=m68k-linux-gnu-gcc-ar"]
#[target.mips64el-unknown-linux-muslabi64]
#dockerfile = "dev/Dockerfile.mips64el.musl"
syd-pandora-0.15.0/Makefile 0000664 0000000 0000000 00000031362 15055626765 0015504 0 ustar 00root root 0000000 0000000 # syd's Makefile
# Copyright (c) 2023, 2024, 2025 Ali Polatel
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0
# User variables
# Target, e.g: --target=aarch64-unknown-linux-musl
TARGET=
ARCH=$(shell uname -m)
LIBC=$(shell readlink /lib/ld* | grep -q musl && echo musl || echo gnu)
ALPINE_MMV=3.19
ALPINE_VER=$(ALPINE_MMV).1
# Use cargo-auditable for auditable binaries if available.
# Respect user's choice of CARGO=
CARGO ?= $(shell \
if which cargo-auditable >/dev/null 2>&1; then \
printf 'cargo auditable'; \
else \
printf 'cargo'; \
fi)
# Common tools
RM= rm
FIND= find
RSYNC = rsync
GIT = git
INSTALL= install
PREFIX= $(HOME)/.local
BINDIR= bin
MANDIR= share/man
DOCDIR= $(HOME)/src/sydbox.exherbo.org
VIMDIR= share/vim/vimfiles
SCDOC= scdoc
MANDOC= mandoc
PKG_CONFIG= pkg-config
# Emacs
EMACS?= emacs
EMACS_BATCH = $(EMACS) -Q --batch
# Environment variables necessary to link libseccomp statically.
export LIBSECCOMP_LINK_TYPE= static
export LIBSECCOMP_LIB_PATH= $(shell $(PKG_CONFIG) --variable=libdir libseccomp || echo /usr/lib)
export RUST_BACKTRACE=1
# Pick number of jobs based on CPU count
JOBS = $(shell nproc)
# Cargo features and flags
CARGOFLAGS= -j$(JOBS) --quiet
CARGOFEATS= uring
# CARGONODEF=YesPlease -> CARGOFLAGS+=--no-default-features
ifneq ($(CARGONODEF),)
CARGOFLAGS+= --no-default-features
endif
CARGOFEATS_DEBUG= $(CARGOFEATS)
PROGRAMS= \
syd \
syd-aes \
syd-asm \
syd-aux \
syd-bit \
syd-cap \
syd-cat \
syd-cpu \
syd-dns \
syd-elf \
syd-emacs \
syd-env \
syd-err \
syd-exec \
syd-fd \
syd-fork \
syd-hex \
syd-info \
syd-key \
syd-ldd \
syd-load \
syd-lock \
syd-ls \
syd-mdwe \
syd-net \
syd-mem \
syd-oci \
syd-open \
syd-path \
syd-pds \
syd-poc \
syd-pty \
syd-read \
syd-rnd \
syd-run \
syd-sh \
syd-sha \
syd-size \
syd-stat \
syd-sys \
syd-test \
syd-test-do \
syd-tck \
syd-tor \
syd-tty \
syd-x
# Manual pages
MANS1= \
man/syd.1 \
man/syd-aes.1 \
man/syd-asm.1 \
man/syd-aux.1 \
man/syd-bit.1 \
man/syd-cap.1 \
man/syd-cat.1 \
man/syd-cpu.1 \
man/syd-dns.1 \
man/syd-elf.1 \
man/syd-emacs.1 \
man/syd-env.1 \
man/syd-err.1 \
man/syd-exec.1 \
man/syd-fd.1 \
man/syd-fork.1 \
man/syd-hex.1 \
man/syd-info.1 \
man/syd-key.1 \
man/syd-ldd.1 \
man/syd-load.1 \
man/syd-lock.1 \
man/syd-ls.1 \
man/syd-mdwe.1 \
man/syd-net.1 \
man/syd-mem.1 \
man/syd-oci.1 \
man/syd-open.1 \
man/syd-path.1 \
man/syd-pds.1 \
man/syd-poc.1 \
man/syd-pty.1 \
man/syd-read.1 \
man/syd-rnd.1 \
man/syd-run.1 \
man/syd-sh.1 \
man/syd-sha.1 \
man/syd-size.1 \
man/syd-stat.1 \
man/syd-sys.1 \
man/syd-test.1 \
man/syd-tck.1 \
man/syd-tor.1 \
man/syd-tty.1 \
man/syd-x.1
MANS2= \
man/syd.2
MANS5= \
man/syd.5
MANS7= \
man/syd.7 \
man/sydtutorial.7
MANS= $(MANS1) $(MANS2) $(MANS5) $(MANS7)
HTMLS= $(patsubst man/%.1,target/man/%.1.html,$(MANS1)) \
$(patsubst man/%.2,target/man/%.2.html,$(MANS2)) \
$(patsubst man/%.5,target/man/%.5.html,$(MANS5)) \
$(patsubst man/%.7,target/man/%.7.html,$(MANS7))
# Vim syntax files
VIMS_FTD= \
vim/ftdetect/syd.vim
VIMS_SYN= \
vim/syntax/syd-3.vim
VIMS= $(VIMS_FTD) $(VIMS_SYN)
PUTFLAGS= -c $(HOME)/.s3cfg.site
PUTFLAGS_HTML= $(PUTFLAGS) \
--no-guess-mime-type \
--default-mime-type=text/html
all: release
man: $(MANS)
build:
@echo Using libseccomp library from $(LIBSECCOMP_LIB_PATH)
#FIXME: Fails to build with:
#error: could not compile `proc-macro2` (build script)
#$(CARGO) acl -n
$(CARGO) deny check
$(CARGO) clippy $(CARGOFLAGS)
$(CARGO) build --locked --features $(CARGOFEATS_DEBUG) $(CARGOFLAGS)
$(CARGO) test
build32:
env \
LIBSECCOMP_LINK_TYPE=static \
LIBSECCOMP_LIB_PATH=/usr/i686-linux-musl/lib \
LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/usr/i686-linux-musl/lib \
RUSTFLAGS="-Ctarget-feature=+crt-static" \
$(CARGO) build \
--target=i686-unknown-linux-musl \
--features $(CARGOFEATS) $(CARGOFLAGS)
clean:
$(CARGO) clean
install32: build32
$(INSTALL) -d $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/$(BINDIR)/
for program in $(PROGRAMS); do \
$(INSTALL) -pm 0755 target/i686-unknown-linux-musl/release/$$program $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/$(BINDIR)/$$program"32"; \
done
install: release
$(INSTALL) -d $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/$(BINDIR)/
for program in $(PROGRAMS); do \
$(INSTALL) -pm 0755 target/release/$$program $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/$(BINDIR)/; \
done
$(MAKE) install-man
$(MAKE) install-vim
cave:
if test -e /etc/exherbo-release; then \
$(INSTALL) -pm 0755 dev/cave-force.rb /usr/libexec/cave/commands/force; \
$(INSTALL) -pm 0755 dev/cave-hide.rb /usr/libexec/cave/commands/hide; \
fi
debug:
$(CARGO) build --locked --features $(CARGOFEATS_DEBUG) $(CARGOFLAGS)
$(INSTALL) -d $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/$(BINDIR)/
for program in $(PROGRAMS); do \
$(INSTALL) -pm 0755 target/debug/$$program $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/$(BINDIR)/; \
done
$(MAKE) install-man
$(MAKE) install-vim
install-man: $(MANS)
$(INSTALL) -d $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/$(MANDIR)/
$(INSTALL) -d $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/$(MANDIR)/man1/
$(INSTALL) -d $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/$(MANDIR)/man2/
$(INSTALL) -d $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/$(MANDIR)/man5/
$(INSTALL) -d $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/$(MANDIR)/man7/
for man in $(MANS1); do \
$(INSTALL) -pm 0644 $$man $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/$(MANDIR)/man1/; \
done
for man in $(MANS2); do \
$(INSTALL) -pm 0644 $$man $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/$(MANDIR)/man2/; \
done
for man in $(MANS5); do \
$(INSTALL) -pm 0644 $$man $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/$(MANDIR)/man5/; \
done
for man in $(MANS7); do \
$(INSTALL) -pm 0644 $$man $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/$(MANDIR)/man7/; \
done
install-vim: $(VIMS)
$(INSTALL) -d $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/$(VIMDIR)/ftdetect
for f in $(VIMS_FTD); do \
$(INSTALL) -pm 0644 $$f $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/$(VIMDIR)/ftdetect/; \
done
$(INSTALL) -d $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/$(VIMDIR)/syntax
for f in $(VIMS_SYN); do \
$(INSTALL) -pm 0644 $$f $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/$(VIMDIR)/syntax/; \
done
uninstall:
for program in $(PROGRAMS); do \
$(RM) -f $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/$(BINDIR)/$$program; \
done
for man in $(MANS1); do \
$(RM) -f $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/$(MANDIR)/man1/$$man; \
done
for man in $(MANS2); do \
$(RM) -f $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/$(MANDIR)/man2/$$man; \
done
for man in $(MANS5); do \
$(RM) -f $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/$(MANDIR)/man5/$$man; \
done
for man in $(MANS7); do \
$(RM) -f $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/$(MANDIR)/man7/$$man; \
done
for f in $(VIMS_FTD); do \
$(RM) -f $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/$(VIMDIR)/ftdetect/$$f; \
done
for f in $(VIMS_SYN); do \
$(RM) -f $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/$(VIMDIR)/syntax/$$f; \
done
release:
@echo Using libseccomp library from $(LIBSECCOMP_LIB_PATH)
$(CARGO) build --release --locked --features $(CARGOFEATS) $(CARGOFLAGS) $(TARGET)
nopie:
env RUSTFLAGS="$(RUSTFLAGS) -g -Ctarget-cpu=native -Clink-arg=-no-pie" $(MAKE) release
prof:
@echo Using libseccomp library from $(LIBSECCOMP_LIB_PATH)
env RUSTFLAGS='-g -Ctarget-cpu=native -Ctarget-feature=-crt-static' \
$(CARGO) build --release --locked --features prof $(TARGET)
$(INSTALL) -d $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/$(BINDIR)/
for program in $(PROGRAMS); do \
$(INSTALL) -pm 0755 target/release/$$program $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/$(BINDIR)/; \
done
audit:
$(CARGO) audit
bpfclean:
find bpf -name '*.bpf' -type f -delete
bpfgen:
/bin/sh -cex 'mkdir -m700 -p bpf; cd bpf; syd -mtrace/allow_unsafe_nocookie:1 -Ebpf'
bpf: bpfgen
@for bpf in ./bpf/*.bpf; do \
./dev/scmp-info.sh $$bpf | tee ./bpf/$$(basename $$bpf .bpf).txt; \
done
check:
$(CARGO) test $(CARGOFLAGS)
doccheck:
$(CARGO) test --doc $(CARGOFLAGS)
distcheck:
env CARGO="$(CARGO)" PATH="$(PWD)/target/release:$(PATH)" \
./dev/cargo-test.sh --release --features $(CARGOFEATS) $(CARGOFLAGS)
distdebug:
env CARGO="$(CARGO)" PATH="$(PWD)/target/debug:$(PATH)" \
./dev/cargo-test.sh --features $(CARGOFEATS) $(CARGOFLAGS)
doc:
$(CARGO) doc --open
eldoc: dev/lsp2html.def src/syd.el
lsp2html -d dev/lsp2html.def src/syd.el
sed -i \
-e 's|charset=ISO-8859-1|charset=UTF-8|' \
-e 's|